לְדַעַת – יָצָא, שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת – לֹא יָצָא;

if he does so with the consent of the one obligated to bring the offering he has fulfilled his obligation, but if he does so without the consent of the one obligated to bring the offering he has not fulfilled his obligation.

״עוֹלָתוֹ וּשְׁלָמָיו שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי עָלַי״, בֵּין לְדַעַת בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת – יָצָא!

With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring the burnt offering or the peace offering of so-and-so, whether he does so with the latter’s consent or without his consent, the one obligated to bring the offering has fulfilled his obligation. This apparently contradicts the statement of Shmuel, who said the bringing of a burnt offering requires the consent of the one obligated to bring the offering.

אָמַר לָךְ שְׁמוּאֵל: כִּי תַּנְיָא הַהִיא בִּשְׁעַת כַּפָּרָה, דְּאִירַצֵּי בִּשְׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה; כִּי קָאָמִינָא אֲנָא – בִּשְׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה.

Shmuel could have said to you: When that baraita is taught, and states that one fulfills his obligation for his burnt offering without his consent, it is referring to the time of atonement, i.e., the sacrifice. At that stage, his consent is not necessary, as he already consented at the time of separating the animal as an offering. When I said the consent of the one receiving atonement is required, I was speaking of the time of separating the animal as an offering.

וּפְלִיגָא דְּעוּלָּא, דְּאָמַר עוּלָּא: לֹא חִילְּקוּ בֵּין חַטָּאת לְעוֹלָה, אֶלָּא שֶׁחַטָּאת צְרִיכָה דַּעַת בִּשְׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה, וְעוֹלָה אֵין צְרִיכָה דַּעַת בִּשְׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה; אֲבָל בִּשְׁעַת כַּפָּרָה, אִידִי וְאִידִי לְדַעַת – יָצָא, שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת – לֹא יָצָא.

And Shmuel disagrees with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: The Sages distinguish between the consent required for a sin offering or a guilt offering and the consent required for a burnt offering or a peace offering only in that a sin offering and a guilt offering require the consent of the one obligated to bring the offering at the time the other person separates the animal for an offering on his behalf, and a burnt offering and a peace offering do not require his consent at the time of separating the animal. But with regard to both this pair of offerings and that pair of offerings at the time of atonement, the requisite consent is the same for all offerings: If the offering was sacrificed with his consent he has fulfilled his obligation; if it was not sacrificed with his consent he has not fulfilled his obligation.

מֵיתִיבֵי: ״חַטָּאתוֹ וַאֲשָׁמוֹ עוֹלָתוֹ וּשְׁלָמָיו שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי עָלַי״, לְדַעַת – יָצָא, שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת – לֹא יָצָא!

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinions of both Shmuel and Ulla from a baraita: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring the sin offering or the guilt offering or the burnt offering or the peace offering of so-and-so, if he does this with the consent of the one who is obligated to bring the offering, then that individual has fulfilled his obligation. If he does so without the consent of the one who is obligated to bring the offering, that person has not fulfilled his obligation. This baraita is difficult for the opinion of Shmuel, who holds that one who brings a burnt offering on behalf of another does not require consent at the time of atonement, and it is also difficult according to the opinion of Ulla, who maintains that one who brings a burnt offering on behalf of another does not need consent when the animal is set aside as an offering.

שְׁמוּאֵל מוֹקֵי לָהּ בִּשְׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה, עוּלָּא מוֹקֵי לָהּ בִּשְׁעַת כַּפָּרָה. אָמַר רַב פַּפָּא: מַתְנִיָּיתָא אַהֲדָדֵי לָא קַשְׁיָין, הָא בִּשְׁעַת כַּפָּרָה, הָא בִּשְׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה;

The Gemara answers: Shmuel establishes the baraita, which requires consent, as referring to the time of separating the animal, and Ulla establishes the baraita as dealing with the required consent at the time of atonement. Rav Pappa says, in summary: The baraitot are not difficult, as they do not contradict each other. This one is referring to consent at the time of atonement, and that one is referring to consent at the time of separating the animal.

וַאֲמוֹרָאֵי נַמִי לָא קַשְׁיָא, שְׁמוּאֵל מוֹקֵי קַמַּיְיתָא בִּשְׁעַת כַּפָּרָה, בַּתְרַיְיתָא בִּשְׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה, עוּלָּא מוֹקֵי אִיפְכָא; אֲמוֹרָאֵי וַדַּאי פְּלִיגִי. פְּשִׁיטָא!

And Rav Pappa adds that the baraitot also are not difficult for the opinions of the amora’im. Shmuel establishes the first baraita, which does not require consent for a burnt offering and a peace offering, as referring to the time of atonement, and the last baraita, which requires consent for those offerings, as speaking of the time of separating the animal. Ulla establishes the baraitot in the reverse manner: The first baraita, which does not require consent for a burnt offering and a peace offering, is dealing with the time of separating the animal, whereas the second baraita is referring to the time of atonement. But the amora’im themselves, Shmuel and Ulla, certainly disagree with each other. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this summary of the opinions of Shmuel and Ulla obvious?

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מַאי בִּשְׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה דְּקָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל – אַף בִּשְׁעַת הַפְרָשָׁה, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּהָךְ קַמַּיְיתָא תְּיוּבְתֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.

The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa’s summary is necessary, lest you say: What is the meaning of that which Shmuel says, that the consent of the one obligated to bring the offering is required at the time of separating the animal? Shmuel means that consent is required not only at the stage of atonement but even at the time of separating the animal. And even though according to this interpretation the first baraita, which says that consent is not required for a burnt offering and for a peace offering, would be a refutation of the opinion of Shmuel, that difficulty would not deter him from holding such an opinion. Therefore, Rav Pappa teaches us that the baraitot do not contradict the opinions of Shmuel and Ulla, which indicates that Shmuel holds that consent is required only when the animal is separated, but not at the time of atonement.

״וְכֵן בְּגִיטֵּי נָשִׁים כּוֹפִין״ וכו׳. אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הַאי מַאן דְּמָסַר מוֹדָעָא אַגִּיטָּא – מוֹדָעֵיהּ מוֹדָעָא. פְּשִׁיטָא!

§ The mishna teaches: And likewise, you say the same with regard to women’s bills of divorce. Although one can divorce his wife only of his own volition, in any case where the Sages obligated a husband to divorce his wife, the court coerces him until he says: I want to do so. Rav Sheshet says: Concerning one who delivered a declaration preemptively invalidating a bill of divorce by announcing before giving the bill of divorce that he is not doing so of his own free will, his declaration is a valid declaration that cancels the bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious?

לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּעֲשָׂאוּהּ וְאִירַצֵּי; מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא בַּטּוּלֵי בָּטְלֵיהּ – קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן,

The Gemara answers: No, the statement of Rav Sheshet is necessary in a case where they coerced him to give a bill of divorce and he declared that he was not giving it of his own free will, but later he agreed to give the bill of divorce of his own volition without explicitly retracting his original declaration that he was coerced. Lest you say: Merely by giving the bill of divorce he has canceled his earlier declaration that he was coerced, Rav Sheshet therefore teaches us that his original declaration that he was coerced is still in effect and the bill of divorce is canceled.

דְּאִם כֵּן לִיתְנֵי ״עַד שֶׁיִּתֵּן״, מַאי ״עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר״? עַד דִּמְבַטֵּל לֵיהּ לְמוֹדָעֵיהּ. הדרן עלך האומר משקלי

The Gemara explains how Rav Sheshet derives his conclusion from the mishna. The reason is that if it were so, i.e., if his original declaration is canceled even without an explicit retraction, let the mishna teach: The court coerces him until he gives the bill of divorce of his own volition. What is the significance of the clause: The court coerces him until he says: I want to do so? This indicates that the court coerces him until he explicitly cancels his original declaration.

מתני׳ שׁוּם הַיְּתוֹמִים שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, וְשׁוּם הַהֶקְדֵּשׁ שִׁשִּׁים יוֹם, וּמַכְרִיזִין בַּבֹּקֶר וּבָעֶרֶב.

