הֲרֵי הִיא כְּפִקָּדוֹן. עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי אֶלָּא דְּמָר סָבַר: מִלְוֶה אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא נִשְׁתַּיֵּיר הֵימֶנָּה שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, וּמַר סָבַר: נִשְׁתַּיֵּיר הֵימֶנָּה שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – אִין, וְאִי לָא נִשְׁתַּיֵּיר הֵימֶנָּה שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – לָא. אֲבָל דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוֶה מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת!

is like a deposit. The Gemara analyzes this: They disagree only with regard to this: There is one Sage who holds that one can betroth a woman with a loan, even though the value of one peruta does not remain of it. And one Sage holds that if the value of one peruta remains from it, yes, he can betroth her with it, but if the value of one peruta does not remain of it, he cannot. But everyone agrees that if one betroths a woman with a loan, she is betrothed. This presents a difficulty for Rav, who stated that one cannot betroth a woman with a loan.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְתִסְבְּרָא, הָא מְתָרַצְתָּא? הָא מְשַׁבַּשְׁתָּא הִיא!

Rava said to him: And how can you understand it that way? Is this baraita fully explainable? It is corrupted and cannot be cited as a proof.

הַאי פִּקָּדוֹן הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דְקַבֵּיל עֲלֵיהּ אַחֲרָיוּת – הַיְינוּ מִלְוֶה. אִי דְּלָא קַבֵּיל עֲלֵיהּ אַחֲרָיוּת – אִי הָכִי, אַדְּתָנֵי סֵיפָא ״וּבְמִלְוֶה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁתַּיֵּיר הֵימֶנָּה שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״ – נִיפְלוֹג וְנִיתְנֵי בְּדִידָהּ: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – שֶׁלֹּא קִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ אַחֲרָיוּת, אֲבָל קִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ אַחֲרָיוּת, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא נִשְׁתַּיֵּיר הֵימֶנָּה שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת!

He explains why the baraita must be corrupted: What are the circumstances of this deposit discussed in the baraita ? If she assumed financial responsibility to repay the owner for it if it is stolen or lost, it is the same as a loan, as even if it is entirely lost she must still repay its value. If she did not assume financial responsibility for it, then if so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the baraita : But if he betroths her with a loan that he had given her, she is betrothed despite the fact that the value of one peruta of it does not remain; let him distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself, as follows: In what case is this statement said, that she is not betrothed if less than the value of one peruta remains from the deposit? If she did not assume financial responsibility upon herself for it. But if she assumed financial responsibility upon herself, even though the value of one peruta did not remain from it, she is betrothed.

אֶלָּא תְּרֵיץ הָכִי: וּבְמִלְוֶה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּיֵּיר הֵימֶנָּה שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

Rather, since the wording of the baraita cannot remain as is, answer this way: But if he betroths her with a loan that he had given her, she is not betrothed, despite the fact that the value of one peruta of it remains.

״רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: מִלְוֶה הֲרֵי הִיא כְּפִקָּדוֹן״. בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? אָמַר רַבָּה: אַשְׁכַּחְתִּינְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן בְּבֵי רַב, דְּיָתְבֵי וְקָאָמְרִי: בְּמִלְוֶה בִּרְשׁוּת בְּעָלִים לַחֲזָרָה, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְאוֹנָסִין, קָמִיפַּלְגִי.

The baraita stated that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A loan is like a deposit. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabba said: I found the scholars in the study hall of Rav who were sitting and saying: They disagree with regard to the issue of whether a loan the debtor had not yet begun to spend is in the possession of the owner with regard to the possibility of retraction of the loan by the lender. And the same is true, i.e., they also disagree, with regard to who bears responsibility for accidents.

דְּמָר סָבַר: מִלְוֶה בִּרְשׁוּת לֹוֶה קַיְימָא, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְאוֹנָסִים. וּמַר סָבַר: מִלְוֶה בִּרְשׁוּת בְּעָלִים קַיְימָא, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְאוֹנָסִים.

As one Sage, the first tanna , holds: A loan stands in the possession of the debtor, i.e., even if it has not been spent, the lender cannot demand the return of the money. And the same is true with regard to responsibility for accidents, i.e., if the money is lost, it is considered lost from the debtor’s possession and he bears responsibility for it. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, holds: A loan that the debtor has not yet begun to spend stands in the possession of the owner, and the same is true with regard to responsibility for accidents. He can therefore betroth a woman with the money he has already lent her, provided that she has not yet begun to spend it.

וְאָמִינָא לְהוּ: לְאוֹנָסִים – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּבִרְשׁוּת לֹוֶה קַיְימֵי. מַאי טַעֲמָא? לָא גָּרְעָא מִשְּׁאֵלָה: מַה שְּׁאֵלָה דְּהָדְרָה בְּעֵינָא חַיָּיב בְּאוֹנָסִים – מִלְוֶה לֹא כָּל שֶׁכֵּן. אֶלָּא הָכָא – מִלְוֶה בִּרְשׁוּת בְּעָלִים לַחֲזָרָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

Rabba continues: And I said to them: With regard to accidents, everyone agrees that it stands in the possession of the debtor and he is responsible for the money. What is the reason? A loan of money is no worse than borrowing an item. Just as in the case of borrowing an item, whereby the item is returned to its owner intact and yet the debtor is liable for accidents, as explicitly stated in the Torah, is it not all the more so that with regard to a loan, which the debtor spends and repays with other money, it should be considered in the debtor’s possession and he should bear responsibility for it? Rather, here the practical difference between them concerns the question of a loan in the possession of the owner with regard to the possibility of retraction of the loan. The first tanna is of the opinion that he cannot retract the loan, whereas Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that he can do so.

