אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ קְנֵי מֵעַכְשָׁיו.

If you wish, say instead that the mishna is referring to a case where the borrower said to the lender: If I do not repay you within three years, you will acquire the field from now, and they performed a formal act of acquisition. Since an act of acquisition was performed at the time, this is a proper sale and not an asmakhta.

אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ מָר יָנוּקָא וּמָר קַשִׁישָׁא בְּנֵי דְּרַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב אַשִׁי: הָכִי אָמְרִי נְהַרְדְּעָאֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: הַאי אַסְמַכְתָּא, בְּזִמְנֵיהּ – קָנְיָא, בְּלָא זִמְנֵיהּ – לָא קָנְיָא.

Mar Yanuka and Mar Kashisha, the younger and elder sons of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: This is what the Sages of Neharde’a say in the name of Rav Naḥman: With regard to this asmakhta described in the mishna, it effects acquisition at its proper time, but it does not effect acquisition not at its proper time.

אָמַר לְהוּ: כָּל מִידֵּי בְּזִמְנֵיהּ קָנֵי בְּלָא זִמְנֵיהּ לָא קָנֵי.

Rav Ashi understood them to be saying that the lender acquires the field only when the loan is due, and he said to them: This statement seems to teach no novel ruling, as the same is true of every matter: It effects acquisition at its proper time, but it does not effect acquisition not at its proper time.

דִּלְמָא הָכִי קָאָמְרִיתוּ: אַשְׁכַּחֵיהּ בְּגוֹ זִמְנֵיהּ וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: קְנֵי – קָנֵי, בָּתַר זִמְנֵיהּ וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ קְנֵי – לָא קָנֵי. מַאי טַעְמָא – מֵחֲמַת כִּיסוּפָא הוּא דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ.

Rav Ashi suggests: Perhaps you meant to say this: If the borrower encountered the lender within its time, i.e., before the payment of the loan was due, and told him to acquire the field, the lender acquires the field, as it is assumed that the borrower was sincere. But if the borrower encountered the lender after its time, i.e., when the payment of the loan was due, and told the lender to acquire the field, he does not acquire it. What is the reason for this? The borrower says this to the lender out of shame with regard to his failure to pay the debt, but he did not really intend for him to acquire the field.

וְלָא הִיא, דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּגוֹ זִמְנֵיהּ נַמִי לָא קָנֵי. וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ קָנֵי – קָא סָבַר: כִּי מָטֵי זִמְנֵיהּ לָא לֵיתֵי לִיטַרְדָּן.

The Gemara comments: But this is not so, as the halakha is that the lender does not acquire the field even if the borrower stated this within its time. And as for the fact that the borrower told him to acquire it, he told him this only because he thinks: This will ensure that when the time for payment arrives, he will not come and disturb me. In other words, he is trying to buy time until he can repay the loan, but he was not sincere in his statement that the lender may acquire the field.

אָמַר רַב פַּפָּא: הַאי אַסְמַכְתָּא, זִימְנִין קָנְיָא וְזִימְנִין לָא קָנְיָא. אַשְׁכַּחֵיהּ דְּקָא שָׁתֵי שִׁכְרָא – קָנֵי, דְּקָא מְהַפַּךְ אַזּוּזֵי – לָא קָנֵי.

Rav Pappa says: With regard to this asmakhta, sometimes it effects acquisition and sometimes it does not effect acquisition. How so? If the lender encountered the borrower while the borrower was drinking beer, it effects acquisition, as, if the borrower agreed to transfer ownership of his field when he did not appear to be in financial stress, such as when he was enjoying a drink, he assumedly did so with full acceptance of the consequences, and therefore the transaction is valid. By contrast, if the lender encountered the borrower when he was searching for money with which to repay the loan, his agreement does not effect acquisition, as it is clear the borrower made the statement under duress.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: דִּלְמָא לְפַכּוּחֵי פַחְדֵיהּ קָא שָׁתֵי. אִי נַמִי, אִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא אַסְמְכֵיהּ אַזּוּזֵי. אֶלָּא אֲמַר רָבִינָא: אִי קָפֵיד בְּדָמֵי – וַדַּאי קָנֵי.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: In the case where the lender encountered the borrower while he was drinking beer, perhaps he was drinking to neutralize his fear, and he really was under financial pressure. Or, perhaps someone else promised him money, and therefore he remains in a precarious position even though he can repay the debt, which would again mean that his promise is merely an asmakhta. Rather, Ravina said that there is a different distinction: If the borrower is particular about the money, i.e., if he is unwilling to sell his property at less than its market value, the lender has certainly acquired the field, as the borrower is clearly not in such a precarious financial position, and he is therefore assumed to have willingly stated his agreement to give the field to the lender.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: דִּלְמָא סָבַר, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא תִּיתְזִיל אַרְעֵיהּ. אֶלָּא אֲמַר רַב פַּפָּא: אִי קָפֵיד בְּאַרְעָא – וַדַּאי קָנֵי.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Even in that case, perhaps the borrower thinks that he ought to present himself as particular about the price of his property in order that the price of his other lands not be lowered. If people know that he is in need of money they will pressure to him to lower the price, and therefore he acts as though he is particular about the price, but in reality he did not wish to sell the property at all. Rather, Rav Pappa said that there is a different distinction: If he is particular about any other land he owns and does not want to sell it even at its market rate, he is clearly not suffering from financial problems, and in that case the creditor certainly acquires the field.

