וְאִם הֵבִיא חֲמִשִּׁים בִּכְלִי אֶחָד וַחֲמִשִּׁים בִּכְלִי אֶחָד – יָצָא; אִם הֵבִיא – אִין, לְכַתְּחִלָּה לָא; וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ כָּל כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא פַּלְגָּא וּפַלְגָּא הוּא, אֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה נַמִי!

And if he brought fifty- tenths in one vessel and fifty in one vessel, he fulfilled his obligation. One can infer from the baraita that after the fact, if he had brought fifty-tenths in each vessel, yes, he fulfilled his obligation, but he may not do so ab initio. And if it should enter your mind to say that every case like this is divided half and half, it should be permitted to divide the meal-offering into equal halves even ab initio.

הָכִי הָשְׁתָּא? הָתָם אֲנַן סָהֲדֵי דְּהַאי גַּבְרָא מֵעִיקָּרָא לְקָרְבָּן גָּדוֹל קָא מְכַוֵּין, וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר בִּשְׁנֵי כֵלִים – דְּיָדַע דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר לְאַתּוּיֵי בִּכְלִי אֶחָד, כַּמָּה דְּאֶפְשָׁר לְאִיתוּיֵי מַיְיתִינַן.

The Gemara dismisses Rabbi Zeira’s objection: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the meal-offering, it is clear to us that this person initially intended to bring a large offering, and the reason that he said he will bring the offering in two vessels was that he knew that it is not possible to bring the entire offering in a single vessel. Therefore, we bring, in a single vessel, as much as it is possible to bring, which is sixty-tenths. In any other case it is possible that the division should be into two equal portions.

וְהִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף בְּשָׂדֶה, עִנְיָן, וּמֶחֱצָה.

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef in three matters where he disagreed with Rabba: In the matter of dividing a field between brothers (see 12b); in the matter of whether certain actions are limited by the court session or by the topic of discussion in the court (see 114a); and in the matter of half, i.e., this matter, whether an unspecified division into two parts is divided into two equal halves.

הַהוּא דִּשְׁדַר פִּיסְקֵי דְּשִׁירָאֵי לְבֵיתֵיהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי אַמִי: הָרְאוּיִין לְבָנִים – לַבָּנִים, רְאוּיִין לְבָנוֹת – לַבָּנוֹת. וְלָא אֲמָרַן אֶלָּא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ כַּלָּתָא, אֲבָל אִית לֵיהּ כַּלָּתָא – לְכַלָּתֵיהּ שְׁדַר; וְאִי בְּנָתֵיהּ לָא נְסִיבָן, לָא שְׁבַק בְּנָתֵיהּ וּמְשַׁדַּר לְכַלָּתֵיהּ.

§ The Gemara cites additional incidents concerning a gift whose method of division was not specified: There was a certain man who sent swaths of silk to his home as a gift. Rabbi Ami says that in such a case, those swaths that are suitable for the sons’ garments are given to the sons, and those that are suitable for the daughters’ garments are given to the daughters. The Gemara comments: We said this only when he does not have daughters-in-law, but if he has daughters-in-law, it is presumed that he sent it for his daughters-in-law. And if his daughters are not married, it is presumed that he does not forsake his daughters and send to his daughters-in-law, so the silk is given to his daughters.

הַהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: ״נְכָסַיי לְבָנַיי״, הֲוָה לֵיהּ בְּרָא וּבְרַתָּא; מִי קָרוּ אֱינָשֵׁי לִבְרָא ״בָּנַיי״, וּלְסַלּוּקֵי לִבְרַתָּא מֵעִישּׂוּר קָאָתֵי. אוֹ דִּלְמָא לָא קָרוּ אֱינָשֵׁי לִבְרָא ״בָּנַיי״, וּלְמוֹשְׁכָהּ לִבְרַתָּא בְּמַתָּנָה קָאָתֵי?

There was a certain man who said to those surrounding him: I leave my property to my sons [levanai], and he had only a son and a daughter. The question was raised: Do people call a single son in the plural: My sons, and in his will he came to remove his daughter even from the tenth of his property that would rightfully be her dowry? Or perhaps people do not call a single son: My sons, and he came to include his daughter in the gift?

