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Bava Batra

Daf 102a

רַב שֵׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי אֲמַר: לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – בְּנִיפְלֵי.

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: Actually, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and here we are dealing with a case where the corpses found were of non-viable newborns buried in a smaller chamber only six cubits long. Adding a courtyard of six cubits and another regular-sized chamber of eight cubits yields a total length of the catacomb of twenty cubits.

TOSAFOT

הכא במאי עסקינן בניפלי אין לפרש דלא חששו לבדוק במערה שניה אלא עד כ' דלא החמירו כולי האי לבדוק רק למערת הנפלים מדפריך בתר הכי מדהך בניפלי הנך נמי בניפלי משמע דאותו שמצא מוקמי בניפלי וקשה דהא קתני מארבע אמות ועד ח' ומערת נפלים אינה אלא ו' וצ"ל דאף על גב דרישא איירי בגדולים מכל מקום הא דקתני ובודק ממנו ולהלן כ' איירי בניפלי ולא קאי ארישא:

וּמִדְּהָא בְּנִיפְלֵי הָא נַמִי בְּנִיפְלֵי, תְּמָנֵי סְרֵי הָוְיָין! חֲדָא בְּנִיפְלֵי אָמְרִינַן, תַּרְתֵּי בְּנִיפְלֵי לָא אָמְרִינַן.

The Gemara asks: But since this is dealing with a chamber that was created for burying non-viable newborns, there too, with regard to that chamber, on the other side of the courtyard, we are dealing with a chamber created for non-viable newborns as well. Therefore, the total length of the catacomb would be eighteen cubits. The Gemara answers: We say that perhaps one of the chambers is for non-viable newborns, but we do not say that two chambers might have been constructed for non-viable newborns.

וְרָמֵי דְּרַבָּנַן אַדְּרַבָּנַן, וְרָמֵי דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אַדְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן,

§ Above, the Gemara cited a baraita that relates a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis with regard to three corpses buried close together. The Rabbis hold that this is not considered a graveyard, whereas Rabbi Shimon maintains that it can be. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another ruling of the Rabbis against this ruling of the Rabbis, and it also raises a contradiction from another ruling of Rabbi Shimon against this ruling of Rabbi Shimon.

דְּתַנְיָא: כֶּרֶם הַנָּטוּעַ עַל פָּחוֹת מֵאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ כֶּרֶם. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הֲרֵי זֶה כֶּרֶם, וְרוֹאִין אֶת הָאֶמְצָעִים כְּאִילּוּ אֵינָן;

As it is taught in a mishna ( Kilayim 5:2): With regard to a vineyard that is planted on an area where there is less than four cubits of open space between the vines, Rabbi Shimon says: It is not considered to be a vineyard with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds and other halakhot , as it is overcrowded. And the Rabbis say: This is considered to be a vineyard, and the reason for this is that the middle vines are viewed as if they are not there, and the outer vines meet the requirements for a vineyard. Therefore, it is prohibited to plant other crops anywhere in that area.

קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבָּנַן אַדְּרַבָּנַן, וְקַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אַדְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן!

The ruling of the Rabbis in this mishna is difficult, as it is contradicted by the ruling of the Rabbis in the baraita , as there the Rabbis did not say: The middle ones are viewed as if they are not there. And the ruling of Rabbi Shimon in this mishna is difficult, as it is contradicted by the ruling of Rabbi Shimon in the baraita , as there he did say: The corpses in the middle are viewed as if they are not there.

דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אַדְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָתָם לָא נָטְעִי אֱינָשֵׁי אַדַּעְתָּא לִיעֲקַר, הָכָא זִימְנִין דְּמִיתְרְמָא לֵיהּ בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת וּמִיקְרִי וּמַנְחִי לֵיהּ.

The Gemara answers: The fact that one ruling of Rabbi Shimon is contradicted by the other ruling of Rabbi Shimon is not difficult. There, with regard to vineyards, Rabbi Shimon holds that middle vines cannot be disregarded, as people do not plant vines with the intention of uprooting them. But here, with regard to burial, sometimes it happens that one has to bury a corpse at twilight just before the onset of Shabbat, and indiscriminately inters the body between other corpses with the intention of reburying it at a later date.

דְּרַבָּנַן אַדְּרַבָּנַן נַמִי לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָכָא כֵּיוָן דְּמִינְוַל לָא מִקְרֵי קֶבֶר, הָתָם מֵימַר אָמַר: הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ דְּשַׁפִּיר – שַׁפִּיר, וּדְלָא שַׁפִּיר – לֶיהֱוֵי לְצִיבֵי. הדרן עלך המוכר פירות

Similarly, the fact that one ruling of the Rabbis is contradicted by the other ruling of the Rabbis is not difficult. Here, with regard to burial, since it is a disgrace to bury bodies so close together, it is not called an area of graves. But there, with regard to vineyards, the owner of the vineyard says to himself: Whichever of the vines will flourish, will flourish and I will leave them, and whichever ones do not flourish, I will uproot them and they will be for firewood.