One proclaims, i.e., publicly announces, the appraisal of the property inherited by minor orphans, which is being sold to repay their father’s debt, for thirty days, in order to receive the maximal price. And one proclaims the appraisal of consecrated property that is being sold by the Temple treasury for sixty days, and one proclaims it in the morning and in the evening.

גמ׳ מַאי שְׁנָא בַּבֹּקֶר וּבָעֶרֶב? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: בִּשְׁעַת הוֹצָאַת פּוֹעֲלִים וּבִשְׁעַת הַכְנָסַת פּוֹעֲלִים; בִּשְׁעַת הוֹצָאַת פּוֹעֲלִים – דְּאִיכָּא דְּנִיחָא לְמִיזְבַּן, אָמַר לְהוּ לְפוֹעֲלִים: אֵיזִילוּ סַיְּירוּ לָהּ נִיהֲלִי; בִּשְׁעַת הַכְנָסַת פּוֹעֲלִים – דְּנִידְכַּר, דְּאָמַר לְהוּ: נֵיזִיל נִישַׁיְילִינְהוּ.

The Gemara asks: What is different about those times that one proclaims the appraisal of the property specifically in the morning and in the evening? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: One proclaims during the time that workers leave to work in the fields and during the time that workers enter the city after completing their workday. Rav Yehuda elaborates: One proclaims during the time that workers leave to work in the fields, so that if there is a person who is amenable to purchasing the property, he may say to the workers: Go and examine the property for me. And one proclaims during the time that workers enter the city so that that individual will be reminded that he said to the workers that they should inspect the property, and he will go and ask them for their opinion of it.

תַּנְיָא נַמִי הָכִי: שׁוּם הַיְּתוֹמִים שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, וְשׁוּם הַהֶקְדֵּשׁ שִׁשִּׁים יוֹם. וּמַכְרִיזִין בַּבֹּקֶר וּבָעֶרֶב, בִּשְׁעַת הוֹצָאַת פּוֹעֲלִים וּבִשְׁעַת הַכְנָסַת פּוֹעֲלִים;

The Gemara notes: That explanation is also taught in a baraita: One proclaims the appraisal of the property inherited by minor orphans for thirty days, and one proclaims the appraisal of consecrated property for sixty days. And one proclaims it in the morning and in the evening, during the time that workers leave to work in the fields and during the time that workers enter the city after completing their workday.

אוֹמֵר: שָׂדֶה פְּלוֹנִי בְּסִימָנֶיהָ וּבִמְצָרֶיהָ כָּךְ הִיא יָפָה וְכָךְ הִיא שׁוּמָא, כָּל הָרוֹצֶה לִיקַּח יָבֹא וְיִקַּח עַל מְנָת לִיתֵּן לְאִשָּׁה בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ וּלְבַעַל חוֹב בְּחוֹבוֹ.

The baraita adds that the one who proclaims states: The field of so-and-so that is identifiable by its markers and by its borders, such is its quality, i.e., it produces such-and-such quantities of grain annually, and such is its appraisal; anyone who wishes to purchase the field let him come and purchase it. He adds that the field is being sold in order to give the proceeds to a wife as payment of her marriage contract, or in order to give a creditor payment of a deceased man’s debt.

לָמָּה לִי לְמֵימַר ״עַל מְנָת לִיתֵּן לְאִשָּׁה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וּלְבַעַל חוֹב חוֹבוֹ״? דְּאִיכָּא דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּבַעַל חוֹב דְּמֵיקֵל בְּזוּזֵי, וְאִיכָּא דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּאִשָּׁה דְּשָׁקְלָה עַל יָד עַל יָד.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need the one making the proclamation to say that the field is being sold in order to give the proceeds to a wife as payment of her marriage contract or in order to give a creditor payment of his debt? The Gemara responds: This declaration is necessary as there are individuals for whom it is preferable to do business with a creditor, as he is lenient with dinars and will accept even damaged coins, and there are others for whom it is preferable to deal with a wife, as she takes her money bit by bit, i.e., in incremental payments.