אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָוְיָא עֶשְׂרִין גְּרִיוֵי. מְשַׁחֵיהּ וְלָא הֲוַאי אֶלָּא חֲמִיסְרָא; אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּאַבַּיֵי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סָבְרַתְּ וְקַבִּילַתְּ.

who, after specifying its demarcations and boundaries, said to him: It is an area of twenty griv, meaning that it is fit for planting twenty se’a of grain. Rav Pappa later measured the field and found that it was fit for planting only fifteen se’a. Rav Pappa came before Abaye to sue the seller. Abaye said to him: You knew what you were buying and accepted the field as is.

וְהָתְנַן: פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁתוּת – הִגִּיעוֹ, עַד שְׁתוּת – יְנַכֶּה! הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּלָא קִים לֵיהּ בְּגַוָּהּ, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּקִים לֵיהּ בְּגַוָּהּ – סָבַר וְקַבֵּיל.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to Abaye’s ruling from the mishna. But didn’t we learn in the mishna that when the seller specifies the field’s demarcations and borders, if the difference between the stated size of the field and its actual size is less than one-sixth, the field is the buyer’s, and the sale is valid as is, but if the difference is greater, until it is calculated at one-sixth, the seller must deduct the difference from the purchase price? And here, in this case, the difference between what the seller promised and the actual size of the field is greater than one-sixth. Abaye replied: That statement applies in a case where the buyer is unfamiliar with the plot being sold to him, but in a case where he is familiar with it, he knew what he was buying and accepted it as is.

וְהָא עֶשְׂרִין אֲמַר לִי! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דַּעֲדִיפָא כְּעֶשְׂרִין.

Rav Pappa raised another objection to Abaye’s ruling: But the seller said to me that the field is fit for planting twenty se’a, and it is not. Abaye said to him: What he meant was that the field is as good and as fruitful as one that is fit for planting twenty se’a.

תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: הָאַחִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ, כֵּיוָן שֶׁעָלָה גּוֹרָל לְאֶחָד מֵהֶן – קָנוּ כּוּלָּם. מַאי טַעֲמָא? אֲמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כִּתְחִלַּת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, מַה תְּחִלָּה בְּגוֹרָל, אַף כָּאן בְּגוֹרָל.

§ It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: When brothers divide their father’s estate once the lot for one of them is drawn, they all acquire the remainder of the property, and they can no longer retract their decision to divide the estate in this manner. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Drawing lots is not one of the recognized modes of acquisition. Rabbi Elazar said: The halakha that applies here is similar to the initial division of Eretz Yisrael among the tribes. Just as the initial division of Eretz Yisrael was carried out by drawing lots, so too here, the brothers can divide their father’s estate by drawing lots.

אִי מַה לְּהַלָּן בְּקַלְפִּי וְאוּרִים וְתוּמִּים, אַף כָּאן בְּקַלְפִּי וְאוּרִים וְתוּמִּים! אֲמַר רַב אַשִׁי: בְּהַהוּא הֲנָאָה דְּקָא צָיְיתִי לַהֲדָדֵי, גָּמְרִי וּמַקְנוּ לַהֲדָדֵי.

The Gemara challenges: If the brothers’ division of their father’s estate is comparable to the initial division of Eretz Yisrael, an additional comparison should apply: Just as there, the initial division of Eretz Israel was carried out through a receptacle [bekalpi] in which lots were placed and the Urim VeTummim, so too here, the division of the father’s estate should be executed only through a receptacle and the Urim VeTummim. Rav Ashi said: With the satisfaction that each of the brothers receives from the fact that they listen to each other and agree to accept the results of the lottery, they fully transfer ownership to each other. Therefore, the division becomes final as soon as the first lot is drawn.

אִיתְּמַר: שְׁנֵי אַחִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ, וּבָא לָהֶן אָח מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם – רַב אָמַר: בָּטְלָה מַחֲלוֹקֶת, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: מְקַמְּצִין.

§ It was stated that the amora’im disagreed about a related issue: If two brothers divided their father’s estate between them, and then later a third brother, of whose existence they had previously been unaware, arrived from a country overseas, Rav says: The original division of the property is void, and the brothers must now redivide the property among the three of them. And Shmuel says: The original division is still valid, but the two brothers must each take off a share from their portion and give it to the third brother.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: לְרַב דְּאָמַר בָּטְלָה מַחֲלוֹקֶת, אַלְמָא הָדַר דִּינָא; אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הָנֵי בֵּי תְלָתָא דְּקַיְּימִי, וַאֲזוּל בֵּי תְרֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ וּפְלוּג, הָכִי נַמִי דְּבָטְלָה מַחֲלוֹקֶת?

The Gemara clarifies the opinions of Rav and Shmuel: Rava said to Rav Naḥman: According to Rav, who says that the division is void, apparently the halakha is that if a division of property was found to have been performed in error, the original verdict is reconsidered and the entire division is void. Accordingly, in the case of the brother who arrived from overseas, the original division of the father’s estate is void. But if that is so, then in the case of these three people who stand as partners, and two of them go and divide the property into three parts without consulting with the third partner, so too, the division should be void, and it should be necessary to divide the property a second time between the three partners. But elsewhere (Bava Metzia 31b), the Gemara indicates that in such a case, if the division of property took place in the presence of a court, it is valid.

הָכִי הָשְׁתָּא? ! הָתָם נְחִיתִי אַדַּעְתָּא דְּבֵי תְלָתָא מֵעִיקָּרָא, הָכָא לָא נְחִיתִי אַדַּעְתָּא דְּבֵי תְלָתָא מֵעִיקָּרָא.

Rav Naḥman rejects this comparison: How can these cases be compared? There is a clear difference between them: There, in the case of the three partners, they entered the process of dividing the property from the outset with the knowledge that they were three, and it was necessary only to clarify the portion to be received by each partner. Here, in the case of the brother who arrived from overseas, they did not enter the process of dividing the property from the outset with the knowledge that they were three, as at the time of the original division, they thought that there were only two brothers.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פַּפָּא לְאַבַּיֵי: לִשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר מְקַמְּצִין, לְמֵימְרָא דְּקָם דִּינָא? וְהָא רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: ״כּוֹר בִּשְׁלֹשִׁים אֲנִי מוֹכֵר לְךָ״ – יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ אֲפִילּוּ בַּסְּאָה הָאַחֲרוֹנָה, ״כּוֹר בִּשְׁלֹשִׁים, סְאָה בְּסֶלַע אֲנִי מוֹכֵר לְךָ״ – רִאשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן קָנָה!

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: According to Shmuel, who says that the two brothers must each take off a share from their portion and give it to the third brother, is this to say that he is of the opinion that even if a division of property was found to have been made in error, the original verdict stands and the division is valid? But don’t Rav and Shmuel both say that if the seller said to the buyer: I am selling you one kor of grain, an amount equivalent to thirty se’a, for the sum of thirty sela, he can renege on the entire sale even while measuring out the last se’a; but if he said: I am selling you one kor of grain for thirty sela, each se’a for a sela, the buyer acquires each se’a one by one as it is being measured out to him? If the original verdict stands, why in the first case may the seller renege even on that portion of the sale that already reached the buyer?