SUMMARY

Since this tractate deals primarily with monetary law and monetary relationships, the principles governing these issues differ in their very essence from those governing ritual matters, or the halakhot and judgments of the Torah in general. One of the central components is the enormous authority granted to courts to ordain laws and enactments. By power of the principle that property declared ownerless by a court is ownerless, a court is authorized to declare one’s property ownerless or grant it to another person. Therefore, whatever is done by power of the court, and in great measure also that which is done by the community’s leaders, has the force of halakha, even when not explicitly stated in the Torah. Another difference between Jewish monetary law and Jewish ritual law follows from the fact that one may give away his money or waive rights granted to him by halakha. For this reason, many of the laws and enactments in this tractate are directives for deciding the halakha when no agreement has been reached between the parties. But when the parties are prepared to reach an agreement, they can decide monetary matters between them as they see fit. Tractate Bava Batra addresses four principal issues: Relations between neighbors, the halakhot of presumption of ownership and deeds, the halakhot of sales, and the halakhot of inheritance. Most of these halakhot are based on ḥazaka, a concept that has multiple meanings, some of which are clarified in this tractate in a comprehensive and profound manner. In its most general sense, a ḥazaka is a presumption with regard to the nature of reality, and in the special context of this tractate it is a presumption with regard to the nature and behavior of human beings, i.e., how an ordinary person behaves in a particular situation, and how an ordinary person understands and formulates agreements. With regard to the details, there is, of course, room for disagreement: Does one suffer when another can see into his property, and to what extent does he suffer? Is a foul odor or excessive noise beyond what an ordinary person is prepared to accept? At what point does one protest when an unauthorized person uses his property? How long does the average person hold on to written records? Similar questions arise with regard to the halakhot of sales. When one buys or sells property, whether by way of a written or an oral agreement, how are his intentions to be understood? Of course, a precise and detailed contract prevents misunderstandings and disagreements. But in the absence of a clear contract, such matters must at times be decided by a court. This tractate provides the definition of certain items, e.g., house, vineyard, boat, and the like. What does each of these terms include, and what is not included? If one buys an item that turns out to be defective or deficient, can he cancel the transaction or demand compensation? When is it said that a defect is insignificant and no reasonable person would raise objections about it? Another fundamental issue in commercial transactions relates to gemirut da’at, final intention or making up of the mind of the parties to a transaction. Here too, the matter is decided in accordance with normal human behavior: When is an action performed under compulsion considered void, and when does it have legal force? Since the halakhot in these areas are not established according to objective criteria dictated by Torah law, they enjoy considerable flexibility. Much depends on regional custom and the manner in which the people of a particular place conduct their affairs. The principle that everything is in accordance with the regional custom is important with regard to these halakhot, because general agreement can establish the halakha in a particular place, whether it was reached through a formal decision of the local residents or expresses the general consensus without any explicit decision ever having been reached. Similarly, many of the matters discussed in this tractate are decided in practice in accordance with the discretion of the judges, who must take into account the circumstances of the time and place, and the particular parties. The halakhot of inheritance differ slightly from the rest of the topics discussed in the tractate, because they are based on what is written in the Torah, and for this reason they do not depend solely on the intentions of the deceased and the heir. While the halakhot of inheritance are by Torah law and are not subject to change, they can be circumvented in various ways, e.g., through a deed of gift or through a deathbed declaration. The requirement that the marriage contract to a widow or a divorcée be paid, and the complex conditions attached to it with regard to providing for the needs of the widow and those of the sons and daughters of the deceased, create an additional factor that must be addressed. Some of the discussions in the tractate come to resolve the problems, and occasionally the contradictions, stemming from this additional consideration. The printed editions of tractate Bava Batra are longer than any other tractate in the Babylonian Talmud because most of the commentary to the tractate was written not by Rashi, whose writing is a shining example of brevity, but by his grandson and disciple Rabbeinu Shmuel ben Meir, the Rashbam,1 whose detailed and expansive style lies somewhere between that of Rashi and that of Tosafot. Tractate Bava Batra is composed of ten chapters, the last five of which are printed in the present volume. While issues occasionally spill over from one chapter to another, in general each chapter deals with a particular and well-defined set of problems. Chapter Six discusses two issues: The halakhot governing the sale of defective goods and the details of agreements and rights with regard to the sale of real estate. Chapter Seven explores the sale of fields and the fixed definitions of the conditions of their sale. Chapter Eight clarifies the halakhot of inheritance and wills. Chapter Nine discusses the division of property and obligations between the various heirs, as well as the halakhot governing deathbed declarations. Chapter Ten describes the halakhot of promissory notes: The manner in which they are written, the liens they create, and the ways in which they are repaid. Tractate Bava Batra deals primarily with halakha and includes many detailed halakhic clarifications and records of judicial actions. However, it also contains sections of aggada that are connected to issues mentioned in the tractate. They are found primarily in the first and the fifth chapters.

