רוֹחְבּוֹ, מַהוּ? יְשִׁיבָתוֹ, מַהוּ? עוֹבְיוֹ, מַהוּ? הֶיקֵּיפוֹ, מַהוּ? תֵּיקוּ.

If one vowed that it is incumbent upon him to donate his width, what is the halakha? Likewise, if one vowed to donate his sitting, what is the halakha? If he referred to his thickness, what is the halakha? Finally, if he spoke of his girth, what is the halakha? The Gemara states that these dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

״מִשְׁקַל יָדִי עָלַי״ וכו׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״מִשְׁקַל יָדִי״ וּ״מִשְׁקַל רַגְלִי עָלַי״ – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מֵבִיא חָבִית וּמְמַלֵּא מַיִם וּמַכְנִיס בַּיָּד עַד הָאַצִּיל, וּבָרֶגֶל עַד הָאַרְכּוּבָה,

§ The mishna teaches that there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei concerning one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the weight of my forearm, as to how he ascertains the weight of his forearm. The Sages taught this dispute in greater detail in a baraita (Tosefta 3:2): With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the weight of my forearm, and with regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the weight of my leg, Rabbi Yehuda says: He brings a barrel and fills it with water, and he inserts his forearm up to the elbow or his leg up to the knee, into the water.

וְשׁוֹקֵל בְּשַׂר חֲמוֹר גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת וְנוֹתֵן לְתוֹכָהּ עַד שֶׁתִּתְמַלֵּא. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רְאָיָה לַדָּבָר – זֵכֶר לַדָּבָר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֲשֶׁר בְּשַׂר חֲמוֹרִים בְּשָׂרָם״.

And in order to measure the displacement, he weighs donkey flesh, sinews, and bones, and places it into the barrel until it fills, and the water reaches the same level as it was when his arm or leg was inserted. And even though there is no proof for the matter, that donkey flesh weighs the same as human flesh, nevertheless there is an allusion to the matter, as it is stated: “Whose flesh is as the flesh of donkeys” (Ezekiel 23:20).

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: הֵיאָךְ אֶפְשָׁר לְכַוֵּין בָּשָׂר כְּנֶגֶד בָּשָׂר, גִּידִים כְּנֶגֶד גִּידִים, עֲצָמוֹת כְּנֶגֶד עֲצָמוֹת? אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אוֹמְדִין. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: עַד שֶׁאוֹמְדִין, יָמוֹדוּ אֶת הַיָּד. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? כַּמָּה דְּאֶפְשָׁר עָבְדִינַן.

Rabbi Yosei said to Rabbi Yehuda: Displacement is according to volume, not according to weight, and how then is it possible to match the amount of the donkey flesh with the flesh in one’s forearm, the sinews with the sinews, and the bones with the bones? Rabbi Yehuda said to him: One estimates. Rabbi Yosei said to him: If one estimates, let one estimate the weight of the forearm directly. And how does Rabbi Yehuda respond to Rabbi Yosei? Rabbi Yehuda holds that we do whatever is possible in order to be more precise.

״בַּיָּד עַד הָאַצִּיל״. וּרְמִינְהוּ: קִידּוּשׁ יָדַיִם וְרַגְלַיִם בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ עַד הַפֶּרֶק!

The Tosefta teaches with regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the weight of my forearm [yad], that Rabbi Yehuda says: He brings a barrel and fills it with water and inserts his forearm up to the elbow. This indicates that the term yad denotes the forearm until the elbow. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita (Tosefta, Yadayim 2:1): Since it is written: “And Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands [yedeihem] and their feet” (Exodus 30:19), the priests are obligated to sanctify their hands and feet in the Temple up to the wrist.

דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא עַד הַפֶּרֶק, בִּנְדָרִים הַלֵּךְ אַחַר לְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם. וּדְאוֹרַיְיתָא עַד הַפֶּרֶק? וְהָא גַּבֵּי תְּפִילִּין דִּכְתִיב: ״יָדְךָ״, וְתָנָא דְּבֵי מְנַשֶּׁה: ״יָדְךָ״ – זוֹ קִיבּוֹרִית!

The Gemara answers: The term yad written in the Torah indicates up to the wrist, but with regard to vows one follows the ordinary language of people, in which the word yad is referring to the forearm until the elbow. Consequently, the vow is interpreted in this manner. The Gemara asks: And does the word yad that is written in the Torah mean up to the wrist? But with regard to phylacteries it is written: “And it shall be for a sign to you upon your hand [yadkha]” (Exodus 13:9), and the school of Menashe taught: Yadkha; this is referring to the bulge of the biceps [kibborit] on the upper arm.

דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא קִיבּוֹרִית כּוּלָּהּ, בִּנְדָרִים הַלֵּךְ אַחַר לְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם, וְקִידּוּשׁ יָדַיִם וְרַגְלַיִם בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ הִילְכְתָא גְּמִירִי לָהּ.

The Gemara answers: Generally, the term yad that is written in the Torah includes the entire biceps area of the upper arm. But with regard to vows one follows the ordinary language of people, in which the word yad means the forearm until the elbow; and with regard to sanctifying the hands and feet in the Temple the halakha is learned as a tradition that the word yad is referring only to the hand up to the wrist.

״בָּרֶגֶל עַד הָאַרְכּוּבָה״? וּרְמִינְהוּ: ״רְגָלִים״ – פְּרָט לְבַעֲלֵי קַבַּיִן!

It is further taught in the Tosefta cited above: His leg [regel] until the knee, which indicates that the term regel is defined as the foot until the knee. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: It is written in the Torah with regard to the obligation to ascend to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage Festivals: “Three times [regalim] you shall keep a feast for Me in the year” (Exodus 23:14). The term regalim, legs, serves to exclude people with artificial legs [ba’alei kabbayin] from this obligation. According to the baraita, one who has a stump in place of his foot is exempt from the pilgrimage. This indicates the term regel is referring to the foot, up to the ankle, not to the entire area below the knee.

בִּנְדָרִים הַלֵּךְ אַחַר לְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם. וּדְאוֹרַיְיתָא פְּרָט לְבַעֲלֵי קַבַּיִן?

The Gemara explains: The term regel that is written in the Torah is referring to the foot below the ankle, but with regard to vows, one follows the ordinary language of people, in which the word regel means the leg until the knee. The Gemara asks: And does regel written in the Torah mean the foot up to the ankle, and therefore it serves to exclude people with artificial legs?

וְהָא גַּבֵּי חֲלִיצָה דִּכְתִיב: ״רַגְלוֹ״, וְתָנָא: חָלְצָה מִן הָאַרְכּוּבָה וּלְמַטָּה – חֲלִיצָתָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה!

But with regard to the ritual by which the yavam frees the yevama of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza], it is written: “Then his brother’s wife shall approach…and loose his shoe from upon his foot [raglo]” (Deuteronomy 25:9), and the Sages taught in a mishna (Yevamot 101a): In the case of a yavam who was missing part of his leg, if the yevama performed the ḥalitza on any part of the leg from the knee and below her ḥalitza is valid. This indicates that the term regel in the Torah means the leg from the foot up to the knee.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״מֵעַל רַגְלוֹ״. אִי הָכִי, לְמַעְלָה מֵהָאַרְכּוּבָה נַמִי! ״מֵעַל״, וְלֹא מֵעַל דְּמֵעַל.

The Gemara answers: The term regel in the Torah actually is referring to the foot, below the ankle, and it is different there, with regard to ḥalitza, as the verse states: From upon his foot [raglo], instead of simply stating: From his foot. This indicates that the area that is upon, i.e., above, the foot is also valid for the performance of ḥalitza. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then if the yevama performed ḥalitza above the knee it should also be valid. The Gemara answers that it is written: From upon, to include only the section directly above the foot, i.e., until the knee, and the area above the knee is considered from upon that area that is from upon the foot.

אֲמַר רַב פַּפָּא, שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: הַאי אִיסְתַּוֵּירָא עַד אַרְעָא נָחֵית, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ מִיפְסַק פָּסֵיק, הֲוָה לֵיהּ אִיסְתַּוֵּירָא מֵעַל, וְשָׁקָא – מֵעַל דְּמֵעַל. רַב אַשִׁי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא מִיפְסַק פָּסֵיק, כָּל דְּבַהֲדֵי כַּרְעָא כְּכַרְעָא דָּמֵי.

Rav Pappa said: Conclude from this discussion that the ankle bone [istaveira] descends to the ground and is not separated from the foot. The reason is that if it enters your mind to say it is separated, then the ankle bone is the section of the leg referred to by the phrase: From upon his foot, and the lower leg, i.e., the section of the leg from the ankle up to the knee, is the section of the leg that is called: From upon that which is from upon the foot, and would therefore be invalid for the performance of ḥalitza. Rav Ashi says: Even if you say the ankle is separated from the foot it would still not be referred to as the section that is upon the foot, as anything that is adjacent to the foot is considered like the foot, i.e., it is part of the same section of the leg as the foot.

מתני׳ ״דְּמֵי יָדִי עָלַי״ – שָׁמִין אוֹתוֹ כַּמָה הוּא שָׁוֶה בְּיַד וּבְלֹא יַד; זֶה חוֹמֶר בַּנְּדָרִים מִבָּעֲרָכִין.

If one vows: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of my forearm, the court appraises him to determine how much he is worth with a forearm and how much he is worth without a forearm, and he pays the difference. This is a halakha that is more stringent with regard to vows of assessment than with regard to valuations, as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my forearm, is exempt from paying.

גמ׳ הֵיכִי שָׁיְימִינַן לֵיהּ? אֲמַר רָבָא: אוֹמְדִין אוֹתוֹ אוֹמֶד שֶׁל נְזָקִין.

How do we assess him? Rava said: The court assesses him by means of the same process of assessment used with regard to the halakhot of damages. If one’s hand was severed, the court considers the injured party as though he is a slave being sold in the slave market and appraises how much he was worth before the injury and how much he is worth after the injury. The difference between these two sums is the amount that the guilty party must pay for damages.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבַּיֵי: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם גַּבְרָא זִילָא הוּא, הָכָא גַּבְרָא שְׁבִיחַ הוּא!

Abaye said to Rava: Are these two assessments comparable? There, with regard to damages, the person has depreciated in value because his hand was severed, and therefore the decline in the assessment is greater for someone with a severed hand than for someone who merely lacks the utility of his hand. Here, with regard to one who vowed to donate the assessment of his forearm, the person himself has good value, as his hand is intact, and if the assessment used with regard to damages is applied to him he would be obligated to pay more than that which he vowed.

אֲמַר אַבַּיֵי: אוֹמְדִין כַּמָּה אָדָם רוֹצֶה לִיתֵּן בְּעֶבֶד הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בְּיָדוֹ אַחַת לַעוֹשֶׂה בִּשְׁתֵּי יָדָיו. יָדוֹ אַחַת מַאי נִיהוּ, וְאִידָךְ פְּסִיקָא? הַיְינוּ הָךְ! אֶלָּא יָדוֹ מוּכְתֶּבֶת לְרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן.

Rather, Abaye said: One assesses how much less a person is willing to pay for a slave who works with one hand than for a slave who works with two hands. The Gemara asks: What is the case of a slave who works with one hand? Isn’t this a situation where the other hand is severed? If so, then this assessment is identical to that which Rava proposed. Rather, one assesses how much more a person is willing to pay for a slave who belongs exclusively to him than for a case where it is written in his bill of sale that his first owner reserves ownership of one hand of the slave.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: אֲמָדוּהוּ אוֹמֶד שֶׁל נְזָקִין וְאָמַר ״דָּמַי עָלַי״, מַהוּ? מִי אָמַר: הָא אֲמָדוּהוּ חֲדָא זִימְנָא, אוֹ דִּילְמָא: שָׁאנֵי אוּמְדָּנָא דְּבֵי עֲשָׂרָה מֵאוּמְדָּנָא דְּבֵי תְּלָתָא?

§ The mishna in Sanhedrin 2a states that the valuation of a person for the purpose of a vow must be performed by nine judges and one priest. By contrast, the valuation of someone for the purpose of damages is performed by three judges. With this in mind Rava raises a dilemma: If one was damaged by another and the court assesses him by the assessment of damages, i.e., with three judges, and then he says: My assessment is incumbent upon me, what is the halakha? Does one say that as his assessment was already assessed one time for damages, this is the amount he must donate? Or perhaps an assessment performed by ten is different from an assessment performed by three, and therefore it is necessary to repeat the assessment with ten judges.

אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר: שָׁאנֵי אוּמְדָּנָא דְּבֵי עֲשָׂרָה מֵאוּמְדָּנָא דְּבֵי תְּלָתָא, אָמַר: ״דָּמַי עָלַי״ וַאֲמָדוּהוּ, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר: ״דָּמַי עָלַי״, מַהוּ? הָכָא וַדַּאי אֲמָדוּהוּ בֵּי עֲשָׂרָה, אוֹ דִּילְמָא שְׁבַח בֵּינֵי וּבֵינֵי?

If you say an assessment performed by ten is different from an assessment performed by three, then in a case where one says: My assessment is incumbent upon me, and the court assessed him, and then he again says: My assessment is incumbent upon me, what is the halakha? Does one say that here he was certainly assessed by ten and there is no need for another assessment, or perhaps there is a concern that in the interim there might have been an enhancement in his assessment?

אָמַר: ״דָּמַי עָלַי״ וְלֹא אֲמָדוּהוּ, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר: ״דָּמַי עָלַי״, מַהוּ? הָכָא וַדַּאי

Furthermore, if you say in that case there is a concern that in the interim his assessment might have increased and it is therefore necessary to assess him a second time, then with regard to one who says: My assessment is incumbent upon me, and the court did not yet assess him, and then before the court assesses him he again says: My assessment is incumbent upon me, what is the halakha? Do we say that here certainly