לְרַבּוֹת שׁוֹגֵג כְּמֵזִיד וְאוֹנֶס כְּרָצוֹן! אִם כֵּן נִכְתּוֹב קְרָא ״פֶּצַע בְּפָצַע״, מַאי ״פֶּצַע תַּחַת פָּצַע״? שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.

This serves to include in the category of those liable to pay compensation one who causes injury unwittingly just as one who causes injury intentionally is liable, and one who causes injury due to circumstances beyond his control just as one who causes injury willingly. The Gemara answers: If so, and the verse teaches only this, let the verse write the more succinct phrase: A wound [petza] for a wound [befatza]; what is taught by the expanded phrase: “A wound [petza] for a wound [taḥat patza]”? Conclude two conclusions from the verse, that the one who caused the injury is liable to pay compensation regardless of how he caused the injury, and that he must pay compensation for pain in addition to compensation for damage.

רַב פַּפָּא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אֲמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא״, לִיתֵּן רְפוּאָה בִּמְקוֹם נֶזֶק.

With regard to compensation for medical costs in a case where one pays compensation for damage, Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava that the verse states: “He shall cause him to be thoroughly healed [verappo yerappe]” (Exodus 21:19), and the doubled term teaches that the one who caused the injury is liable to give monetary compensation for medical costs in a case of compensation for damage.

הַאי מִבָּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא״ – מִכָּאן שֶׁנִּיתְּנָה רְשׁוּת לְרוֹפֵא לְרַפְּאוֹת! אִם כֵּן, נִכְתּוֹב קְרָא ״וְרוֹפֵא יְרַפֵּא״, שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: לִיתֵּן רְפוּאָה בִּמְקוֹם נֶזֶק.

The Gemara challenges: This verse is necessary for teaching a different halakha, that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught. As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: When the verse states: “ Verappo yerappe,” from here it is derived that permission is granted to a doctor to heal. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse write: Verofeh yerappe, meaning: And a doctor shall heal. Learn from the phrase employed that the one who caused the injury is liable to give monetary compensation for medical costs in a case of damage.

וְאַכַּתִּי מִבָּעֵי לֵיהּ לִכְדַאֲמָרַן, לְמִיתְנֵי בֵּיהּ קְרָא בְּרִיפּוּי! אִם כֵּן, לֵימָא קְרָא אוֹ ״רַפֹּא רַפֹּא״ אוֹ ״יְרַפֵּא יְרַפֵּא״, מַאי ״וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא״? שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: לִיתֵּן רְפוּאָה בִּמְקוֹם נֶזֶק.

The Gemara challenges: But it is still necessary for the halakhot that we stated previously, i.e., it was necessary for the verse to repeat the language of healing, as the Gemara explained. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse say one of the two words twice, either: Rappo rappo, or: Yerappe yerappe. What is taught by repeating the language with a change: “ Verappo yerappe ”? Learn from this wording that the one who caused the injury is liable to give monetary compensation for medical costs in a case of damage.

מִכְּלָל דְּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לְהוּ שֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹם נֶזֶק, שֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹם נֶזֶק הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לְהוּ?

The baraita stated that compensation for pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation are paid even where the one who caused the injury pays compensation for damage. The Gemara notes: By inference, it must be that you find these examples of cases where the one who caused an injury must pay compensation for these indemnities that are not in a case of damage. The Gemara asks: How would you find examples of these cases that are not in a case of damage?

צַעַר, כִּדְקָתָנֵי: צַעַר – כְּוָואוֹ בְּשַׁפּוּד אוֹ בְּמַסְמֵר, וַאֲפִילּוּ עַל צִפּוֹרְנוֹ מָקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה חַבּוּרָה; רִיפּוּי – דַּהֲוָה כָּאֵיב לֵיהּ מִידֵי, וְסָלֵיק וְאַיְיתֵי לֵיהּ סַמָּא חֲרִיפָא וְאַחְוְורֵיהּ לְבִישְׂרֵיהּ, דְּצָרִיךְ לְאוֹתְבֵי לֵיהּ סַמָּא לְאַנְקוּטֵיהּ גַּוְונָא דְּבִישְׂרֵיהּ;

The Gemara answers: An example of a case where one must pay compensation for pain alone is as that which the mishna teaches explicitly: How is payment for pain assessed? If he burned another with a skewer or with a hot nail, or even if he burned him on his fingernail, which is a place where he does not cause a bruise, i.e., there was no personal injury, only pain, the court evaluates the monetary value of the pain. An example of a case where one must pay compensation for medical costs alone is where some body part was hurting and another came and brought him a strong drug, and it whitened his flesh; the halakha is that the second person must give him another drug to restore the color to his flesh, even though he caused no damage, i.e., loss of function.

שֶׁבֶת – דְּהַדְקֵיהּ בְּאִינְדְּרוֹנָא וּבַטְּלֵיהּ; בּוֹשֶׁת – דְּרָק לֵיהּ בְּאַפֵּיהּ.

An example of a case where one must pay compensation for loss of livelihood alone is a case of one who locked another in a room [be’inderona] and forced him to be idle, but did not cause him any personal injury. An example of a case where one must pay compensation for humiliation alone is a case of one who spit in the face of another,

״שֶׁבֶת – רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ כְּאִילּוּ הוּא שׁוֹמֵר קִישּׁוּאִין״. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שֶׁבֶת – רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ כְּאִילּוּ הוּא שׁוֹמֵר קִישּׁוּאִין; וְאִם תֹּאמַר: לָקְתָה מִדַּת הַדִּין – דְּכִי מִיתְפַּח הַאי גַּבְרָא, לָאו אַגְרָא דְּשׁוֹמֵר קִישּׁוּאִין הוּא שָׁקֵיל, אֶלָּא דָּלֵי דַּוְולָא וְשָׁקֵיל אַגְרָא, אִי נַמִי אָזֵיל בְּשָׁלִיחַ וְשָׁקֵיל אַגְרָא.

§ The mishna teaches: How is payment for loss of livelihood assessed? The court views the injured party as though he were a watchman of cucumbers. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:2): How is payment for loss of livelihood assessed? The court views the injured party as though he were a watchman of cucumbers. And if you say: But the standard of justice was compromised. The Gemara interjects to clarify this statement of the baraita: It appears to be compromised, as when this man will recover, he will not collect the wage of a watchman of cucumbers, but rather he will carry buckets and collect a higher wage, or he will travel as an agent and collect an even higher wage. The assessment of loss of livelihood should also account for one of these types of labor.

מִדַּת הַדִּין לֹא לָקְתָה, שֶׁכְּבָר נָתַן לוֹ דְּמֵי יָדוֹ וּדְמֵי רַגְלוֹ.

The Gemara returns to quoting the baraita: The standard of justice was not compromised, because the one who caused him injury already gave him the value of his hand or the value of his leg, and that compensation took into account the professional opportunities he lost due to the injury.

אָמַר רָבָא: קָטַע אֶת יָדוֹ – נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי יָדוֹ, וְשֶׁבֶת – רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ כְּאִילּוּ הוּא שׁוֹמֵר קִישּׁוּאִין; שִׁיבֵּר אֶת רַגְלוֹ – נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי רַגְלוֹ, וְשֶׁבֶת – רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ כְּאִילּוּ הוּא שׁוֹמֵר אֶת הַפֶּתַח;

Rava says: If one severed the hand of another, he gives him the value of his hand as compensation for damage, and for loss of livelihood the court views the injured party as though he were a watchman of cucumbers. If one broke the leg of another, he gives him the value of his leg as compensation for damage. And for loss of livelihood the court views the injured party as though he were a watchman at the opening to a courtyard, because he cannot work even as a watchman of cucumbers, as that requires walking around the cucumber field.

סִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ – נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי עֵינוֹ, וְשֶׁבֶת – רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ כְּאִילּוּ הוּא מַטְחִינוֹ בְּרֵיחַיִם; חֵירְשׁוֹ – נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי כּוּלּוֹ.

Rava continues: If one blinded the eye of another, he gives him the value of his eye as compensation for damage; and as for loss of livelihood, the court views the injured party as though the one who caused the injury caused him to grind with a mill, as even a blind person can do this. If one deafened another, he gives him his entire value as compensation for damage, because one lacking the ability to hear is not fit for any form of employment.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: קָטַע אֶת יָדוֹ וְלֹא אֲמָדוּהוּ, שִׁיבֵּר אֶת רַגְלוֹ וְלֹא אֲמָדוּהוּ, סִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ וְלֹא אֲמָדוּהוּ, וּלְבַסּוֹף חֵירְשׁוֹ, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דְּלָא אֲמָדוּהוּ, בְּחַד אוּמְדָּנָא סַגִּי לֵיהּ, וְיָהֵיב לֵיהּ דְּמֵי כּוּלֵּיהּ בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי, אוֹ דִּלְמָא: חֲדָא חֲדָא אָמְדִינַן וְיָהֲבִינַן לֵיהּ?

§ Rava raises a dilemma: If one severed the hand of another, and the court did not yet evaluate him to determine the compensation, and then he broke his leg, and the court did not yet evaluate him for this additional injury, and then he blinded his eye, and the court did not yet evaluate him for this further injury; and ultimately he deafened him, what is the halakha? Do we say: Since the court did not evaluate him each time, one evaluation is sufficient for the court to determine his compensation, and the one who caused him injury must give him his entire value at once, as that is the compensation for deafening him? Or perhaps we say: We evaluate each injury one by one, and we obligate the one who caused him injury to give him compensation for each.

נָפְקָא מִינֵּיהּ, דְּבָעֵי לְמֵיתַב לֵיהּ צַעַר וּבוֹשֶׁת דְּכָל חֲדָא וַחֲדָא; נְהִי דְּנֶזֶק וְרִיפּוּי וְשֶׁבֶת דְּכָל חֲדָא וַחֲדָא לָא יָהֲבִינַן לֵיהּ, דְּכֵיוָן דְּקָא יָהֵיב לֵיהּ דְּמֵי כּוּלֵּיהּ כְּמַאן דְּקַטְלֵיהּ דָּמֵי, וְהָא יָהֵיב לֵיהּ דְּמֵי כּוּלֵּיהּ, צַעַר וּבוֹשֶׁת מִיהַת דְּכָל חֲדָא וַחֲדָא יָהֵיב, דְּהָא הֲוָה לֵיהּ צַעַר וּבוֹשֶׁת?

Rava explains the dilemma: The difference is with regard to whether the one who caused the injury must give him monetary compensation for pain and humiliation for each and every one of the injuries. Although he does not give him monetary compensation for damage, medical costs, and loss of livelihood for each and every one of the injuries, since, ultimately, he is giving him his entire value after deafening him, he is like someone who killed him, and therefore he gives him his entire value and no more; in any event, must he give compensation for pain and humiliation for each and every one of the injuries, as the injured party had pain and humiliation each time?

וְאִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר: כֵּיוָן דְּלָא אֲמָדוּהוּ קָא יָהֵיב לֵיהּ דְּמֵי כּוּלֵּיהּ בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי, אֲמָדוּהוּ מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמָדוּהוּ, חֲדָא חֲדָא בָּעֵי לְמֵיתַב לֵיהּ, אוֹ דִּלְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּלָא שַׁלֵּים, יָהֵיב לֵיהּ דְּמֵי כּוּלֵּיהּ? תֵּיקוּ.

Rava continues: And if you say as a resolution to this dilemma that since the fact is that the court had not evaluated him after each injury, the one who caused him injury pays him his entire value all together, then there is another dilemma: If the court had evaluated him after each injury but the one who caused the injury had not paid the compensation before he deafened him, what is the halakha? Do we say: Since it is so that the court evaluated him, the one who caused him injury is required to give him the compensation for each and every one of the injuries? Or perhaps, since the one who caused him injury had not yet paid those compensations before deafening him, he must give him his entire value. The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי רַבָּה: שֶׁבֶת הַפּוֹחַתְּתוֹ בְּדָמִים, מַהוּ? הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִכָּהוּ עַל יָדוֹ וְצָמְתָה יָדוֹ וְסוֹפָהּ לַחֲזוֹר, מַאי? כֵּיוָן דְּסוֹפָהּ לַחֲזוֹר לָא יָהֵיב לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵי, אוֹ דִּלְמָא הָשְׁתָּא מִיהַת אַפְחֲתֵיהּ?

Rabba raises a dilemma: If one injured another, causing him loss of livelihood that diminishes his monetary value, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains: What are the circumstances of this case? For example, in a case where he struck him on his hand and his hand became weakened so that he could not work, but his hand will ultimately return to its original health, what is the halakha? Should one say: Since his hand will ultimately return to its original health, he does not need to give him any compensation whatsoever for the damage? Or perhaps, in any event, he has diminished his value for now.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמַּכֶּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ וְלֹא עָשָׂה בָּהֶן חַבּוּרָה, וְהַחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים

Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a mishna (87a): One who strikes his father or his mother and did not cause them to have a bruise, and who therefore is not liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, which is the penalty for one who causes his parent a bruise, and one who injures another on Yom Kippur, and therefore is liable for excision from the World-to-Come [karet] and not liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment,