menu
small logo

Back

Bekhorot

Daf 52b

לְאִיתוּיֵי שְׁבָחָא דְּמִמֵּילָא, חֲפוּרָה וְהָווּ שׁוּבְלֵי, שַׁלְפּוּפֵי וְהָווּ תַּמְרֵי.

The Gemara explains that this halakha is repeated in order to include an enhancement that occurs by itself after the death of the father or husband, for instance in a case when fodder [ḥafura], i.e., produce that has grown stalks but is not yet ripe, becomes full ears, or when date flowers [shalpufei] become fully developed dates. Despite the fact that in such cases the property became enhanced by itself, without any effort on the part of the other brothers, the firstborn may not claim his double portion from that enhancement, and the same applies in the other cases mentioned in the mishna.

TOSAFOT

לאיתויי שבחא דממילא חפורה והוו שובלי כו׳ כרבנן אתיא מתני׳ דפליגי רבי ורבנן גבי בכור אם נוטל בשבח אם לאו ומסיק התם ובחפורה והוי שובלי שלפופי והוו תמרי פליגי והתם נמי קאמר רבא דאסור לעשות כדברי רבי:

״וְלֹא בָּרָאוּי כְּבַמּוּחְזָק״ – לְאִיתוּיֵי נִכְסֵי דַּאֲבִי אַבָּא.

With regard to the repetition of the statement: Nor does he take twice the portion in property due the father as he does in property in his possession, this serves to include property of the father’s father, in a case where the father died before his own father. The firstborn does not receive his portion in such property, despite the fact that it will certainly come into the father’s possession, as this too is considered property that is due the father, not property in his possession. The same halakha applies also in the case of property due the wife, the daughters, or a yavam.

מתני׳ וְאֵלּוּ שֶׁאֵין חוֹזְרִין בַּיּוֹבֵל: הַבְּכוֹרָה, וְהַיּוֹרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְהַמְיַיבֵּם אֶת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו;

And these are the people whose properties, unlike an ancestral field, do not return to their original owners in the Jubilee Year: primogeniture need not return the extra portion for redistribution among the brothers; and one who inherits his wife’s property need not return it to her family; and one who consummates the levirate marriage with the wife of his brother and gains the right to his brother’s property need not return it for redistribution among the brothers.

וְהַמַּתָּנָה – דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הַמַּתָּנָה כְּמֶכֶר. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: כּוּלָּם חוֹזְרִין בַּיּוֹבֵל. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה אוֹמֵר: אַף הַיּוֹרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ יַחֲזִיר לִבְנֵי מִשְׁפָּחָה, וִינַכֶּה מֵהֶן אֶת הַדָּמִים.

And likewise, a gift of land need not be returned to the original owners in the Jubilee Year; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The halakhic status of a gift is like that of a sale, and it must be returned. Rabbi Elazar says: All these lands return in the Jubilee Year. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Even one who inherits his wife’s property must return the land to the members of her father’s family and should deduct from them the monetary value of the land, as the Gemara will explain.

גמ׳ מַאי טַעֲמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? מֶכֶר הוּא דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא לִיהֲדַר בַּיּוֹבֵל, מַתָּנָה וִירוּשָּׁה – לָא, וְהָנֵי מִירוּשָּׁה – יְרוּשָּׁה, דְּמַתָּנָה – מַתָּנָה; בְּכוֹר – ״לָתֶת לוֹ פִּי שְׁנַיִם״, מַתָּנָה קָרְיֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא,

The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Meir, who holds that none of these items return in the Jubilee Year? The Gemara answers: It is with regard to land acquired specifically by means of a sale that the Merciful One states that it should be returned during the Jubilee Year (see Leviticus 25:28), whereas a gift and an inheritance are not returned. And these cases listed in the mishna that are derived from the halakha of an inheritance have the status of an inheritance, and those that are derived from a gift have the status of a gift. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to a firstborn, it is stated: “By giving him a double portion” (Deuteronomy 21:17); here the Merciful One calls the portion of a firstborn a gift, an item that is given.

TOSAFOT

בכור לתת לו פי שנים מתנה קרייה רחמנא תימה בפרק שני דיבמות (דף כד:) דמסיק גבי יבם אלא בכור דקרייה רחמנא למאי הלכתא לגריעותא דאינו נוטל בראוי כבמוחזק אמאי לא קאמר לחשיבותא דאינה חוזרת ביובל בבכורה וי״ל משום דאיכא ר׳ אלעזר דפליג הכא ואמר כולן חוזרין ביובל:

וְהַיּוֹרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ – יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא, וְהַמְיַיבֵּם אֶת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו – ״בְּכוֹר״ קָרְיֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.