וְאֶלָּא הָא דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הַשּׁוֹאֵל קוּרְדּוֹם מֵחֲבֵירוֹ, בִּיקֵּעַ בּוֹ – קְנָאוֹ, לֹא בִּיקֵּעַ בּוֹ – לֹא קְנָאוֹ. לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי אֲמָרָהּ לִשְׁמָעֲתֵיהּ?

The Gemara asks: But rather, with regard to that which Rav Huna says: In the case of one who borrows an ax from his friend for a certain period of time, if he chops wood with it he has acquired it in the sense that the lender cannot demand its immediate return. If he has not chopped wood with it he has not acquired it. Let us say that this halakha that Rav Huna stated is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im . According to the explanation of Rabba, it would be a dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

לָא, עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי אֶלָּא בְּמִלְוֶה, דְּלָא הָדְרָה בְּעֵינָא. אֲבָל בִּשְׁאֵלָה דְּהָדְרָה בְּעֵינָא – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל: בִּיקֵּעַ בּוֹ – אִין, לֹא בִּיקֵּעַ בּוֹ – לֹא קְנָאוֹ.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, they disagree only with regard to a loan, which is not returned intact. Since there is no need for the debtor to return the same money to the lender, this means that the money has been transferred to the debtor’s domain, and the first tanna holds that the lender may not retract the loan. But with regard to the borrowing of an item, for example the ax, which is returned intact, everyone agrees that if one chopped with it, yes, he has acquired it and is responsible for it. If he has not chopped with it, he has not acquired it.

נֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בִּשְׁטַר חוֹב״ אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ מִלְוֶה בְּיַד אֲחֵרִים וְהִירְשָׁהּ עֲלֵיהֶם, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. הַאי שְׁטַר חוֹב הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵימָא שְׁטַר חוֹב דַּאֲחֵרִים – הַיְינוּ מִלְוֶה בְּיַד אֲחֵרִים! אֶלָּא לָאו – שְׁטַר חוֹב דִּידָהּ, וּבִמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוֶה קָמִיפַּלְגִי?

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav’s statement that one cannot betroth a woman with a loan is subject to a dispute between tanna’im . The baraita teaches: If one says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with a promissory note, or if he had a loan in the possession of others and he authorized her to collect the money for herself, Rabbi Meir says she is betrothed and the Rabbis say she is not betrothed. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this promissory note? If we say it is a promissory note of others who owe him money, this is the same as a loan in the possession of others, and why would the baraita state it twice? Rather, is it not referring to her promissory note, i.e., a loan she has taken from him, and they disagree with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, whether forgiving the debt by returning the promissory note counts as betrothal money?

לְעוֹלָם שְׁטַר חוֹב דַּאֲחֵרִים, וְהָכָא בְּמִלְוֶה בִּשְׁטָר וּבְמִלְוֶה עַל פֶּה קָא מִיפַּלְגִי.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Actually, the baraita is referring to a promissory note of others, and here they disagree in two cases: In the case of a loan with a promissory note and in the case of a loan by oral agreement.

בְּמִלְוֶה בִּשְׁטָר בְּמַאי פְּלִיגִי? בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי וְרַבָּנַן קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּתַנְיָא: אוֹתִיּוֹת נִקְנוֹת בִּמְסִירָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין שֶׁכָּתַב וְלֹא מָסַר, בֵּין שֶׁמָּסַר וְלֹא כָּתַב – לֹא קָנָה, עַד שֶׁיִּכְתּוֹב וְיִמְסוֹר.

The Gemara explains: With regard to a loan with a promissory note, concerning what matter do they disagree? They disagree concerning the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita : Letters, i.e., the content of a promissory note, are acquired by merely transferring the document. If the lender hands over a promissory note to a third party, the latter can collect the debt. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: Whether one wrote a document of sale for the promissory note but did not transfer the promissory note itself, or whether he transferred the promissory note but did not write a document of sale for it, the recipient has not acquired the promissory note. The recipient acquires it only once the other writes a document of sale and transfers the promissory note.

מָר אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי, וּמָר לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי.

The suggestion is that one Sage, Rabbi Meir, is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and therefore one can betroth a woman by giving her a promissory note even without writing a document of sale for it. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, is not of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and she is not betrothed because she has not received anything.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לֵית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי, וְהָכָא בִּדְרַב פַּפָּא קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאָמַר רַב פַּפָּא: הַאי מַאן דְּזַבֵּין שְׁטָרָא לְחַבְרֵיהּ – צָרִיךְ לְמִיכְתַּב לֵיהּ ״קְנֵי לָךְ הוּא וְכָל שִׁעְבּוּדֵיהּ״. מָר אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַב פַּפָּא, וּמָר לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַב פַּפָּא.

And if you wish, say instead the following answer: No one is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and here they disagree with regard to the statement of Rav Pappa, as Rav Pappa says: This one who sells a promissory note to his friend must write the following formula for him: Let it be acquired by you, it and all its liens. Otherwise, the debt discussed in the promissory note is not transferred. One Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. And one Sage, Rabbi Meir, is not of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. He holds that the debt is acquired even if one did not write this phrase, and a man can betroth a woman by giving a promissory note to her.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַב פַּפָּא. וְהָכָא בְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל.

And if you wish, say instead: Everyone is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa, and even Rabbi Meir agrees that she is betrothed only if he wrote in the document: Let it be acquired by you, it and all its liens. And here they disagree with regard to the statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel says: