״עַשֵּׂר תְּעַשֵּׂר…וְאָכַלְתָּ״ – וְלֹא מוֹכֵר; ״תְּבוּאַת זַרְעֶךָ״ – וְלֹא לוֹקֵחַ. אֶלָּא מִדְּרַבָּנַן, וּקְרָא אַסְמַכְתָּא בְּעָלְמָא.

that a buyer need not tithe the produce he purchases, as derived from the verses: “You shall tithe all the produce of your planting, which is brought forth in the field year by year, and you shall eat before the Lord, your God” (Deuteronomy 14:22–23). They claimed that the phrases “you shall tithe …and you shall eat” indicate that only the one who eats the produce must tithe it, but not the one who sells it. Likewise, the phrase “the produce of your planting” teaches that the one who performs the planting must separate tithes, but not the one who buys it. Rather, the obligation of a buyer to separate tithes applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited as a mere support for this halakha. The residents of Beit Hino did not adhere to this rabbinic law and did not observe the halakha requiring the buyer to separate tithes.

אֶלָּא ״כְּנַפְשְׁךָ״ לְמַאי אֲתָא? לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״כְּנַפְשְׁךָ״, מַה נַּפְשְׁךָ אִם חָסַמְתָּ – פָּטוּר, אַף פּוֹעֵל, אִם חָסַמְתָּ – פָּטוּר.

It was stated previously that a buyer is not required to tithe produce by Torah law. If so, the same certainly applies to a laborer. Consequently, the term kenafshekha cannot serve to teach that a laborer may eat without tithing, as claimed earlier. The Gemara asks: Rather, what does kenafshekha come to teach? The Gemara answers: It comes to teach that which is taught in another baraita: Kenafshekha can mean: Like your own person. Just as with regard to your own person, i.e., the owner, if you muzzled yourself and did not eat from your field’s produce, you are exempt from liability for the transgression of: “You shall not muzzle an ox when it is treading out the grain” (Deuteronomy 25:4), so too with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him, exempt from liability for the transgression of muzzling an ox while it is working.

מְתִיב מָר זוּטְרָא: אֵיזֶהוּ גּוֹרְנָן לְמַעַשְׂרוֹת? בְּקִישּׁוּאִים וּבִדְלוּעִים מִשֶּׁיִּפָּקְסוּ. וְאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִי: מִשֶּׁיִּנָּטֵל פִּיקָס שֶׁלָּהֶן. מַאי לָאו – מִשֶּׁיִּפָּקְסוּ אֲפִילּוּ בַּשָּׂדֶה!

Mar Zutra raises an objection from a mishna (Ma’asrot 1:5): With regard to different types of produce, what is the equivalent of their granary, i.e., the point at which the processing of various types of produce is completed so that they become subject to the halakhot of tithes? With regard to cucumbers and gourds, they become obligated from when they lose their blossom; and Rabbi Asi said: This means from when their blossom [pikas] is removed. The Gemara clarifies the objection from the mishna: What, is it not correct to say that the mishna means from when they lose their blossom, even while the produce is still in the field? This would mean that the produce is subject to the halakhot of tithes before it enters the house or the courtyard, which is not in accordance with the opinions of either Rabbi Yannai or Rabbi Yoḥanan.

לָא, מִשֶּׁיִּפָּקְסוּ בַּבַּיִת. אִי הָכִי, ״מִשֶּׁיִּפָּקְסוּ״? ״עַד שֶׁיִּפָּקְסוּ״ מִיבָּעֵי לֵיהּ!

The Gemara answers: No, the mishna means: From when they lose their blossom specifically in the house or courtyard, i.e., the house or courtyard renders the produce subject to tithes only when the produce loses its blossom. The Gemara asks: If so, the phrase: From when they lose their blossom, is inaccurate, as the mishna should have said: Until they lose their blossom. The expression: From when they lose their blossom, indicates that the obligation applies as soon as that happens, i.e., before the produce enters the courtyard or house. By contrast, the expression: Until they lose their blossom, indicates that the obligation does not come into effect until they lose their blossom, regardless of whatever else is done to them, i.e., only when they are in the house and they lose their blossom.

אִי תְּנָא ״עַד שֶׁיִּפָּקְסוּ״ – הֲוָה אָמִינָא: עַד דְּגָמַר לְפִיקוּסַיְיהוּ. קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן ״מִשֶּׁיִּפָּקְסוּ״ – מִכִּי אַתְחוּלֵי פִּיקוּסַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara answers: Had the mishna taught: Until they lose their blossom, I would say erroneously that the produce is not subject to tithes until their loss of blossom is complete, i.e., until all of the produce loses its blossoms. The expression: From when they lose their blossom, teaches us that the obligation to separate tithes takes effect from when they begin to lose their blossom.

מְתִיב מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: גּוֹרְנוֹ לְמַעֲשֵׂר לְחַיֵּיב עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם טֶבֶל מִשֶּׁתִּגָּמֵר מְלַאכְתָּן. וְאֵיזֶהוּ גְּמַר מְלַאכְתָּן – מְלֶאכֶת הַכְנָסָתָן. מַאי לָאו – הַכְנָסָתָן אֲפִילּוּ בַּשָּׂדֶה!

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to produce, its granary for tithes, rendering one who eats it liable for violating the prohibition against untithed produce, is from when its work is completed. And what is meant by the completion of its work? This means the work of its being brought in. The Gemara discusses the meaning of being brought in. What, is it not correct to say that this is referring to its being brought into a pile, even while the produce is still in the field?

לֹא, הַכְנָסָתָן לַבַּיִת זֶה הוּא גְּמַר מְלַאכְתָּן. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כִּי קָאָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי – בְּזֵיתִים וַעֲנָבִים, דְּלָאו בְּנֵי גוֹרֶן נִינְהוּ. אֲבָל חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין – גּוֹרֶן בְּהֶדְיָא כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it means that its being brought into the house is considered the completion of its work. And if you wish, say instead: When Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yoḥanan say that types of produce are subject to tithes when they are brought into the house or courtyard, they were referring only to olives or grapes, which are not of a granary, i.e., since these types of produce are not processed in a granary, which is the typical criterion for rendering produce subject to tithes, they become subject to tithes when they are brought into a house or courtyard. But in the case of wheat or barley, a granary is explicitly written with regard to them (see Numbers 18:27, 30).

אַשְׁכַּחַן אָדָם בִּמְחוּבָּר וְשׁוֹר בְּתָלוּשׁ. אָדָם בְּתָלוּשׁ מְנָלַן?

§ The Gemara returns to its discussion with regard to the right of a laborer to eat while working: We found a source for the halakha that a person may eat from attached produce while working in the field; and likewise we found a source that an ox that is threshing must be allowed to eat from detached produce, as the verse states: “You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing” (Deuteronomy 25:4). From where do we derive that a person, while working, may eat from detached produce?

קַל וָחוֹמֶר מִשּׁוֹר: וּמַה שּׁוֹר שֶׁאֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל בִּמְחוּבָּר – אוֹכֵל בְּתָלוּשׁ, אָדָם שֶׁאוֹכֵל בִּמְחוּבָּר – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאוֹכֵל בְּתָלוּשׁ! מַה לְּשׁוֹר שֶׁכֵּן אַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה עַל חֲסִימָתוֹ, תֹּאמַר בְּאָדָם – שֶׁאִי אַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה עַל חֲסִימָתוֹ.

The Gemara answers: This is derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of an ox. And if an ox, which one need not allow to eat from attached produce, must be allowed to eat from detached produce, then with regard to a person, who may eat from attached produce, is it not right that he may also eat from detached produce? The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about an ox? It is notable in that you are commanded concerning its muzzling. Can you say that a similar halakha should apply to a person, as you are not commanded with regard to his muzzling?

וִיהֵא אָדָם מְצוּוֶּה עַל חֲסִימָתוֹ מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר מִשּׁוֹר: וּמַה שּׁוֹר שֶׁאִי אַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה לְהַחֲיוֹתוֹ – אַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה עַל חֲסִימָתוֹ. אָדָם שֶׁאַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה לְהַחֲיוֹתוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה עַל חֲסִימָתוֹ?

The Gemara asks: But let an employer be commanded concerning a person’s, i.e., his laborer’s, muzzling, from an a fortiori inference from an ox: And if with regard to an ox, which you are not commanded to sustain, as there is no mitzva to support ownerless oxen if they do not have food to eat, and yet you are commanded concerning its muzzling, with regard to a Jewish person, whom you are commanded to sustain if he is impoverished (see Leviticus 25:35–36), is it not right that you are commanded concerning his muzzling?

אָמַר קְרָא: ״כְּנַפְשְׁךָ״ – כְּנַפְשׁוֹ שֶׁל פּוֹעֵל; מַה נַּפְשׁוֹ, אִם חֲסַמְתּוֹ פָּטוּר – אַף פּוֹעֵל אִם חֲסַמְתּוֹ פָּטוּר.

The Gemara answers: The halakha that one is not commanded concerning the muzzling of his laborer is derived from the fact that the verse states: “ Kenafshekha,” which indicates that as you treat your own person, so is the halakha with regard to the person of the laborer. In other words, just as with regard to himself, the owner, if you muzzled yourself, you are exempt from punishment for violating the transgression of: “You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing,” so too with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him you are exempt from punishment for violating the transgression of muzzling an ox while it is working.

וְאֶלָּא אָדָם בְּתָלוּשׁ מְנָלַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״קָמָה״, ״קָמָה״ שְׁתֵּי פְעָמִים, אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְאָדָם בִּמְחוּבָּר, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְאָדָם בְּתָלוּשׁ.

After refuting the a fortiori inference, the Gemara inquires: Rather, from where do we derive that a person may eat from detached produce? The Gemara answers: The verse states the term “standing,” “standing” twice: “When you come into your neighbor’s standing grain…but you shall not move a sickle on your neighbor’s standing grain” (Deuteronomy 23:26). If the second expression is not applied to the matter of the right of a person to eat from attached produce, as that halakha has been derived from the first mention of “standing,” apply it to the matter of the right of a person to eat from detached produce.

רַבִּי אַמִי אֲמַר: אָדָם בְּתָלוּשׁ לָא צְרִיךְ קְרָא. כְּתִיב: ״כִּי תָבֹא בְּכֶרֶם רֵעֶךָ״ – מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן שֶׁשְּׂכָרוֹ לְכַתֵּף, וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא לֵיכוּל.

Rabbi Ami stated an alternative answer: A verse is not required to teach the right of a person to eat from detached produce, as it is written: “When you come into your neighbor’s vineyard, then you may eat grapes” (Deuteronomy 23:25). Are we not dealing even with a case in which the employer hired the laborer to transport the grapes out of the vineyard, and yet the Merciful One states that he may eat?

שׁוֹר בִּמְחוּבָּר מְנָלַן? קַל וָחֹמֶר מֵאָדָם: וּמָה אָדָם שֶׁאֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל בְּתָלוּשׁ – אוֹכֵל בִּמְחוּבָּר, שׁוֹר שֶׁאוֹכֵל בְּתָלוּשׁ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאוֹכֵל בִּמְחוּבָּר? מַה לְּאָדָם שֶׁכֵּן אַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה לְהַחֲיוֹתוֹ, תֹּאמַר בְּשׁוֹר שֶׁאִי אַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה לְהַחֲיוֹתוֹ?

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce? an a fortiori inference from the case of a person. And if a person, who may not eat from detached produce, i.e., there is no explicit verse that permits him to do so, nevertheless may eat from attached produce, then with regard to an ox, which must be allowed to eat from detached produce, is it not right that it must also be allowed to eat from attached produce? The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about a person? He is notable in that you are commanded to sustain him. Can you say that a similar halakha should apply in a case of an ox, when you are not commanded to sustain it?

וִיהֵא שׁוֹר מְצוּוֶּה לְהַחֲיוֹתוֹ מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה אָדָם שֶׁאִי אַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה עַל חֲסִימָתוֹ – אַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה לְהַחֲיוֹתוֹ, שׁוֹר שֶׁאַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה עַל חֲסִימָתוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאַתָּה מְצוּוֶּה לְהַחֲיוֹתוֹ?

The Gemara asks: But let one be commanded to sustain an ox, to prevent the suffering of living creatures, by an a fortiori inference from the case of a person: And if, with regard to a person, where you are not commanded concerning his muzzling, nevertheless you are commanded to sustain him, then in the case of an ox, where you are commanded concerning its muzzling, is it not right that you are commanded to sustain it?

אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְחֵי אָחִיךָ עִמָּךְ״ – ״אָחִיךָ״ וְלֹא שׁוֹר. וְאֶלָּא שׁוֹר בִּמְחוּבָּר מְנָלַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״רֵעֶךָ״, ״רֵעֶךָ״ שְׁתֵּי פְעָמִים, אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְאָדָם בִּמְחוּבָּר – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְשׁוֹר בִּמְחוּבָּר.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This cannot be the case, as the verse states: “And your brother shall live with you” (Leviticus 25:36), which indicates that the mitzva to provide sustenance applies only to your brother, but not to an ox. After refuting the a fortiori inference, the Gemara inquires: Rather, from where do we derive that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce? The Gemara answers: The verse states the term “your neighbor,” “your neighbor” twice (Deuteronomy 23:26). If the second expression is not applied to the matter of the right of a person to eat from attached produce, as that halakha has been derived from the first mention of “your neighbor,” apply it to the matter of an ox, that it must be allowed to eat from attached produce.

רָבִינָא אֲמַר: לָא אָדָם בְּתָלוּשׁ וְלָא שׁוֹר בִּמְחוּבָּר צְרִיכִי קְרָאֵי, דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא תַחְסֹם שׁוֹר בְּדִישׁוֹ״.

Ravina said: Verses are not necessary either for the halakha that a person may eat from detached produce, or for the halakha that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce, as it is written: “You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing” (Deuteronomy 25:4).