INTRO

This chapter, like the one preceding it, deals with the sale of various types of real estate. It opens with a discussion of imperfections in the property being sold. It is necessary to clarify which imperfections the buyer is prepared to accept because they are part and parcel of the nature of real estate, and which defects he is unwilling to accept because they are more severe. It is natural that not all fields are completely level; rather, they are liable to contain inclines, slopes, rocks, and crevices. Due to this reality, it is necessary to define when such imperfections in a field are considered part of the nature of landed property and when they are considered a loss to the buyer to the extent that he is entitled to a refund of part of the purchase price paid for the field or to compensation in the form of additional land. Similarly, at times one purchases a plot of land of a particular size, and it turns out that the actual measurements are not exactly the same as those stipulated in the agreement. In such a case the precise conditions of the sale must be examined, to clarify whether the seller committed himself to selling a field of a precise size or whether he intended to sell a field of approximately that size. Even when the parties agree in advance that the measurements need not be precise, there is still a standard for deviation from the stipulated measurements, and when that standard is exceeded, the party who stands to suffer a loss must be compensated. With regard to the compensation, the Gemara discusses whether the difference must be returned in money or in land. Other questions that are raised relate to one who sells half of his field to another person without specifying the borders of the plot being sold. What should be done when the field consists of choice and defective sections? How are the seller and the buyer to divide the field between them? Other related issues are dealt with, such as what to do when a deed of sale contains contradictory conditions. Cases pertaining to the division of inherited or joint property are also considered: What should be done if after the property was divided it becomes clear that there was an essential flaw in the division? Must the property be redivided or does one of the recipients forfeit his rights?

מתני׳ הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״בֵּית כּוֹר עָפָר אֲנִי מוֹכֵר לְךָ״, הָיוּ שָׁם נְקָעִים עֲמוּקִּים עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, אוֹ סְלָעִים גְּבוֹהִין עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים – אֵינָן נִמְדָּדִין עִמָּהּ, פָּחוֹת מִכָּאן – נִמְדָּדִין עִמָּהּ. וְאִם אָמַר לוֹ ״כְּבֵית כּוֹר עָפָר״, אֲפִילּוּ הָיוּ שָׁם נְקָעִים עֲמוּקִּים יוֹתֵר מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, אוֹ סְלָעִים גְּבוֹהִין יוֹתֵר מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נִמְדָּדִין עִמָּהּ.

If one says to another: I am selling you a plot of earth of the size required for sowing one kor of seed [ beit kor ], and there on that plot there were crevices [ neka’im ] ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not measured together with the rest of the field. Rather, the buyer must be provided with land measuring a beit kor exclusive of those crevices or rocks. If the crevices or rocks measured less than ten handbreadths, they are measured together with the rest of the field. But if the seller said to the buyer: I am selling you a plot of earth that is about the size of a beit kor , then even if there on that plot there were crevices deeper than ten handbreadths or rocks higher than ten handbreadths, they are measured together with the rest of the field.

גמ׳ תְּנַן הָתָם: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ שָׂדֵהוּ בִּשְׁעַת הַיּוֹבֵל – נוֹתֵן לוֹ לְבֵית זֶרַע חוֹמֶר שְׂעוֹרִים חֲמִשִּׁים שֶׁקֶל כֶּסֶף; הָיוּ שָׁם נְקָעִים עֲמוּקִּים עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, אוֹ סְלָעִים גְּבוֹהִין עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים,

We learned in a mishna elsewhere ( Arakhin 25a): With regard to one who consecrates his ancestral field during the time that the halakhot of the Jubilee Year he must give the Temple treasurer fifty silver shekels for every place that is fit for sowing a ḥomer of barley seed, which is the biblical equivalent of a kor , for all the years of the Jubilee cycle, as this is the sum fixed by the Torah for this purpose (see Leviticus 27:16). But if there were crevices ten handbreadths deep there, in the field, or rocks ten handbreadths high,

TOSAFOT

מתני' בית כור עפר נראה דנקט עפר לרבותא דאפי' הכי פחות מי' טפחים נמדדין עמה ולא כמו שפירש הקונטרס דאי לא אמר ליה עפר אלא בית כור סתם אפי' כולן סלעים הגיעו: