מְחַתֵּךְ בְּבָשָׂר הוּא! אֲמַר רַבָּה: לָא נִצְרְכָה, לְהָבִיא סַכִּין דֶּרֶךְ רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים.

It is merely cutting flesh, and there is no reason why it should be prohibited. Rabba said: No, the halakha concerning cutting open her abdomen is necessary only to teach that it is permitted to bring a knife by way of the public thoroughfare for that purpose, despite the fact that this constitutes a prohibited labor by Torah law.

וּמַאי קָמַשְׁמַע לָן, דְּמִסְּפֵיקָא מְחַלְּלִינַן שַׁבְּתָא? תָּנֵינָא: מִי שֶׁנָּפְלָה עָלָיו מַפּוֹלֶת, סָפֵק הוּא שָׁם סָפֵק אֵינוֹ שָׁם, סָפֵק חַי סָפֵק מֵת, סָפֵק נָכְרִי סָפֵק יִשְׂרָאֵל – מְפַקְּחִין עָלָיו אֶת הַגַּל!

The Gemara asks: And what does this teach us? Does it teach that even in a case of uncertainty we desecrate Shabbat for the chance of saving a life? But we already learned this in a mishna (Yoma 83a): With regard to one upon whom a rockslide fell, and there is uncertainty as to whether he is there under the debris or whether he is not there, and there is also uncertainty as to whether he is still alive or whether he is dead, and finally there is uncertainty as to whether the person under the debris is a gentile or a Jew, one clears the pile from atop him on Shabbat.

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָתָם הוּא דַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ חֲזָקָה דְּחִיּוּתָא, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּלָא הֲוָה לֵיהּ חֲזָקָה דְּחִיּוּתָא מֵעִיקָּרָא – אֵימָא לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.

The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach that one may bring a knife in the case of a woman, lest you say that it is specifically there that one may desecrate Shabbat, as the person who was buried under the rockslide had a presumptive status of being alive and therefore he is assumed to still be alive. But here, where the child had no prior presumptive status of being alive, as he was not yet born, you might say that one may not desecrate Shabbat in order to save his life. Therefore, it is necessary for Shmuel to teach us that even here one may desecrate Shabbat for the possibility of saving the fetus’s life.

״הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנֶּהֶרְגָה״ וכו׳. וְאַמַּאי? אִיסּוּרֵי הֲנָאָה נִינְהוּ! אֲמַר רַב: בְּאוֹמֶרֶת ״תְּנוּ שְׂעָרִי לְבִתִּי״. אִילּוּ אָמְרָה ״תְּנוּ יָדִי לְבִתִּי״ מִי יָהֲבִינַן לָהּ?!

§ The mishna taught: In the case of a woman who was killed through court-imposed capital punishment, one may derive benefit from her hair. The Gemara asks: But why is it permitted? After all, a corpse and its hair are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Rav said that this is referring to a case where she says before she dies: Give my hair to my daughter. The Gemara asks: Is the prohibition contingent on the deceased’s wishes? Were she to say: Give my hand to my daughter, would we give the hand to her?

אֲמַר רַב: בְּפֵאָה נָכְרִית. טַעְמָא דְּאָמְרָה ״תְּנוּ״, הָא לָא אָמְרָה ״תְּנוּ״ – גּוּפָהּ הוּא וּמִיתַּסַּר;

Rather, Rav said: This is not referring to the actual hair of the deceased, but to a wig [pe’a nokhrit], which is not part of the deceased’s body. The Gemara infers from Rav’s statement that the reason it is permitted is that she said to give her wig to her daughter, thereby indicating that she did not consider it part of her body. But if she did not say to give her wig to her daughter, it is considered part of her body, and it is forbidden to derive benefit from it.

וְהָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא, דְּבָעֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: שְׂעַר נָשִׁים צִדְקָנִיּוֹת מַהוּ?

The Gemara explains why this implication is problematic: But didn’t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raise this as a dilemma? As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina raised a dilemma: With regard to the hair of righteous women in a city whose residents were incited to idolatry and, therefore, all of their property must be burned, what is the halakha? Is it considered their property and burned, or part of their body and not burned?

וַאֲמַר רָבָא: בְּפֵאָה נָכְרִית (לָא) קָמִיבָּעֲיָא לֵיהּ! כִּי קָמִיבָּעֲיָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא – דְּתָלֵי בְּסִיכְתָא,

And Rava said: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, was not referring to actual hair, but rather he raised his dilemma with regard to a wig. This is difficult according to the opinion of Rav, as his ruling indicates that a wig should be considered part of a woman’s body unless she stipulated otherwise. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raised his dilemma as to whether a wig is considered part of the body, he was referring specifically to a case where the wig was hanging on a peg. The dilemma is whether it is considered part of her clothing, which, like her body, is not burned, or whether it is considered like any other property of hers, since she was not wearing it at the time.

הָכָא – דְּמִחַבַּר בָּהּ. טַעְמָא דְּאָמְרָה: ״תְּנוּ״, הָא לָא אָמְרָה: ״תְּנוּ״ – גּוּפָהּ הוּא וּמִיתַּסַּר;

On the other hand, here Rav is referring to a wig that is actually attached to her. In such a case, one may correctly infer that the reason that it is permitted is that the deceased said to give her wig to her daughter, thereby indicating that she did not consider it part of her body. But if she did not say to give her wig to her daughter, it is considered to be part of her body and is prohibited.

קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: וְהָא דּוּמְיָא דִּבְהֵמָה קָתָנֵי, מָה הָתָם גּוּפֵיהּ – אַף הָכָא נַמִי גּוּפֵיהּ!

This claim, that the mishna is dealing with a wig rather than natural hair, is difficult for Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak. He explains the difficulty: The mishna teaches the issue of the prohibition of the woman’s hair as being similar to the other prohibition it mentions, that of the animal. Just as there, in the case of the animal, it is referring to deriving benefit from its body, so too here, it must be referring to benefit from her body itself, not from a wig.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: זוֹ – מִיתָתָהּ אוֹסַרְתָּהּ, וְזוֹ – גְּמַר דִּינָהּ אוֹסַרְתָּהּ.

Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The mishna is referring to natural hair, and there is a distinction between the hair of an animal and that of a woman. In the case of this woman, it is her death that causes her to be forbidden. Therefore, the hair, which does not undergo any change when she dies, remains permitted. But in the case of that animal, the verdict causes it to be forbidden, even before it is killed. It is prohibited to derive benefit from the animal as soon as the verdict is issued. Therefore, the hair that is attached to the animal is forbidden as well.

תָּנֵי לֵוִי כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב, תָּנֵי לֵוִי כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק; תָּנֵי לֵוִי כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁיּוֹצְאָה לֵיהָרֵג וְאָמְרָה: ״תְּנוּ שְׂעָרִי לְבִתִּי״ – נוֹתְנִין, מֵתָה – אֵין נוֹתְנִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַמֵּת אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה;

Levi teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and Levi also teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak. The Gemara elaborates: Levi teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav: In the case of a woman who was being taken to be killed and who said: Give my hair to my daughter, one gives it to the daughter. If she died without instructing that it be given to her daughter, one does not give it to the daughter, because it is forbidden to derive benefit from a corpse.

פְּשִׁיטָא! אֶלָּא: שֶׁנּוֹיֵי הַמֵּת אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that this is the reason her hair is prohibited? The Gemara explains that this is referring not to the hair itself, but rather to a wig, and the baraita is teaching that it is forbidden to derive benefit even from the adornments of the deceased, such as a wig.

תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמֵּתָה – נֶהֱנִין בִּשְׂעָרָהּ, בְּהֵמָה שֶׁנֶּהֶרְגָה – אֲסוּרָה בַּהֲנָאָה; וּמָה הֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין זֶה לְזֶה? זוֹ – מִיתָתָהּ אוֹסַרְתָּהּ, וְזוֹ – גְּמַר דִּינָהּ אוֹסַרְתָּהּ. הדרן עלך הכל מעריכין

The Gemara further explains: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, as follows: Whereas in the case of a woman who died, one may derive benefit from her hair, with regard to an animal that was put to death, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it. And what is the difference between this case and that one? In this case it is her death that causes her to be forbidden, but in that case the verdict causes the animal to be forbidden.

מתני׳ אֵין נֶעֱרָכִין פָּחוּת מִסֶּלַע, וְלֹא יָתֵר עַל חֲמִשִּׁים סֶלַע. כֵּיצַד? נָתַן סֶלַע וְהֶעֱשִׁיר – אֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן כְּלוּם, פָּחוֹת מִסֶּלַע וְהֶעֱשִׁיר – נוֹתֵן חֲמִשִּׁים סֶלַע.

One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela, nor can one be charged more than fifty sela. How so? If one gave one sela and became wealthy, he is not required to give anything more, as he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave less than a sela and became wealthy, he is required to give fifty sela, as he has not fulfilled his obligation.

הָיוּ בְּיָדָיו חָמֵשׁ סְלָעִים – רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן אֶלָּא אַחַת, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נוֹתֵן אֶת כּוּלָּן. אֵין נֶעֱרָכִין פָּחוֹת מִסֶּלַע, וְלֹא יָתֵר עַל חֲמִשִּׁים סֶלַע.

If there were five sela in the possession of the destitute person, and the valuation he undertook is more than five sela, how much should he pay? Rabbi Meir says: He gives only one sela and thereby fulfills his obligation. And the Rabbis say: He gives all five. One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela; nor can one be charged more than fifty sela.

גמ׳ אֵין נֶעֱרָכִין פָּחוֹת מִסֶּלַע, מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכָל עֶרְכְּךָ יִהְיֶה בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ״ – כָּל עֲרָכִין שֶׁאַתָּה מַעֲרִיךְ לֹא יְהוּ פְּחוּתִין מִשֶּׁקֶל.

The mishna teaches: One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this principle? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And all your valuations shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 27:25). This verse indicates that all valuations that you valuate shall not be less than a shekel, which is the equivalent of a sela. One does not fulfill his obligation by giving less than this amount.

וְלֹא יָתֵר עַל חֲמִשִּׁים סְלָעִים – דִּכְתִיב: ״חֲמִשִּׁים״.

The mishna further teaches: Nor can one be charged more than fifty sela. This is the highest valuation specified in the Torah, as it is written: “Then your valuation shall be for the male from twenty years old unto sixty years old, your valuation shall be fifty shekels of silver” (Leviticus 27:3).

״הָיוּ בְּיָדָיו חֲמִשָּׁה״ כו׳. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? כְּתִיב ״חֲמִשִּׁים״ וּכְתִיב ״שֶׁקֶל״, אוֹ חֲמִשִּׁים אוֹ שֶׁקֶל.

§ The mishna teaches that if there were five sela in the possession of the destitute person, Rabbi Meir says: He gives only one sela and thereby fulfills his obligation, and the Rabbis say: He gives all five. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir? The Gemara answers: It is written with regard to a male between the ages of twenty and sixty: “Your valuation shall be fifty shekels of silver” (Leviticus 27:3), and the verses likewise specify the valuations for other individuals. And it is also written: “Your valuations shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 27:25). This teaches that the valuation is either fifty shekels for one who vows to donate the valuation of a man between twenty and sixty, or one shekel, if he cannot afford to pay fifty.

וְרַבָּנַן? הַהוּא, לְכָל עֲרָכִין שֶׁאַתָּה מַעֲרִיךְ לֹא יְהוּ פְּחוּתִים מִשֶּׁקֶל הוּא דְּאָתָא, הֵיכָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ – אָמַר קְרָא: ״אֲשֶׁר תַּשִּׂיג יַד הַנּוֹדֵר״, וַהֲרֵי יָדוֹ מַשֶּׂגֶת.

And how do the Rabbis respond to this reasoning? According to the Rabbis, that second verse comes to teach that all valuations that you valuate shall not be less than a shekel, but in a case where the individual has more than a shekel, the verse states: “According to the means of him that vowed shall the priest value him” (Leviticus 27:8), and as he has the means to pay more than a shekel, he is required to pay the maximum that he can afford.

וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר? הַהוּא, יַד הַנּוֹדֵר וְלֹא יַד הַנִּידָּר הוּא דְּאָתָא. וְרַבָּנַן? לָאו מִמֵּילָא שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינָּהּ, דְּהֵיכָא דְּיָדוֹ מַשֶּׂגֶת שְׁקוֹל מִינֵּיהּ?

And how does Rabbi Meir respond to this reasoning? According to Rabbi Meir, that verse comes to teach that the charge is calculated according to the means of one who took the vow and not according to the means of the one about whom the vow was made. Consequently, if a poor man vowed to donate the valuation of a rich man, the amount to be paid is calculated according to what the poor man, not the rich man, can afford. And how do the Rabbis respond to this reasoning? They would say: Doesn’t it emerge by itself that you also learn from this verse that in a case where he has the means to pay more than a shekel, you should take from him the maximum that he can afford?

אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: הָיוּ בְּיָדָיו חָמֵשׁ סְלָעִים וְאָמַר ״עֶרְכִּי עָלַי״, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר ״עֶרְכִּי עָלַי״, וְנָתַן אַרְבַּע לַשְּׁנִיָּה וְאֶחָד לָרִאשׁוֹנָה – יָצָא יְדֵי שְׁתֵּיהֶן.

§ The Gemara cites a ruling based upon the opinion of the Rabbis. Rav Adda bar Ahava says: If one had five sela in his possession and said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and he then said again: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and he gave four sela for the second vow and one sela for the first vow, he has fulfilled his obligation to pay for both of the vows. Consequently, even if he becomes wealthy, he is not required to make any further payments.

מַאי טַעְמָא? בַּעַל חוֹב מְאוּחָר שֶׁקָּדַם וְגָבָה – מַה שֶּׁגָּבָה גָּבָה;

What is the reason for this? There is a principle that with regard to a creditor holding a promissory note dated later than the notes of other creditors, who collected his debt before the other creditors collected theirs, whatever he has collected he has collected, and it is not expropriated from him even if the debtor does not have the means to pay back all his creditors.

בְּעִידָּנָא דְּיָהֵיב לַשְּׁנִיָּה – מְשַׁעְבַּד לָרִאשׁוֹנָה, בְּעִידָּנָא דְּיָהֵיב לָרִאשׁוֹנָה – תּוּ לֵית לֵיהּ.

In this case, since at the time that he gave the four sela for the second vow, his possessions were liened for the payment of his first vow, it is as though he had no possessions at all with which to pay the second vow, and he therefore fulfilled the second vow even though he paid less than the full amount of money in his possession. Then, at the time he gave one sela for payment of the first vow, he in fact had no more than one sela, as he had given the other four sela in payment of the second vow, and therefore he fulfills his obligation by paying one sela.