דְּיֵשׁ מִקְצָת שִׁלְיָא בְּלֹא וָלָד, וּגְזֵירָה מִקְצָתָהּ אַטּוּ כּוּלָּהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.

that there is a possibility that part of the afterbirth will emerge without part of the fetus inside, and the reason that the Sages forbid eating the afterbirth is due to a rabbinic decree prohibiting a case where part of an afterbirth emerges from the womb and part of it remains inside, due to the possibility that one may confuse it with a case where all of the afterbirth emerges. Therefore, Ulla teaches us that, in fact, part of the afterbirth does not emerge without part of the fetus inside.

וְאָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: בְּכוֹר שֶׁנִּטְרַף בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – אֵין פּוֹדִין אוֹתוֹ.

The Gemara cites another halakha taught by Ulla, citing Rabbi Elazar: And Ulla says that Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to a male firstborn child who was mauled by an animal within thirty days of his birth and died, one is not required to redeem him, as the requirement to do so, by paying five sela to a priest, applies only once the child is thirty days old (see Numbers 18:15–16).

וְכֵן תָּנֵי רָמִי בַּר חָמָא, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״פָּדֹה תִפְדֶּה״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ נִטְרַף בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אַךְ״ – חִלֵּק.

And similarly, Rami bar Ḥama taught a baraita: Since it is stated: “Yet you shall redeem” (Numbers 18:15), one might have thought that even if a male firstborn child was mauled by an animal within thirty days of his birth one should redeem him. Therefore, the verse states “yet you shall redeem”; the addition of the word “yet” serves to differentiate and limit the requirement to redeem the firstborn male.

וְאָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה נִקְנֵית בִּמְשִׁיכָה.

The Gemara cites another halakha taught by Ulla, citing Rabbi Elazar: And Ulla says that Rabbi Elazar says: A large animal, such as a cow or a horse, is acquired by the buyer pulling the animal.

וְהָא אֲנַן תְּנַן: בִּמְסִירָה! הוּא דְּאָמַר כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא; דְּתַנְיָא, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: זוֹ וְזוֹ בִּמְשִׁיכָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: זוֹ וְזוֹ בְּהַגְבָּהָה.

The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Kiddushin 25b): A large animal is acquired by passing the reins of the animal to the buyer? The Gemara explains: Rabbi Elazar states his opinion in accordance with the opinion of that tanna, i.e., the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita: And the Rabbis say: This and that, i.e., both large and small animals, are acquired through the buyer pulling the animal. Rabbi Shimon says: This and that are acquired through the buyer lifting the animal.

וְאָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הָאַחִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ, מַה שֶּׁעֲלֵיהֶן – שָׁמִין, וּמַה שֶּׁעַל בְּנֵיהֶן וּבְנוֹתֵיהֶן – אֵין שָׁמִין.

The Gemara cites another halakha taught by Ulla, citing Rabbi Elazar: And Ulla says that Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to brothers who divide the estate they inherited, the court appraises whatever clothes are upon them if those clothes came from, or if they were purchased with money from, the deceased’s estate, and that sum is considered part of the portion they receive. But the court does not appraise whatever is upon their sons and daughters. In order to save the children from the humiliation of having to appear in court, the brothers waive their rights to the clothes the children are wearing.

אֲמַר רַב פַּפָּא: פְּעָמִים אַף מַה שֶּׁעֲלֵיהֶן אֵין שָׁמִין, מַשְׁכַּחַת לָהּ בִּגְדוֹל אַחֵי, דְּנִיחָא לְהוּ דְּלִשְׁתַּמְעוּן מִילֵּיהּ.

Rav Pappa said: Sometimes, it does not even appraise what- ever is upon the brothers. You find such a case with the eldest brother where the other brothers waive their rights to the value of his clothes, as it is beneficial for them to have the eldest brother appear well dressed in order that when he represents their interests in dealings with others, his words will be listened to and respected.

וְאָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: שׁוֹמֵר שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר – פָּטוּר. וְלָא מִיבָּעֲיָא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, דְּעַלּוּיֵי עַלְּיֵיהּ לִשְׁמִירָתוֹ, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, דְּהָשְׁתָּא גָּרוּעֵי גָּרְעֵיהּ לִשְׁמִירָתוֹ – נַמִי פָּטוּר, שֶׁהֲרֵי מָסַר לְבֶן דַּעַת.

The Gemara cites another halakha taught by Ulla, citing Rabbi Elazar: And Ulla says that Rabbi Elazar says: In the case of a bailee who conveyed a deposit that was entrusted to him to another bailee, the first bailee is exempt for any occurrence for which he would have been exempt had he kept the deposit with him. The Gemara adds: And it is not necessary to state this in the case of an unpaid bailee who conveyed a deposit to a paid bailee, thereby increasing the level of its safeguarding, since the paid bailee has a greater level of accountability than an unpaid bailee. Rather, this is the halakha even in a case of a paid bailee who conveyed a deposit to an unpaid bailee, thereby decreasing the level of its safeguarding. In this case, the first bailee is exempt for any occurrence for which he would have been exempt had he kept the deposit with him, because he conveyed it to a mentally competent person and thereby fulfilled his responsibility to ensure the deposit is safeguarded.