And one who inherits his wife’s property need not return it to her family in the Jubilee Year, as Rabbi Meir maintains that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, not a rabbinic enactment, and land acquired through inheritance is not returned. And likewise, one who consummates the levirate marriage with the wife of his brother need not return the brother’s property for redistribution among the brothers. This is because the Merciful One calls the yavam a firstborn, in the verse: “And it shall be, the firstborn” (Deuteronomy 25:6), and Rabbi Meir holds that the portion of the firstborn is not returned in the Jubilee Year, as explained earlier.

״וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים מַתָּנָה כְּמֶכֶר״. מַאי טַעֲמַיְיהוּ דְּרַבָּנַן? ״תָּשֻׁבוּ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַמַּתָּנָה,

The mishna further teaches: And the Rabbis say: The halakhic status of a gift is like that of a sale, and must be returned. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of the Rabbis? The Gemara answers that the term “you shall return” in the verse: “In the Jubilee Year you shall return every man to his possession” (Leviticus 25:13), is superfluous, as it is already stated: “It shall be a Jubilee for you, and you shall return every man to his possession” (Leviticus 25:10). Therefore, this term serves to include a gift, which is also returned in the Jubilee Year.

וְהָנֵי כּוּלְּהוּ יְרוּשָּׁה נִינְהוּ;

And these other cases listed in the mishna are all considered as an inheritance, and consequently they are not returned in the Jubilee Year. With regard to the husband’s inheritance of his wife’s property, the Rabbis, like Rabbi Meir, maintain that it applies by Torah law, and they agree that the yavam is considered like a firstborn with respect to his portion.

בְּכוֹר – אָמַר קְרָא: ״לָתֶת לוֹ פִּי שְׁנַיִם״, מַקִּישׁ חֵלֶק בְּכוֹרָה לְחֵלֶק פָּשׁוּט, מַה חֵלֶק פָּשׁוּט – יְרוּשָּׁה, אַף חֵלֶק בְּכוֹרָה – יְרוּשָּׁה.

As for a firstborn, the verse states: “By giving him a double portion” (Deuteronomy 21:17), and the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir, who derives from this verse that the portion of the firstborn has the status of a gift. Rather, they maintain that the verse juxtaposes the extra portion of the firstborn to the portion he receives as an ordinary brother: Just as the portion of an ordinary brother is not redistributed among the brothers in the Jubilee Year, but rather is an inheritance, as it is stated: “On the day that he causes his sons to inherit” (Deuteronomy 21:16), so too the portion of the firstborn is an inheritance, and is not returned in the Jubilee Year.

״רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר כּוּלָּם חוֹזְרִים בַּיּוֹבֵל״. סָבַר לָהּ כְּרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי: ״תָּשֻׁבוּ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַמַּתָּנָה, וְהָנֵי כּוּלְּהוּ מַתָּנָה נִינְהוּ; בְּכוֹר – ״לָתֶת לוֹ פִּי שְׁנַיִם״, מַתָּנָה קָרְיֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.

The mishna further teaches that Rabbi Elazar says: All these lands return in the Jubilee Year. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the term “you shall return” serves to include a gift, and he further maintains that these cases listed in the mishna are all considered gifts. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to a firstborn it is stated: “By giving him a double portion.” Through the use of the term “giving,” the Merciful One calls his portion a gift.

וְהַיּוֹרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ – יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּרַבָּנַן, וְהַמְיַיבֵּם אֶת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו – ״בְּכוֹר״ קָרְיֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.

And with regard to one who inherits his wife’s property, Rabbi Elazar maintains that the inheritance of a husband is by rabbinic law, and therefore it does not have the status of an inheritance that does not return in the Jubilee Year. And finally, one who consummates the levirate marriage with the wife of his brother returns the property for redistribution among the brothers, as the Merciful One calls him a firstborn, and Rabbi Elazar rules that the portion of the firstborn is returned in the Jubilee Year.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָאַחִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ – לָקוֹחוֹת הֵן, וּמַחֲזִירִין זֶה לָזֶה בַּיּוֹבֵל. מוֹתִיב רַב הוֹשַׁעֲיָא: וְאֵלּוּ שֶׁאֵין חוֹזְרִין בַּיּוֹבֵל: הַבְּכוֹרָה!

§ Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Brothers who divided property are considered purchasers from each other, i.e., one does not say they each received the exact inheritance to which they were entitled. And as purchasers of land, they must return the portions to each other in the Jubilee Year, at which point they redistribute the property. Rav Hoshaya raises an objection from the mishna: And these are the people whose properties do not return to their original owners in the Jubilee Year: The firstborn who inherited his father’s property by the right of primogeniture.

