This chapter enumerated the halakhot of two related offerings, the sin offering and the provisional guilt offering. The two main topics discussed were the cases in which one is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering, and the nature of the unwitting sin for which one is obligated to bring a sin offering. For every sin that renders one liable to bring a sin offering in the case of a known transgression, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for an uncertain transgression. An individual is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering only if there are two possibilities or items before him, one permitted and the other forbidden, e.g., two pieces of fat, one forbidden and the other permitted, and he ate one of them; or two women, one of whom was permitted to him and the other forbidden, and he engaged in intercourse with one of them; or if he is unsure whether he performed labor on Shabbat or on the following day. If there was only one piece of fat before him, he is not liable. Several reasons are suggested for this ruling. The one accepted by halakha is that in such a case the prohibition has not been established. If the prohibition was initially established, then even if a dog first ate one of the pieces, one who eats the second piece is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. The obligation to bring a provisional guilt offering is similar in form to the obligation to bring a sin offering. Just as one who ate several pieces of forbidden fat in a single lapse of awareness is liable to bring only one sin offering, so too, if one ate several pieces of questionable fat in one lapse of awareness he is liable to bring a single provisional guilt offering. Similarly, just as in the case of a sin offering, if one became aware that he had eaten forbidden fat between each instance of consumption, he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each instance, so too, if one who ate fat of questionable status was made aware of this fact between each instance of consumption, he must bring a provisional guilt offering for each act. If one brings a provisional guilt offering for an uncertain transgression and later discovers that he did, in fact, commit a transgression, he is required to bring a sin offering. By contrast, in a case where he became aware that the status of the piece was questionable and then ate another questionable piece, if he eventually discovers that the pieces were in fact forbidden, his awareness of their questionable status between each act of consumption does not render him liable to bring more than one sin offering. This is because only definite awareness divides one’s acts and renders him liable to bring a sin offering for each act. One brings a provisional guilt offering for a case of uncertainty only if he is uncertain whether he committed a transgression that would render him liable to bring a sin offering. If he certainly committed a transgression, but he does not know which one, he is exempt from bringing a provisional guilt offering, as it is stated with regard to this offering: “And if anyone sin…though he does not know it” (Leviticus 5:17), and in this case he does know that he sinned. The question of whether he brings a standard sin offering in such a case is subject to a dispute between tanna’im. The conclusion is that he does not bring a sin offering, as the verse states with regard to this offering: “If his sin…be known to him” (Leviticus 4:23), and in this case the exact sin in unknown to him. Just as one must know his precise transgression in order for him to be liable to bring a sin offering, he likewise brings a sin offering only if he intended the specific action that he performed. If he accomplished his intended action but unwittingly committed a transgression because he thought it was permitted, he is liable. If he acted unawares, he is exempt. The concept of acting unawares was discussed at length in this chapter, and various opinions were stated with regard to the definition of such an action. The halakha is in accordance with the opinion that even if one intended to perform a transgression and eventually performed that very same transgression with a completely different item than he had initially intended, he is exempt. For example, if he intended to pick grapes on Shabbat and instead he accidentally picked figs, he is exempt. He is also exempt in a case where he planned to commit two transgressions in a specific order, but in practice he reversed the order. Moreover, even if one committed a transgression with the item that he had initially intended, but while performing the action he temporarily forgot his initial intention and was intending to use a different item, he is exempt. Nevertheless, when both items are of the same category he is liable even if he had initially intended to use a different item. In the course of discussing the principle of one who acts unawares, the Gemara clarified that this exemption applies to the halakhot of Shabbat. The reason is that the Torah prohibited only planned, constructive labor on Shabbat. An act of labor that is not intended, or whose result is unintended, is not included in this category. By contrast, in the case of one who eats forbidden foods or engages in forbidden sexual intercourse, he is not exempt from the obligation to bring an offering for acting unawares. In these cases, since he derives physical pleasure from these acts, he is liable despite the fact that his intention was unrealized. In addition to these main points in the chapter, the Gemara mentioned other related halakhot. These include the case of one who enters the Temple while ritually impure but without clear knowledge of his impure status, an analysis of the atonement one receives on Yom Kippur, and some clarification of the halakhot of Shabbat that are governed by the principle that the Torah prohibited only constructive labor on Shabbat.

And you shall consume no manner of blood, whether it is of bird or of animal, in any of your dwellings. Whoever consumes any blood, that soul shall be cut off from his people. (Leviticus 7:26–27)

And any man there is of the house of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among them, who consumes any manner of blood, I will set My face against that soul that consumes blood, and will cut him off from among his people. For the soul of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that atones for the soul. (Leviticus 17:10–11)

The first part of this chapter seeks to define the prohibition against consuming blood, which is listed at the beginning of the tractate among the prohibitions punishable by karet. There are two primary areas that must be clarified in this regard: First, which kinds of living things are included in this prohibition? Is the prohibition limited to the consumption of the blood of birds and mammals, which are mentioned in the verse, or is the blood of other kinds of creatures also included, and if so, which kinds of creatures? Second, the Torah states that the reason blood is forbidden to be consumed is that “the soul of the flesh is in the blood” (Leviticus 17:11). This raises the question of whether there is a distinction between the blood that spurts out as the animal dies, and the blood that emerges later. Is one liable to receive karet for consuming the latter type of blood or only the former type? With regard to both of these areas of inquiry, the common denominator is the following question: Is there blood that is forbidden for consumption, but for which one is not liable to receive karet if he consumed it intentionally, and for which one is not liable to bring a sin offering if he consumed it unwittingly? The chapter continues with an examination of the provisional guilt offering and the transgressions for which it is brought. Is this guilt offering sacrificed only in a case where it is uncertain whether one committed a sin that would cause liability to bring a sin offering, or does it apply with regard to other prohibitions as well? The main discussion in this regard appears in the next chapter; the focus of the analysis in this chapter is on the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, which does not render one liable to bring a sin offering. This prohibition is of particular relevance in the context of the provisional guilt offering, for two reasons: First, the passage pertaining to the guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property is written in the Torah adjacent to the passage about the provisional guilt offering. Second, the guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, like the sin offering, is brought only for an unwitting transgression. The last section of the chapter deals with special cases where there is uncertainty about which one of two individuals violated a prohibition. For example, if there were two pieces of meat, only one of which was prohibited, and each person ate one piece but it is not known who ate the forbidden piece, the following question arises: Are the individuals treated separately and each is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, or can they bring a single sin offering together and stipulate that it should be considered to have been brought by the one who ate the forbidden piece? These issues and more are discussed in this chapter.