אֲמַר אַבַּיֵי, תָּא שְׁמַע: ״וּבְנֵי דָן חֻשִׁים״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא, דִּלְמָא כִּדְתָנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה: שֶׁהָיוּ מְרוּבִּין כְּחוּשִׁים שֶׁל קָנֶה! אֶלָּא אֲמַר רָבָא: ״וּבְנֵי פַלּוּא אֱלִיאָב״. רַב יוֹסֵף אֲמַר: ״וּבְנֵי אֵיתָן עֲזַרְיָה״.

Abaye said: Come and hear a proof that one does refer to a single son using the plural term sons, as it is written: “And the sons of Dan: Hushim” (Genesis 46:23). Rava said to Abaye: Perhaps this verse should be understood as the school of Ḥizkiyya taught, that Hushim is not the name of Dan’s son but that they, Dan’s sons, were as numerous as the groups [ḥushim] of reeds. Rather, Rava said: One can prove this usage of the term sons in the verse: “And the sons of Pallu: Eliab” (Numbers 26:8). Rav Yosef said: This can be proven from another verse: “And the sons of Ethan: Azariah” (I Chronicles 2:8).

הַהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: ״נִכְסַאי לְבָנַאי״, הֲוָה לֵיהּ בְּרָא וּבַר בְּרָא; קָרוּ אֱינָשֵׁי לְבַר בְּרָא ״בְּרָא״, אוֹ לָא? רַב חֲבִיבָא אֲמַר: קָרוּ אֱינָשֵׁי לְבַר בְּרָא ״בְּרָא״; מָר בַּר רַב אַשִׁי אֲמַר: לָא קָרוּ אֱינָשֵׁי לְבַר בְּרָא ״בְּרָא״. תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּמָר בַּר רַב אַשִׁי: הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מִבָּנִים – מוּתָּר בִּבְנֵי בָנִים.

There was a certain man who said to those surrounding him: I leave my property to my sons, and he had a son and a grandson, i.e., his son’s son. The question was raised: Do people call a grandson a son, or do they not? Rav Ḥaviva said: People call a grandson a son. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: People do not call a grandson a son. The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Mar bar Rav Ashi: With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from a certain person’s sons, it is permitted for him to derive benefit from the sons of that person’s sons, as they are not included in the term sons.

מתני׳ הִנִּיחַ בָּנִים גְּדוֹלִים וּקְטַנִּים, הִשְׁבִּיחוּ גְּדוֹלִים אֶת הַנְּכָסִים – הִשְׁבִּיחוּ לָאֶמְצַע; אִם אָמְרוּ: ״רְאוּ מַה שֶּׁהִנִּיחַ אַבָּא, הֲרֵי אָנוּ עוֹשִׂין וְאוֹכְלִים״ – הִשְׁבִּיחוּ לְעַצְמָן. וְכֵן הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִשְׁבִּיחָה אֶת הַנְּכָסִים – הִשְׁבִּיחָה לָאֶמְצַע; אִם אָמְרָה: ״רְאוּ מַה שֶּׁהִנִּיחַ לִי בַּעֲלִי, הֲרֵי אֲנִי עוֹשָׂה וְאוֹכֶלֶת״ – הִשְׁבִּיחָה לְעַצְמָהּ.

In the case of one who died and left behind adult and minor sons, if the adult sons enhanced the property, they enhanced it so that the profit goes to the middle, i.e., it is distributed among all the heirs. If the adult sons said from the outset: See that which our father left behind; we are going to engage in business with our share of the property and profit from it, then they enhanced the property for themselves. And similarly, with regard to a wife who enhanced the property of her deceased husband, she enhanced it so that the profit goes to the middle, i.e., it is divided between her and the heirs. If she said: See that which my husband left me; I am going to engage in business with my share and profit from it, then she enhanced the property for herself.

גמ׳ אָמַר רַב חֲבִיבָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁשָּׁבְחוּ נְכָסִים מֵחֲמַת נְכָסִים, אֲבָל שָׁבְחוּ נְכָסִים מֵחֲמַת עַצְמָן – הִשְׁבִּיחוּ לְעַצְמָן.

Rav Ḥaviva, son of Rav Yosef, son of Rava, says in the name of Rava: They taught this halakha only with regard to where the property was enhanced on account of the property, i.e., the heirs invested money from the common inheritance in order to enhance the property, and their input was only in the management of its investment. But if the property was enhanced on their account, i.e., on account of the efforts or expenditure of the adult sons, the halakha is that they enhanced it for themselves.

אִינִי? וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: אֲפִילּוּ לֹא הִנִּיחַ לָהֶם אֲבִיהֶם אֶלָּא

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥanina say: Even if their father left them nothing but