מִמַּאי דִּבְחַד בֵּי דִינָא אִיתְּקּוּן? דִּלְמָא בִּתְרֵי בֵּי דִינָא אִיתְּקּוּן!

From where do you conclude that both clauses, the one for the benefit of the sons and the one for the benefit of the daughters, were instituted by one court and are therefore each read in light of the other? Perhaps they were instituted by two different courts and are unrelated to each other. Accordingly, the wording of the gift and the wording of the inheritance are not part of the same statement.

לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּקָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא, זֶה מִדְרָשׁ דָּרַשׁ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים בְּכֶרֶם בְּיַבְנֶה: הַבָּנִים יִירְשׁוּ וְהַבָּנוֹת יִזּוֹנוּ, מַה הַבָּנִים אֵינָן יוֹרְשִׁין אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתַת אֲבִיהֶם, אַף בָּנוֹת לֹא יִזּוֹנוּ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתַת אֲבִיהֶן;

The Gemara answers: This possibility should not enter your mind, as the former clause of that mishna teaches (Ketubot 49a): A father is not obligated to provide his daughter’s sustenance. This interpretation was interpreted by Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya before the Sages of the vineyard in Yavne: Since the Sages instituted that after the father’s death, the sons inherit the sum of money specified in their mother’s marriage contract, and the daughters are sustained from their father’s estate, these two halakhot are equated: Just as the sons inherit only after their father’s death, not during his lifetime, so too, the daughters are sustained from their father’s property only after their father’s death.

אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּחַד בֵּי דִינָא אִיתְּקּוּן, הַיְינוּ דְּיָלְפִינַן תַּקָּנָה מִתַּקָּנָה, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּתְרֵי בֵּי דִינָא אִיתְּקּוּן, הֵיכִי יָלְפִינַן תַּקָּנָה מִתַּקָּנָה!

The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the two clauses were instituted by one court, this is the reason that we derive the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance, under the assumption that a court institutes ordinances in a consistent manner. But if you say that they were instituted by two distinct courts operating in different periods, how can we derive the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance?

מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: בִּתְרֵי בֵּי דִינָא אִיתְּקּוּן, וּבֵי דִינָא בָּתְרָא תְּקוּן כְּבֵי דִינָא קַמָּא, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא תִּקְשֶׁה תַּקַּנְתָּא אַתַּקַּנְתָּא.

The Gemara rejects this explanation: From where is it assumed that they were instituted by one court? Actually, I will say to you that perhaps the two clauses were instituted by two separate courts, and nevertheless Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya derived the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance, because the latter court presumably instituted its ordinance in accordance with the format of the former court, so that one should not ask about contradictions between one ordinance and the other ordinance. With regard to the halakhot of inheritance, there is no reason to read the two clauses in light of the other.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַכּוֹתֵב כָּל נְכָסָיו לְאִשְׁתּוֹ – לֹא עֲשָׂאָהּ אֶלָּא אַפּוֹטְרוֹפָּא.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A person on his deathbed who writes a document granting all his property to his wife has merely rendered her a steward. The assumption is that he did not intend to deprive his heirs of their entire inheritance. Rather, he intended to appoint her as a steward in charge of the property, so that the heirs will honor her.

פְּשִׁיטָא, בְּנוֹ הַגָּדוֹל – לֹא עֲשָׂאוֹ אֶלָּא אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס; בְּנוֹ הַקָּטָן מַאי?

The Gemara discusses similar cases: It is obvious that if one writes a document granting all his property to his adult son, he does not intend to give him the entire inheritance, but to have him distribute it among his brothers. Rather, he has merely rendered him a steward [apotropos]. If he writes it to his minor son, what is the halakha? Is it still assumed that his intention is to appoint him as a steward, or is that implausible since a minor boy is not yet capable of assuming this position and therefore the father apparently intended to bequeath to him the entire inheritance?

אִיתְּמַר, רַב חֲנִילָאי בַּר אִידִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֲפִילּוּ בְּנוֹ קָטָן הַמּוּטָּל בַּעֲרִיסָה.

It was stated that Rav Ḥanilai bar Idi says that Shmuel says that even if one wrote a document granting all his property to his minor son who is lying in his crib, he does not receive the entire inheritance. Rather, the father presumably intended to appoint him as a steward when he reached adulthood, so that the other heirs would honor him.

פְּשִׁיטָא, בְּנוֹ וְאַחֵר – אַחֵר בְּמַתָּנָה וּבְנוֹ אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס. אִשְׁתּוֹ וְאַחֵר – לְאַחֵר בְּמַתָּנָה וְאִשְׁתּוֹ אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס.

The Gemara states: It is obvious that if one wrote a document granting all his property to his son and another person, he intended to give the other person half the property as a gift, and to appoint his son a steward to oversee the property of his brothers, with whom he shares the other half. Similarly, if he wrote a document granting all his property to his wife and another person, he intended to give the other person half the property as a gift, and to appoint his wife a steward to oversee the other half of the property for his sons.

אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲרוּסָה וְאִשְׁתּוֹ גְּרוּשָׁה – בְּמַתָּנָה.

Furthermore, it is obvious that if one wrote a document granting all his property to his betrothed wife, whom he did not yet wed, or to his former wife, whom he had divorced, he intended to give it to them as a gift, as he had no reason to have his heirs honor them.

אִיבַּעֲיָא לְהוּ: בַּת אֵצֶל הַבָּנִים, וְאִשָּׁה אֵצֶל הָאַחִים, וְאִשָּׁה אֵצֶל בְּנֵי הַבַּעַל, מַהוּ?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one wrote a document granting all his property to his daughter before his sons, in a case where he has sons who would inherit from him, or to his wife before his brothers, or to his wife before the husband’s sons who are not her sons, what is the halakha? Is it assumed that his intention was to appoint her as a steward or to give her the property as a gift?

אֲמַר רָבִינָא, מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: בְּכוּלְּהוּ לֹא קָנָה, לְבַר מֵאִשְׁתּוֹ אֲרוּסָה וְאִשְׁתּוֹ גְּרוּשָׁה; רַב עֲוִירָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אֲמַר: בְּכוּלְּהוּ קָנֵי, לְבַר מֵהָאִשָּׁה אֵצֶל הָאַחִין וְאִשָּׁה אֵצֶל בְּנֵי הַבַּעַל.

Ravina said in the name of Rava that in all of these cases the recipient did not acquire the property. Rather, he or she was merely appointed a steward, except for the cases of his betrothed wife and his former wife whom he divorced. By contrast, Rav Avira said in the name of Rava that in all of these cases the recipient acquired the property, except for the cases of his wife before his brothers and his wife before the husband’s sons, where he clearly intended only to appoint her as a steward.