TOSAFOT

אמר רבי אסי אמר ר׳ יוחנן האחין שחלקו לקוחות הן ומה שקשה אדר׳ אסי דריש פירקין (בכורות מח.) דאמר מחצה יורשין ומה שמקשה ר״ת היאך מצינו ידינו ורגלינו בבית המדרש דקי״ל כרבי יוחנן דלקוחות הן וכריש לקיש דקנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף וא״כ לא משכחת לך דמייתי ביכורים אלא חד בר חד עד יהושע בן נון הכל פירשתי בפ׳ החובל (ב״ק פח: ד״ה הכי) (ובפ׳ בית כור) (קו) ויש לפרש דאע״ג דאית ליה לקוחות הן וכל הנהו נמי דאית להו אין ברירה לא אמרו דמחזירין ביובל רק רבי יוחנן לבדו ודוקא על ר׳ יוחנן דייק בסוף השולח (גיטין דף מח.) היאך מצא ידיו ורגליו דהרי חוזרת ביובל בכך אבל כולהו אחריני סברי אע״ג דלקוחות הן דאין ברירה מכר הוא דאמר רחמנא דליהדר ביובל ירושה ומתנה לא כדאמר לעיל וכדאמר נמי לקמן בפרק בתרא (בכורות דף נו:) דאע״ג דא״ר יוחנן דאפילו חלקו ט׳ כנגד ט׳ וי׳ כנגד י׳ אין אומרים הוא חלקו המגיעו משעה ראשונה לכך אפ״ה אצטריך לאשמועי׳ דלקוחות הוו וחוזרים ביובל דסלקא אדעתין דאין חוזר מטעם דפרישית אי נמי ילפינן כל חלוקת ירושה מחלוקת יהושע דאמר ביש נוחלין (ב״ב דף קיט:) דירושה היא להם מאבותיהם ואפ״ה מודה בה ר׳ יוחנן דלא חזרה ביובל כדקאמר חד בר חד עד יהושע בן נון דסברא הוא דלא חזרה כיון שחלקו על פי נביאים ובאורים ותומים ובגזירת הכתוב ובהך סברא פליגי שאר אמוראי על רבי יוחנן וניחא השתא הא דפריך הכא רב אושעיא על רבי יוחנן ממתניתין דקתני ואלו שאין חוזרין ביובל הבכורה ואיכא אמוראי דאית להו לקוחות הן ואין ברירה ולא פריך עלייהו אלא דווקא על רבי יוחנן משום דאמר חוזרין וא״ת מאי קשה לרבי יוחנן הא רבי מאיר קתני לה למתני׳ דאית ליה ברירה גבי לוקח יין מבין הכותיים (תוספתא דדמאי פ״ז מ״ד) וי״ל דחכמים נמי לא פליגי עליה בבכור אלא ר״א ועוד דאע״ג דאית ליה ברירה היכא דמברר הספק ע״פ תנאו דלמא לית ליה בעלמא שיש לחלק כדפרשי׳ לעיל (בכורות דף מח. ד״ה דכולי):

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מַאי ״אֵין חוֹזְרִין״ – אֵין חוֹזְרִין לְבַטָּלָה. מַתְקִיף לָהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מִכְּלָל דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר חוֹזְרִין – חוֹזְרִין לְבַטָּלָה קָאָמַר?

Rabbi Elazar said to Rav Hoshaya: What is the meaning of the clause: They do not return? It means that they do not return for naught, i.e., the firstborn does not forfeit the double portion; rather, when they redistribute the property he again receives a double portion. Rav Sheshet objects to this: By inference from this answer, should one conclude that the one who says the portion of the firstborn returns in the Jubilee Year is saying that it returns for naught? Why should the firstborn lose his double portion?

קָרֵי רַב חָמָא עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: ״טוֹבָה חָכְמָה עִם נַחֲלָה״; וְלָא שְׁמִיעַ לְהוּ הָא, דְּכִי אָתֵי רָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְאָמְרִי לָהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן שַׁמּוּעַ: מַאי ״חוֹזְרִין״ – חוֹזְרִין לְבַטָּלָה.

Rav Ḥama read the verse about Rav Sheshet: “Wisdom is good with an inheritance” (Ecclesiastes 7:11), baraitot, as does Rav Sheshet; rather, one must also be expert in the wisdom of amora’im. Rav Ḥama explained: Didn’t Rav Sheshet hear this matter, that when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say that Rabbi Elazar said it in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua, who is the tanna Rabbi Elazar in the mishna: What is the meaning of the clause: They return in the Jubilee Year? It means that they return for naught, and they forfeit that which they received.

TOSAFOT

קרי רב חמא עליה דרב ששת טובה חכמה עם נחלה רב ששת בעל ברייתות הוה כדאמר בפ׳ הדר (עירובין דף סז.) דרב חסדא מרתען שפוותיה (ממתניתין) דרב ששת ולה״ק טובה חכמה מימרא דרבין א״ר יוחנן עם נחלה קבלות הרבה שהיו לו שנויות בברייתא:

״רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה אוֹמֵר: אַף הַיּוֹרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ יַחֲזִיר לִבְנֵי״ וכו׳. מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא – אַמַּאי יַחֲזִיר לִבְנֵי מִשְׁפָּחָה? וְאִי קָסָבַר יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּרַבָּנַן – דָּמִים מַאי עֲבִידְתַיְיהוּ?

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Even one who inherits his wife’s property must return the land to the members of her father’s family What does Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka hold? If he holds that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, why must he return the property to the members of his wife’s family? An inheritance by Torah law is not given back in the Jubilee Year. And if he holds that the inheritance of a husband is by rabbinic law, what is the purpose of the money he receives from his wife’s relatives? Since the property belongs to them, they should not have to pay him anything.

לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁהוֹרִישַׁתּוּ אִשְׁתּוֹ בֵּית הַקְּבָרוֹת, וּמִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה אָמוּר רַבָּנַן לִשְׁקוֹל דָּמֵי וְלִיהֲדַר.

The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka holds that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, and what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where his wife bequeathed to him her family’s graveyard. And due to the need to avoid a family flaw, i.e., harm to the family name, if the wife’s family would be buried in plots belonging to others, the Sages said he should take money from them and return the graveyard.

וְכִדְתַנְיָא: הַמּוֹכֵר קִבְרוֹ וְדֶרֶךְ קִבְרוֹ, מְקוֹם מַעֲמָדוֹ, וּבֵית הֶסְפֵּדוֹ – בָּאִים בְּנֵי מִשְׁפָּחָה וְקוֹבְרִים אוֹתוֹ בְּעַל כָּרְחוֹ, מִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה. וּמַאי ״יְנַכֶּה לָהֶם מִן הַדָּמִים״? דְּמֵי קֶבֶר אִשְׁתּוֹ. הדרן עלך יש בכור

And this is as it is taught in a baraita discussing halakhot connected with burial that serve to uphold family honor: In the case of one who sells his grave, or the path to his grave, or the place where visitors would stand to comfort the mourners, or the place of his eulogies, the members of his family may come and bury him in his ancestral plot against the purchaser’s wishes, due to the need to avoid a family flaw, i.e., harm to the family name. And what is the meaning of the clause: And deduct for them part of the monetary value of the property? It means that he must deduct the monetary value of his wife’s grave from the value of the field, as a husband is obligated to pay for his wife’s burial (see Ketubot 47b).

TOSAFOT

באין בני המשפחה וקוברין אותו בעל כרחו משום פגם משפחה בפרק נגמר הדין (סנהדרין דף מו: ושם) מבעיא לן קבורה משום בזיונא או משום כפרה נפקא מינה דאמר לא תקברוניה דאי משום בזיונא לאו כל כמיניה וליכא למיפשט מידי מהכא דלא קאמר הכא דלא ליקברוהו כלל אלא זוזי אנסוהו למכור קברו ודרכו וכן מההיא דכתובות (דף מח.) נמי ליכא למיפשט מינה דקאמר אל תקברוהו מנכסיו אין שומעין לו דבעי הוא שיקברוהו אלא מתכוין להפיל עצמו על הציבור ולהעשיר את בניו:

SUMMARY

With regard to the halakha of redemption of the firstborn, a firstborn is defined as a male who was the first child born to an Israelite woman, specifically one who “opens the womb” (Exodus 13:2), i.e., is born via a natural birth. Consequently, a son born following a miscarriage is not a firstborn, as he did not open the womb. If the miscarriage occurred in the very early stages of development of the fetus, the son born afterward is a firstborn with regard to redemption. With regard to a son born by caesarean section, he is not a firstborn with regard to redemption, as he did not open the womb, but the one who follows him is not the firstborn either, as he is not the first child born to his mother. It is further derived from the phrase “whatever opens the womb among the children of Israel” that only a son who opens his mother’s womb when she is a Jew is classified as the firstborn. Therefore, if a woman had given birth when she was a gentile and subsequently gave birth to a male after her conversion, that son is not a firstborn. Conversely, if a woman was pregnant when she was a gentile, and converted before giving birth for the first time to a son, he is considered a firstborn. Although the definition of a firstborn is determined based on the opening of the womb, nevertheless, all firstborn members of the tribe of Levi, including Levites and priests, are exempt from the obligation of redemption. Moreover, even a firstborn son born to the daughter of a priest or the daughter of a Levite who married an Israelite is exempt from redemption. The reason for this is that the firstborn is determined based on the opening of the womb, which relates to the female; consequently, her status as a Levite also exempts her son from the obligation. The mitzva of the redemption of the firstborn applies once the son is one month old, and it is concluded that the obligation does not take effect until following the thirtieth day. If one redeemed his son at a younger age, and the son then died before he reached the age of a month, the priest must return the redemption money to the father. If the father gave five silver shekel coins to a priest within thirty days on the condition that his son should be redeemed at the appropriate time, he is redeemed after thirty days. Nevertheless, since most people do not redeem their sons before thirty days from the birth, if the father died within thirty days it is presumed that he did not perform the redemption and his son is obligated to redeem himself. Conversely, there is an assumption that a father will generally redeem his son when the time arrives, and therefore if the father died after thirty days the presumption is that the son was redeemed. The mitzva of redemption applies primarily to the father, but if he neglected to perform it the son must redeem himself. If that son fathered a firstborn before he himself was redeemed, his own redemption takes precedence over that of his son, as a mitzva that pertains to one’s own body precedes a mitzva he must perform with regard to someone else. The five silver shekels that must be given to a priest for the redemption of a firstborn son are calculated according to the value of the shekel of the Sanctuary, each of which weighs twenty gera, as stated in the Torah. This weight is in refined silver, similar to the Tyrian coinage in the period of the Mishna, and the Sages of the Gemara evaluated these shekels according to the weight and value of the coins of their time. Just as the redemption of the firstborn must be given in Tyrian coinage, the same applies to the other set payments in the Torah, such as the fine of fifty shekels paid by a rapist and by a seducer. By contrast, a fine imposed by the Sages is calculated based on provincial coinage, which is worth one-eighth of Tyrian coinage. One may redeem his son not only with money but also with items of equivalent value, provided the item used is movable and has intrinsic monetary value. Therefore, land, which is not movable, Canaanite slaves, which are compared to land, and promissory notes, which do not have intrinsic monetary value, may not be used. The priest is permitted to return to the father the five sela that he received, and this has been the custom of many priests over the generations. The Sages insisted that the father must fully intend to give over the money to the priest; otherwise, his son is not redeemed. The firstborn who is entitled to a double share in his father’s inheritance is one who is “the first of his strength” (Deuteronomy 21:17). Unlike the case of the redemption of the firstborn, which depends on the opening of the womb, one who follows a miscarriage is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance. Nevertheless, if the head of the one born first emerged while he was still alive, even if he subsequently died, the following son is not the firstborn, as the first child is considered one whom the father would “recognize” (Deuteronomy 21:17). A convert who fathered sons when he was a gentile does not have a firstborn son for inheritance, even if he later had a son when he was a Jew, as that son is not called “the first of his strength.” The Sages derived from the phrase: “Of all that he has” (Deuteronomy 21:17), that the firstborn receives a double portion only in that which was in his father’s possession at the time of his death. He does not take a double portion in any enhancement of the value of the property after the death of the father, nor does he take a double portion in property due the father that was not actually in the father’s possession, such as a loan that was due him. The Sages add that these principles also apply to property that a yavam inherits from his late brother, as well as the right of a woman to her husband’s property as payment for her marriage contract, and the right of the daughters to their sustenance from his estate. The last part of the chapter dealt with another aspect of the inheritance of a firstborn, which is that his double portion is not considered like a sold field and therefore does not return in the Jubilee Year for redistribution among all the brothers. Although the Sages stated that brothers who divided their father’s inheritance are obligated to return their portions to the common estate in the Jubilee Year, this means they must return it, but the firstborn does not forfeit his extra portion. Incidental to this halakha, the chapter enumerated which items are returned in the Jubilee Year. Many cases of uncertainty were analyzed in the chapter, both with regard to the right of a priest to the redemption money of the son and the right of the firstborn to a double portion of his father’s inheritance. The guiding principle is that the burden of proof rests on the claimant, and therefore in most situations of uncertainty neither the priest nor the firstborn may take what they maintain is theirs. Nevertheless, there are certain instances where a priest is entitled to the redemption money notwithstanding the uncertainty, and likewise there are cases where people can authorize each other to claim a debt, if it is certain that at least one of them is definitely entitled to it.