וְכִי מְשַׁיֵּיר בָּהּ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה וּמְיַיעֵד – הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין, הָכָא נַמִי לָא שְׁנָא.

And yet if time for her to perform work worth one peruta remains, and he designates her, it is a betrothal. This shows that he can betroth her with a loan, i.e., the value of the remaining time of her servitude, for which she herself is collateral. Here too, it is no different, and in general one may betroth a woman with a loan for which there is collateral.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כֵּיצַד מִצְוַת יֵעוּד? אוֹמֵר לָהּ בִּפְנֵי שְׁנַיִם ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״ ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְאוֹרֶסֶת לִי״, אֲפִילּוּ בְּסוֹף שֵׁשׁ, וַאֲפִילּוּ סָמוּךְ לִשְׁקִיעַת הַחַמָּה. וְנוֹהֵג בָּהּ מִנְהַג אִישׁוּת, וְאֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג בָּהּ מִנְהַג שִׁפְחוּת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אִם יֵשׁ שְׁהוּת בַּיּוֹם כְּדֵי לַעֲשׂוֹת עִמּוֹ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת; וְאִם לָאו – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

§ The Sages taught: How is the mitzva of designation performed? says to her before two witnesses: You are hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet] to me, or: You are hereby betrothed [me’oreset] to me. The designation is effective even if he said this at the end of six years of work, and even if it is close to sunset on the last day of her term. And once he designates her he treats her in the manner of marriage and may not treat her in the manner of slavery. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: If there is enough time left in that day for her to perform for him work worth one peruta, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.

מָשָׁל לָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי מֵעַכְשָׁיו לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״, וּבָא אַחֵר וְקִידְּשָׁהּ בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – שֶׁמְּקוּדֶּשֶׁת לָרִאשׁוֹן. מָשָׁל לְמַאן?

The baraita continues: This can be understood by way of a parable comparing this halakha to the halakha of one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me from now after thirty days, and another man came and betrothed her within thirty days. In this case the halakha is that she is betrothed to the first man. The Gemara inquires: According to whom is this parable suggested? Of the two opinions cited in the baraita, whose opinion accords with the halakha in the case of the parable?

אִילֵימָא מָשָׁל לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – הָא אִם יֵשׁ שְׁהוּת בַּיּוֹם כְּדֵי לַעֲשׂוֹת עִמּוֹ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו – לָא!

If we say that the halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, didn’t he say: If there is enough time on that day for her to perform for him work worth one peruta, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, maintains that she is not considered betrothed conditionally when she is initially acquired as a Hebrew maidservant. Rather, the betrothal takes effect only when he designates her. This is evident from the fact that enough time must remain for her to perform work worth one peruta, as she is betrothed with that amount. If so, one cannot compare his ruling to the case of the parable, where the betrothal of the first was given before that of the second.

אֲמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: מָשָׁל לְרַבָּנַן. פְּשִׁיטָא!

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said: The halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of the Rabbis, i.e., the first opinion cited in the baraita, who say that when she was initially acquired as a Hebrew maidservant it is as though he had betrothed her on condition that she would be retroactively betrothed whenever her master desired. This indicates that retroactive betrothal is possible. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that this comparison is correct? Why would the baraita need to state a parable?

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָא לָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו״. קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.

The Gemara explains: The baraita needs to state a parable lest you say that the Rabbis hold she is betrothed to the master even if the master did not say to the father that she is betrothed to him from now. The parable therefore teaches us that the case of the master is comparable to a case where the first man said to her: From now, and if the master did not state this term when acquiring her as a Hebrew maidservant, then she is not betrothed to him.

תַּנְיָא אִידָךְ: הַמּוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ, וְהָלַךְ וְקִידְּשָׁהּ לְאַחֵר – שִׂיחֵק בָּאָדוֹן, וּמְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אִם רָצָה לְיַיעֵד – מְיַיעֵד.

It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who first sells his daughter as a Hebrew maidservant and then goes and betroths her to another man, he mocks the master, and she is betrothed to the second man. Although he sold her as a Hebrew maidservant, he can remove her from the authority of the master, and this is seen as mocking him. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: If the master wants to designate her, he can designate her, and the second man’s betrothal is void.

מָשָׁל לָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״ וּבָא אַחֵר וְקִידְּשָׁהּ בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – שֶׁמְּקוּדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי. מָשָׁל לְמַאן?

The baraita continues: This can be understood by way of a parable comparing this halakha to the halakha of one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me after thirty days, and another man came and betrothed her within thirty days. In this case the halakha is that she is betrothed to the second man. The Gemara inquires: According to whom is this parable suggested? Of the two opinions cited in the baraita, whose opinion accords with the halakha in the case of the parable?

אִילֵימָא לְרַבָּנַן – הָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אִם רָצָה לְיַיעֵד מְיַיעֵד!

If we say that the halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of the Rabbis, don’t the Rabbis say that if the master wants to designate her, he may designate her, and the second man’s betrothal does not take effect? In the case of the parable, she is betrothed to the second man, and the first cannot prevent this.

אֶלָּא אֲמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: מָשָׁל לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. פְּשִׁיטָא!

Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said: The halakha in the case of the parable is compared to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that this comparison is correct? Why would the baraita need to state a parable?

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָא לָא אֲמַר לָהּ ״לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״. קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.

The Gemara explains: The baraita needs to state a parable lest you say that the case of the Hebrew maidservant is different, as he did not say to her when he acquired her: After thirty days. One might argue that the reason Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that she is not betrothed to the master is that he did not state when he acquired her that she should be designated at a specific time in the future, but if he would have stated this at the time he acquired her as a Hebrew maidservant, the designation would then take effect. By comparing this case to the case of the parable, the baraita teaches us that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, would hold that the designation does not take effect even if the master had said at the time of the acquisition that designation should take effect in thirty days, provided that her father betroths her to another in the interim.

תַּנְיָא אִידָךְ: הַמּוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ וּפָסַק עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא לְיַיעֵד – נִתְקַיֵּים הַתְּנַאי, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אִם רָצָה לְיַיעֵד – מְיַיעֵד, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִתְנָה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה, וְכָל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל.

§ It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who sells his daughter and stipulates with the buyer that the sale applies on the condition that he does not designate her, the condition stands. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: If the master wants to designate her he may designate her, because the father stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah, as the Torah permits the designation of a Hebrew maidservant. And with regard to anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.

וּלְרַבִּי מֵאִיר תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים? וְהָתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לָךְ עָלַי שְׁאֵר כְּסוּת וְעוֹנָה״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וּתְנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים!

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, does his condition stand in that case? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you do not have against me any claims of food, clothing, and conjugal rights, she is betrothed and his condition is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to monetary matters, e.g., food and clothing, his condition stands. This indicates that Rabbi Meir maintains that one cannot stipulate counter to that which is written in the Torah.

אֲמַר חִזְקִיָּה: שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״לְאָמָה״ – פְּעָמִים שֶׁאֵינוֹ מוֹכְרָהּ אֶלָּא לְאָמָה בִּלְבַד.

Ḥizkiyya said: It is different here, as the verse states: “And if a man sells his daughter as a maidservant” (Exodus 21:7), from which it is derived: There are times when he sells her only as a maidservant, not for the sake of marriage. This indicates that the designation of a maidservant is not a Torah obligation but is optional. Therefore, one can issue a stipulation that runs counter to the master designating her.

וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״לְאָמָה״ מַאי עָבְדֵי לֵיהּ? הַאי מִיבָּעֵי לְהוּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״לְאָמָה״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁמּוֹכְרָהּ לִפְסוּלִים.

The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, what do they do with this phrase: “As a maidservant”? How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: This expression is necessary for them for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states “as a maidservant.” This teaches that he can sell her to people of flawed lineage, mamzer, whom she is prohibited from marrying but whose betrothal is effective.

וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא: אִם מְקַדְּשָׁהּ לִפְסוּלִים – לֹא יִמְכְּרֶנָּה לִפְסוּלִים? מַה לִּמְקַדְּשָׁהּ לִפְסוּלִים – שֶׁכֵּן אָדָם מְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא נַעֲרָה; יִמְכְּרֶנָּה לִפְסוּלִים – שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא נַעֲרָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לְאָמָה״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁמּוֹכְרָהּ לִפְסוּלִין.

The baraita asks: Why is it necessary to derive that halakha from the verse? But could this not be derived through logical inference: If her father can betroth her to people of flawed lineage, can he not sell her to people of flawed lineage? The baraita answers: The verse is necessary, as what is unique about betrothal to people of flawed lineage is that a person can betroth his daughter even when she is a young woman, i.e., between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half. Therefore, one cannot learn from this that he can also sell her to people of flawed lineage because that case is different, as a person cannot sell his daughter when she is a young woman. The halakha that a person can betroth his daughter even when she is a young woman demonstrates that the rights that a father has with regard to his daughter’s betrothal are more extensive than his right to sell her. Therefore, the verse states “as a maidservant,” which teaches that he can, in fact, sell her to disqualified people.

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אִם לְלַמֵּד שֶׁמּוֹכְרָהּ לִפְסוּלִין – הֲרֵי כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״אִם רָעָה בְּעֵינֵי אֲדֹנֶיהָ״ – שֶׁרָעָה בְּנִישּׂוּאֶיהָ. מַה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לְאָמָה״? מְלַמֵּד שֶׁמּוֹכְרָהּ

The baraita continues: Rabbi Eliezer says: If that verse serves to teach that he can sell her to people of flawed lineage, it is unnecessary, as it is already stated: “If she does not please her master, who designated her” (Exodus 21:8). This indicates that she is displeasing in her marriage, i.e., marriage to him was forbidden, and yet the sale is valid. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states “as a maidservant”? This teaches that he can sell her