וַאֲמַר רַב פַּפָּא: אַף עַל גַּב דַּאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן אַסְמַכְתָּא לָא קָנְיָא – אַפּוֹתֵיקִי הָוְיָא לְמִיגְבָּא מִינָּהּ.

And Rav Pappa said: Even though the Sages said that an asmakhta does not effect acquisition, and therefore even if he stipulated that the lender can collect the debt by seizing land, the lender does not acquire that land, nevertheless, the land is considered to be set aside as designated repayment [apoteiki] for the lender to collect repayment from it up to the amount of money owed.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נָתָן לְרַב פַּפָּא: מִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ קְנֵי לְגוּבַיְינָא? אָמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא, וְאִי אָמַר קְנֵי לְמִיגְבָּא מִינֵּיהּ – קָנֵי? סוֹף סוֹף אַסְמַכְתָּא הִיא, וְאַסְמַכְתָּא לָא קָנְיָא!

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: Did the borrower say to the lender: Acquire it for the sake of debt collection? Since the borrower did not specify that transferring ownership of the field was in place of the payment of the debt, his statement is considered an asmakhta, and the field is not set aside as designated repayment. Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: And if he had said to him: Acquire it for the sake of debt collection, would the lender then acquire it? Ultimately, it is an asmakhta, and the halakha is that an asmakhta does not effect acquisition.

אֶלָּא אַפּוֹתֵיקִי דְּאָמַר רַב פַּפָּא מַאי הִיא? דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: לֹא יְהֵא לְךָ פֵּרָעוֹן אֶלָּא מִזּוֹ.

The Gemara poses a question: But in that case, what is the designated repayment spoken of by Rav Pappa? According to Mar Zutra’s analysis, it makes no difference whether or not he said it was set aside as designated repayment of the loan. The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa is referring to a case, for example, where the borrower said to the lender: Not only will I give you the land if I fail to repay the loan, but even if I do pay you will receive payment only from this land asmakhta is negated, while the promise of repayment from the land remains intact.

הַהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּזַבֵּין לֵיהּ אַרְעָא לְחַבְרֵיהּ בְּאַחֲרָיוּת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי טָרְפוּ לֵיהּ מִנָּאִי – מַגְבֵּית לִי מֵעִידֵּי עִידִּית דְּאִית לָךְ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מֵעִידֵּי עִידִּית לָא מַגְבֵּינָא לָךְ, דְּבָעֵינַן לְמֵיקָם קַמַּאי. אֶלָּא מַגְבֵּינָא לָךְ מֵעִידִּית אֲחֵרִים דְּאִית לִי. לְסוֹף טְרָפוּהָ מִינֵּיהּ, אֲתָא בִּדְקָא שָׁקֵיל לְעִידֵּי עִידִּית.

§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who sold land to another with a property guarantee, meaning that in the event that land is seized by the seller’s creditors, the seller will reimburse the buyer his purchase money. The buyer said to him: If your creditors seize the land from me, will you allow me to collect that which is owed to me from the most superior quality of the superior-quality land that you have? The seller said to him: I will not allow you to collect from the most superior quality of my superior-quality land, as I want to keep those before me. But I will allow you to collect from other superior-quality land I have. Ultimately, creditors seized the field from the buyer, and in the meantime a flood came and flooded the seller’s most superior quality of his superior-quality land.

סָבַר רַב פַּפָּא לְמֵימַר: מֵעִידִּית אֲמַר לֵיהּ – וְהָא קַיְימָא.

As his remaining superior-quality land was now the best he had, the seller was unwilling to give them to the buyer and sought to repay him with intermediate-quality land, in accordance with the standard halakha concerning reimbursement to a buyer. Rav Pappa thought to say: Since the seller said to the buyer that he could collect from his superior-quality land, and this superior-quality land is intact, the seller must give it to him, in accordance with his promise.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ כִּי אֲמַרִי לָךְ אֲנָא מַגְבֵּינָא לָךְ – דַּהֲוָה עִידִּית קַיְימָא, הָשְׁתָּא קַיְימָא לֵיהּ עִידִּית בִּמְקוֹם עִידֵּי עִידִּית.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: But let the seller say to the buyer: When I said to you that I would allow you to collect from my superior-quality land, that was when the most superior quality of my superior-quality land was intact. But now my superior-quality land stands for me in place of the most superior quality of the superior-quality land I had before, and I am not obligated to give you the very best of my property.

רַב בַּר שַׁבָּא הֲוָה מַסֵּיק בֵּיה רַב כָּהֲנָא זוּזֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי לָא פָּרַעֲנָא לָךְ לְיוֹם פְּלוֹנִי – גְּבֵי מֵהַאי חַמְרָא. סָבַר רַב פַּפָּא לְמֵימַר: כִּי אָמְרִינַן אַסְמַכְתָּא לָא קָנְיָא – הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּאַרְעָא, דְּלָאו לְזַבּוּנֵי קַיְימָא. אֲבָל חַמְרָא, כֵּיוָן דִּלְזַבּוּנֵי קָאֵי – כְּזוּזֵי דָּמֵי.

The Gemara relates: Rav bar Shabba owed money to Rav Kahana. Rav bar Shabba said to him: If I do not repay you by such and such a date, you can collect the debt from this wine. Rav Pappa thought to say: When we said that an asmakhta does not effect acquisition, this matter applies only to land, which does not stand to be sold, i.e., which is not typically bought and sold on the market, and therefore the promise is invalid, as he did not genuinely intend to give it to him. But in the case of wine, since it does stand to be sold, it is considered like money, and therefore he can claim the debt from wine, as he can claim the debt from any other item with monetary worth.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרַב פַּפָּא: הָכִי אָמְרִינַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה: כָּל דְּאִי – לָא קָנֵי.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: This is what we say in the name of Rabba: Any statement including a condition introduced with the word: If, does not effect acquistion. Any agreement that does not involve a definitive commitment but does obligate one in the event of a particular outcome has the status of an asmakhta and does not effect acquisition, as the one setting the condition did not really intend to fulfill the commitment.

אֲמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הָשְׁתָּא דַּאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן אַסְמַכְתָּא לָא קָנְיָא – הָדַר אַרְעָא וְהָדְרִי פֵּירֵי. לְמֵימְרָא דְּסָבַר רַב נַחְמָן: מְחִילָה בְּטָעוּת לָא הָוְיָא מְחִילָה?

§ Rav Naḥman said: Now that the Sages have said that an asmakhta does not effect acquisition, in a case such as that in the mishna, when one promised another land for the repayment of a debt, if the lender in fact took it, the land must be returned and the value of any produce the creditor consumed from this land must also be returned. The Gemara poses a question: Is this to say that Rav Naḥman maintains that mistaken forgiveness of payment is not valid forgiveness, meaning that if one forgoes repayment of a loan of a certain amount of money in error, he can change his mind? In this case, the borrower had thought that the lender had acquired the land, and he therefore allowed him to consume the produce.

וְהָאִיתְּמַר: הַמּוֹכֵר פֵּירוֹת דֶּקֶל לַחֲבֵירוֹ, אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: עַד שֶׁלֹּא בָּאוּ לָעוֹלָם – יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ. מִשֶּׁבָּאוּ לָעוֹלָם אֵין יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ, וְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: אַף מִשֶּׁבָּאוּ לָעוֹלָם יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ.

But it was stated that amora’im disputed this very issue: If one sells the fruit of a palm tree to another before the fruit ripens, Rav Huna says: He can retract and cancel the sale until the fruits have come into the world, as the fruit is not yet in existence. But once they have come into the world, even if they are still unripe, he cannot retract, as once the fruits that are being acquired exist, the sale has gone into effect. And Rav Naḥman says: He can retract even once they have come into the world, as one cannot transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world, and the actual transaction was performed before the fruits existed.

וַאֲמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מוֹדֵינָא, דְּאִי שָׁמֵיט וְאָכֵיל, לָא מַפְּקִינַן מִינֵּיהּ! הָתָם זְבִינֵי, הָכָא הַלְוָאָה.

And Rav Naḥman said: I concede that if the buyer seized the fruit and consumed it, we do not take its value from him. The reason is that since the seller initially accepted the transaction, although it involved a legal error, it can be assumed that he decided to waive his rights to the fruit and allowed the other to take it. Consequently, it can be demonstrated that Rav Naḥman holds that mistaken forgiveness is forgiveness. The Gemara rejects this proof: There, the discussion involves a sale, with regard to which it can be said that the seller waived his rights to the fruit. Here, it is referring to a loan, and not requiring the lender to reimburse the borrower for the produce consumed is considered a form of interest.

אֲמַר רָבָא:

Rava said: