שֵׁן דְּחָלָב, כָּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״עַיִן״. וְאִי כָּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״עַיִן״ הֲוָה אָמִינָא, מָה עַיִן שֶׁנִּבְרָא עִמּוֹ – אַף כֹּל שֶׁנִּבְרָא עִמּוֹ, אֲבָל שֵׁן – לָא. צְרִיכָא.

a milk tooth, a child’s tooth that will eventually fall out to be replaced by another, is included in this halakha. Therefore the Merciful One writes “eye,” to teach that this halakha applies only to a body part that does not regenerate, like an eye. And if the Merciful One had written only “eye,” I would say that just as an eye was created with him in the womb, so too, this halakha applies to anything that was created with him in the womb. But with regard to a tooth, which grows later, perhaps he would not be emancipated if his master knocked it out. Therefore, it is necessary to mention both cases.

וְאֵימָא: ״כִּי יַכֶּה״ – כְּלָל; ״שֵׁן וְעַיִן״ – פְּרָט. כְּלָל וּפְרָט – אֵין בַּכְּלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁבַּפְּרָט, שֵׁן וְעַיִן – אִין, מִידֵי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא!

The Gemara asks: But one can say the following argument: “If a man smites” (Exodus 21:26), is a generalization; “a tooth” and “an eye” are each a detail. If so, this should be read as a generalization and a detail, and the hermeneutical principle in a case of this kind is that the generalization includes only what is mentioned explicitly in the detail. Consequently, a tooth and an eye are included, but not other matters.

״לַחָפְשִׁי יְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ״ חָזַר וְכָלַל. כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל אִי אַתָּה דָּן אֶלָּא כְּעֵין הַפְּרָט; מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – מוּם שֶׁבְּגָלוּי וְאֵינָן חוֹזְרִים, אַף כֹּל מוּמִין שֶׁבְּגָלוּי וְאֵינָן חוֹזְרִין.

The Gemara answers that when each verse states: “To freedom shall he send him” (Exodus 21:26, 27), it then generalized again. Consequently, this should be read as a generalization and a detail and a generalization. In this case, the hermeneutical principle is that you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail: Just as the explicit detail is an exposed blemish that does not regenerate itself, so too, any body parts that are exposed blemishes and that do not regenerate themselves are included in this halakha.

אִי מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – מוּמִין שֶׁבְּגָלוּי, וּבָטֵל מִמְּלַאכְתּוֹ, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר – אַף כֹּל מוּמִין שֶׁבְּגָלוּי, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר, וּבָטֵל מִמְּלַאכְתּוֹ. אַלָּמָּה תַּנְיָא: תָּלַשׁ בִּזְקָנוֹ וְדִילְדֵּל בּוֹ עֶצֶם – עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶם לְחֵירוּת? ״לַחָפְשִׁי יְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ״ רִיבּוּיָא הוּא.

The Gemara asks: If so, one can limit this category even further: Just as with the explicit details, they are referring to exposed blemishes and the body part is prevented from performing its regular function and does not regenerate, so too, a slave should be emancipated as a result of an injury to all exposed blemishes that do not regenerate and where the body part is prevented from performing its regular function. Why, then, is it taught in a baraita: If the master pulled out his beard and dislocated a bone in the slave’s jaw, the slave is emancipated by means of this injury. In this case there is no loss of function. The Gemara answers: “To freedom shall he send him” (Exodus 21:26–27), is an amplification, which includes an injury that is not exactly the same as the detail.

וְאִי רִיבּוּיָא הוּא – אֲפִילּוּ הִכָּהוּ עַל יָדוֹ וְצָמְתָה וְסוֹפָהּ לַחֲזוֹר נַמִי. אַלָּמָּה תַּנְיָא: הִכָּהוּ עַל יָדוֹ וְצָמְתָה וְסוֹפָהּ לַחֲזוֹר – אֵין עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהּ לְחֵירוּת? אִם כֵּן שֵׁן וְעַיִן מַאי אַהֲנֵי לֵיהּ?