רָבָא אָמַר: שׁוֹמֵר שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר – חַיָּיב; וְלָא מִיבָּעֲיָא שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, דְּגָרוּעֵי גָּרְעֵיהּ לִשְׁמִירָתוֹ, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם שֶׁמָּסַר לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – חַיָּיב,

Rava said: With regard to a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee, the first bailee becomes liable to pay for any loss to the item, even for mishaps for which he would not have been liable had he kept the deposit with him. The Gemara adds: And it is not necessary to state this in a case of a paid bailee who conveyed a deposit to an unpaid bailee, thereby decreasing the level of its safeguarding. Rather, this is the halakha even in the case of an unpaid bailee who conveyed a deposit to a paid bailee, thereby increasing the level of its safeguarding; he is liable.

דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: אַתְּ מְהֵימַנְתְּ לִי בִּשְׁבוּעָה, הַאי לָא מְהֵימַן לִי בִּשְׁבוּעָה.

The reason he is liable is that the owner of the deposit can say to him: You are credible to me with regard to taking an oath, but this other bailee, to whom you conveyed my item, is not credible to me with regard to taking an oath. If an occurrence for which a bailee does not carry liability occurs, damaging the deposit, in order to release himself from an obligation to pay the bailee must take an oath to the item’s owner that none of the types of occurrences for which he bears liability occurred. Rava rules that the owner is required to accept an oath only from the bailee with whom he entrusted his item, but not from anyone else. Accordingly, since the first bailee was not present when the event occurred, he is unable to attest to what happened, and even if the second bailee takes an oath to that effect, the owner is not expected to accept his oath. Consequently, the first bailee bears full liability for any loss.

וְאָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, הִלְכְתָא: גּוֹבִין מִן הָעֲבָדִים.

The Gemara cites another halakha taught by Ulla, citing Rabbi Elazar: And Ulla says that Rabbi Elazar says: The halakha is that one can collect from the debtor the slaves that he owns

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן לְעוּלָּא: אֲמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אֲפִילּוּ מִיַּתְמֵי? לָא, מִינֵּיהּ. מִינֵּיהּ, אֲפִילּוּ מִגְּלִימָא דְּעַל כִּתְפֵיהּ!

Rav Naḥman said to Ulla: Did Rabbi Elazar say that this halakha applies even when collecting from a debtor’s orphans? A creditor can collect the debt from orphans only by taking the land the debtor bequeathed to his children. Rav Naḥman asked whether this also extends to collecting any slaves the children inherited. Ulla replied: No, a creditor collects a debt by taking slaves only when he collects directly from the debtor himself. Rav Naḥman challenges this: But when the creditor collects from him, he can collect the debt even from the cloak that is upon his shoulders, and therefore he can certainly also collect the debt by taking his slaves, so what is the novelty of this ruling?

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – שֶׁעֲשָׂאוֹ אַפּוֹתֵיקִי; כִּדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: עָשָׂה עַבְדּוֹ אַפּוֹתֵיקִי וּמְכָרוֹ – בַּעַל חוֹב גּוֹבֶה הֵימֶנּוּ, שׁוֹרוֹ אַפּוֹתֵיקִי וּמְכָרוֹ – אֵין בַּעַל חוֹב גּוֹבֶה הֵימֶנּוּ,

Ulla explains: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case in which the debtor set aside his slave as designated repayment [appoteiki]. Consequently, if the slave was subsequently sold to a third party and the debtor was later unable to repay the debt, the creditor can seize the slave from the third party as payment of the debt. Even though generally only land can be seized from a buyer as payment for the seller’s debt, a slave is considered to have similar status to land in this regard. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava says: If a master set aside his slave as designated repayment of a debt and then sold him, the master’s creditor collects the debt by taking the slave; but if one set aside his ox as designated repayment and then sold it, the creditor does not collect the debt by taking the ox.

מַאי טַעֲמָא? הָא אִית לֵיהּ קָלָא, וְהָא לֵית לֵיהּ קָלָא.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this difference? The Gemara explains: The designation of this slave generates publicity, since a slave is significant and identifiable, therefore any prospective buyer is assumed to have been aware of the status of the slave and accepted the consequences of purchasing him. But the designation of this ox does not generate publicity, since one ox is not easily distinguishable from another, and a buyer cannot be assumed to be aware that the ox was set aside as designated repayment. Therefore it is unfair that one who purchases such an ox should have it seized from him. Therefore, the Sages enacted that a creditor cannot do so.