The Gemara asks: But if it is an amplification, which includes additional injuries, the slave should also be emancipated even if he struck him on his hand and it withered, i.e., became temporarily paralyzed, but would eventually be expected to regenerate. Why, then, is it taught in a baraita: If he struck him on his hand and the hand withered but it will eventually regenerate, the slave is not emancipated by means of this injury? The Gemara answers: If so, that even limbs that will eventually regain their function are included in this halakha, what purpose do the examples of tooth and eye serve? These two items that are explicitly stated in the verse would not exclude anything. Rather, only injuries similar to the details of an tooth and an eye are included, but not temporary injuries.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: בְּכוּלָּם עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶם לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: צָרִיךְ. רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: צָרִיךְ.

The Sages taught: With regard to any of the twenty-four extremities, if a master strikes his slave and injures him there, the slave is emancipated by means of these injuries, and he requires a bill of manumission from his master. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Meir says: He does not require a bill of manumission. Rabbi Eliezer says: He requires one. Rabbi Tarfon says: He does not require one. Rabbi Akiva says: He requires one.

הַמַּכְרִיעִים לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן בְּשֵׁן וְעַיִן, שֶׁהַתּוֹרָה זָכְתָה לוֹ, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא בִּשְׁאָר אֵבָרִים, הוֹאִיל וּקְנַס חֲכָמִים הוּא. קְנָס הוּא?! קְרָאֵי קָא דָּרְשִׁינַן! אֶלָּא, הוֹאִיל וּמִדְרַשׁ חֲכָמִים הוּא.

Those who discuss matters and decide before the Sages say the following compromise: Rabbi Tarfon’s statement appears correct with regard to a tooth and an eye, since in these cases the Torah explicitly benefitted him. Because his right to emancipation is stated explicitly in the verse, the slave does not require a bill of manumission. And Rabbi Akiva’s statement is reasonable with regard to other limbs, since it is a rabbinic penalty. The Gemara is puzzled by this claim: Is it a rabbinic penalty? We interpret the verses, and therefore this halakha applies to the other limbs by Torah law. Rather, these Sages meant that is necessary to give a bill of manumission since it is a rabbinic interpretation and is not written explicitly in the Torah.

מַאי טַעֲמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? יָלֵיף שִׁילּוּחַ שִׁילּוּחַ מֵאִשָּׁה; מָה אִשָּׁה בִּשְׁטָר – אַף עֶבֶד נַמִי בִּשְׁטָר. וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: אִי כָּתַב ״חָפְשִׁי״ לְבַסּוֹף – כִּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ. הָשְׁתָּא דְּכָתַב ״לַחָפְשִׁי יְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ״ – הֲוָה לֵיהּ חָפְשִׁי מֵעִיקָּרָא.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? He derives a verbal analogy between: Sending away, “to freedom shall he send him” (Exodus 21:26, 27), and: Sending away, “and sends her out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:1), from the case of a woman. Just as a woman can be released from her husband only by means of a document, so too, a slave can also be released from his master only by means of a document. And Rabbi Meir would say that if the term “freedom” was written at the end of the phrase, i.e., if the verse had stated: He shall send him away to freedom, it would be as you said, that he must be given a bill of manumission before he can be emancipated. Now that it is written “to freedom shall he send him,” this indicates that he is free from the beginning, i.e., no additional act of emancipation is required.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הִכָּהוּ עַל עֵינוֹ וְסִמְּאָהּ, עַל אָזְנוֹ וְחֵרְשָׁהּ – עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת. נֶגֶד עֵינוֹ וְאֵינוֹ רוֹאֶה, כְּנֶגֶד אָזְנוֹ וְאֵינוֹ שׁוֹמֵעַ – אֵין עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת. אֲמַר רַב שֶׁמֶן לְרַב אַשִׁי: לְמֵימְרָא דְּקָלָא לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא?

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 9:26): If a slave owner struck his slave on his eye and blinded him, or on his ear and deafened him, the slave is emancipated by means of these injuries. If he struck near his eye and as a result he does not see, or near his ear and he does not hear, the slave is not emancipated by means of these injuries. Rav Shemen said to Rav Ashi: Is this to say that a sound that causes damage is nothing?

וְהָתָנֵי רָמִי בַּר יְחֶזְקֵאל: תַּרְנְגוֹל שֶׁהוֹשִׁיט רֹאשׁוֹ לַאֲוִיר כְּלִי זְכוּכִית, וְתָקַע בּוֹ וּשְׁבָרוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם נֵזֶק שָׁלֵם. וְאָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף, אָמְרִי בֵּי רַב: סוּס שֶׁצָּנַף, וַחֲמוֹר שֶׁנָּעַר, וְשָׁבְרוּ כֵּלִים בְּתוֹךְ הַבַּיִת – מְשַׁלְּמִים חֲצִי נֵזֶק!

But didn’t Rami bar Yeḥezkel teach a baraita: With regard to a rooster that stuck its head into the airspace of a glass vessel and crowed into it and the noise broke it, its owner pays the full cost of the damage like a regular case of damage. And Rav Yosef said that the Sages of Rav’s study hall say: With regard to a horse that neighed or a donkey that brayed and they thereby broke vessels in the house, their owners must pay for half of the damage. Although these two examples are different, as one results in full payment and the other in half payment, it is clear that sound can be a source of liability for damages.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי אָדָם, דְּכֵיוָן דְּבַר דַּעַת הוּא – אִיהוּ מִיבְעִית נַפְשֵׁיהּ. כִּדְתַנְיָא: הַמַּבְעִית אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ – פָּטוּר מִדִּינֵי אָדָם וְחַיָּיב בְּדִינֵי שָׁמַיִם. כֵּיצַד? תָּקַע בְּאָזְנוֹ וְחֵרְשׁוֹ – פָּטוּר; אֲחַזָהוּ וְתָקַע בְּאָזְנוֹ וְחֵרְשׁוֹ – חַיָּיב.

Rav Ashi said to him: A person is different, as, since he is mentally competent it is he who frightened himself. It was not the physical sound that caused the damage but the slave’s subjective fear, which is not a direct result of the action. As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 6:16) that injury can result from being frightened: One who frightens another and causes him injury is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. How so? If one shouted into another’s ear and deafened him, he is exempt. But if he held him and shouted into his ear and deafened him, he is liable according to human laws as well, as he took physical hold of him. Once he physically took hold of him, he is liable for all the resultant damage.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הִכָּהוּ עַל עֵינוֹ וְכָהֲתָה, עַל שִׁינּוֹ וְנָדְדָה, אִם יָכוֹל לְהִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן עַכְשָׁיו – אֵין עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת, וְאִם לָאו – עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת. תַּנְיָא אִידָךְ: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיְתָה עֵינוֹ כְּהוּיָה וְסִמְּאָהּ, שִׁינּוֹ נְדוּדָה וְהִפִּילָהּ, אִם יָכוֹל לְהִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן כְּבָר – עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת, וְאִם לָאו – אֵין עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת.

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 9:9): In a case where the master struck him on his eye and weakened his vision on his tooth and loosened it, if he can use the eye or the tooth now, the slave is not emancipated by means of them. And if he can no longer use them at all, then the slave is emancipated by means of them. It is taught in another clause in that baraita: In a case where the slave’s eye was weak prior to this incident, and the master blinded it entirely, or if the slave’s tooth was loose and his master knocked it out, if he was able to use them before the master struck him, the slave is emancipated by means of them, and if not, then the slave is not emancipated by means of them.

וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אַשְׁמוּעִינַן הָךְ קַמַּיְיתָא – מִשּׁוּם דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא נְהוֹרָא בָּרִיא וְהָשְׁתָּא נְהוֹרָא כְּחִישָׁא, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא נַמִי נְהוֹרָא כְּחִישָׁא – אֵימָא לָא.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state both halakhot, despite the fact that they apparently teach the same halakha that a weakened eye is not considered a significant injury, as, if the tanna had taught us only this first halakha, I would say that he is emancipated, because at the outset his vision was strong and now his vision is weak. But here, in the second baraita, where his vision was also weak at the outset, I would say he is not emancipated if the master blinded him entirely, as his eye did not function properly even beforehand.

וְאִי אַשְׁמוּעִינַן הָא – מִשּׁוּם דְּסָמְיָא לְגַמְרֵי, אֲבָל הָתָם דְּלָא סָמְיָא לְגַמְרֵי – אֵימָא לָא. צְרִיכָא.

And conversely, if the tanna had taught us only this second halakha, I would say that he is emancipated because he blinded him entirely. But there, where he did not blind him entirely I would say no, he is not emancipated, despite the fact that he weakened his vision. Therefore, it is necessary to state both halakhot.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה רַבּוֹ רוֹפֵא וְאָמַר לוֹ לִכְחוֹל לוֹ עֵינוֹ וְסִמְּאָהּ, לַחֲתוֹר לוֹ שִׁינּוֹ וְהִפִּילָהּ – שִׂיחֵק בָּאָדוֹן, וְיָצָא לְחֵירוּת. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: ״וְשִׁחֲתָהּ״ – עַד שֶׁיִּתְכַּוֵּין לְשַׁחֲתָהּ.

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 9:9): In a case where his master was a doctor and the slave said to him to paint his eye with a medicament, and the master blinded it in the process, or he asked him to drill his aching tooth, and the master knocked it out, the slave laughs at the master and is emancipated. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the verse: “And if a man smites the eye of his slave, or the eye of his maidservant, and destroys it, to freedom shall he send him for his eye’s sake” (Exodus 21:26), means that the slave is not emancipated unless the master intends to destroy it. If he intended to heal him, the slave is not freed, even if the master did, in fact, injure him.

וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״וְשִׁחֲתָהּ״ מַאי עָבְדֵי לֵיהּ? מִיבָּעֵי לְהוּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי שֶׁהוֹשִׁיט יָדוֹ לִמְעֵי שִׁפְחָתוֹ וְסִימֵּא עוּבָּר שֶׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ – פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעֲמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְשִׁחֲתָהּ״ – עַד שֶׁיְּכַוֵּין לְשַׁחֲתָהּ.

The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, what do they do with this verse “and destroys it”? What do they derive from this phrase? The Gemara answers: They require it for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar says that in a case where the master stuck his hand into the womb of his maidservant to assist her in giving birth and he blinded the fetus in her womb, he is exempt and the fetus is not emancipated when born. What is the reason for this? As the verse states “and destroys it,” meaning unless he intends to destroy it, and in this case he did not mean to touch the fetus’s eye.

וְאִידָךְ: מִ״וְשִׁחֵת״ ״שִׁחֲתָהּ״ נָפְקָא. וְאִידָךְ: ״שִׁחֵת״ ״שִׁחֲתָהּ״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.

And the other Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, would say that that halakha is derived from the fact that the verse could have said: And destroys, and instead said “destroys it.” And the other Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, how do they respond to this argument? They do not expound the difference between “destroys” and “destroys it,” i.e., they maintain that this is not a significant deviation from which one can derive a halakha.

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיְתָה עֵינוֹ סְמוּיָה וְחִטְּטָהּ – עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת. מַאי טַעֲמָא? מְחוּסַּר אֵבֶר הוּא.

Rav Sheshet says: In a case where the slave’s eye was blind and the master removed it entirely, the slave is emancipated by means of this injury. What is the reason for this? He is now lacking a limb, which is worse than a mere blemish.

וְתָנָא תּוּנָא: תַּמּוּת וְזַכְרוּת בִּבְהֵמָה, וְאֵין תַּמּוּת וְזַכְרוּת בְּעוֹפוֹת.

And the tanna of a baraita also taught: The halakha of unblemished status, i.e., that an offering must not contain a blemish, and the halakha of male status apply to animal offerings, but the halakha of unblemished status and the halakha of male status do not apply to bird offerings.

יָכוֹל יָבְשָׁה גַּפָּהּ, נִקְטְעָה רַגְלָהּ, נֶחְטְטָה עֵינָהּ – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״מִן הָעוֹף״ – וְלֹא כָּל הָעוֹף.

The Gemara comments: One might have thought that if one brings a bird whose wing is dried, or whose leg is severed, or whose eye was removed, that it too is acceptable as an offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And if his offering to the Lord is a burnt-offering from birds” (Leviticus 1:14). This phrase indicates that only some birds can be sacrificed as offerings, but not all birds. This teaches that a bird can be disqualified due to a blemish. For example, if a significant part of the bird is missing, e.g., a limb, the bird is not acceptable as an offering. This indicates that the actual loss of an eye is considered a greater blemish than blindness. Consequently, if his master takes out the slave’s blind eye, he is emancipated.

אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אַשִׁי אָמַר רַב: הָיְתָה לוֹ

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi says that Rav says: If the slave had