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Kiddushin

Daf 58a

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוֹצָאָה אַתְּ. אִיכְסִיף, הוּא סָבַר: מִשְּׁמַעֲתָא קָאֲמַר לֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי קָאָמִינָא: רַב אַסִי דְּהוּצָל קָאֵי כְּוָתֵיךְ.

Rav Huna said to him: You are out [hotza’a]. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin was embarrassed, as he thought Rav Huna told him he was out, i.e., wrong, due to the halakha he stated. Sensing Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin’s embarrassment, Rav Huna said to him: This is what I said: You are a Hutzla’a, as Rav Asi, from the town of Huzal, stands in accordance with your opinion.

RASHI

הוצאה את הוא סבר משמעתא קאמר ליה מוצא את משמועה זו נראה שאין אתה חכם בה אי נמי קטיל קני באגמא את לשון הוצא ודפנא (סוכה דף כג.):

נֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַגּוֹנֵב טִבְלוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם לוֹ דְּמֵי טִבְלוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא דְּמֵי חוּלִּין שֶׁבּוֹ. מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה – מָמוֹן, וּמַר סָבַר: טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן?

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. The baraita (Tosefta, Ma’aser Sheni 3:9) taught: One who steals another’s untithed produce pays him the full value of the other’s untithed produce; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He pays only the value of the non-sacred produce that it contains. What, is it not the case that they disagree about this issue: That one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that the benefit of discretion has monetary value, and one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value, and only the non-sacred produce is of value to the owner.

RASHI

לימא כתנאי טובת הנאה ממון או אינה ממון:

משלם לו דמי טיבלו אף דמי תרומה ומעשר שבו:

אלא דמי חולין שבו אבל בתרומה ומעשר אמר ליה לאו בעל דברים דידי את וכשיבא כהן גם הוא לתובעו ידחהו ויאמר לא לך אתננה כי אם לכהן אחר:

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן, וְהָכָא בִּטְבָלִים שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לוֹ מִבֵּית אֲבִי אִמּוֹ כֹּהֵן, וּבְמַתָּנוֹת שֶׁלֹּא הוּרְמוּ כְּמִי שֶׁהוּרְמוּ דָּמְיָין, קָמִיפַּלְגִי. מָר סָבַר: כְּמִי שֶׁהוּרְמוּ דָּמְיָין, וּמַר סָבַר: לָאו כְּמִי שֶׁהוּרְמוּ דָּמְיָין.

The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value, and here the case is with an Israelite who came into possession of untithed produce as an inheritance from the household of his mother’s father, who was a priest. And they disagree with regard to the question of whether or not gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they have been separated. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that they are considered as though they have been separated, which means that the grandson inherited the teruma itself from his grandfather, so the thief must repay him the value of the terumot and tithes as well. And one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that such gifts are not considered as though they have been separated; and the produce is viewed as regular untithed produce, where the Israelite has only the benefit of discretion, which is of no monetary value.

RASHI

ה״ג לא דכ״ע טובת הנאה אינה ממון והכא במתנות שלא הורמו קמיפלגי וכגון שנפל לו טבל זה מבית אבי אמו כהן רבי סבר כמי שהורמו דמיין וזכה אבי אמו בתרומה ומעשרות שבו שאף מעשר ראשון לכהנים מדקנסינהו עזרא ללוים:

ורבי יוסי סבר לאו כמי שהורמו דמיין וצריך היורש הזה לתתן לכהן ואין לו בהן אלא טובת הנאה והיא אינה ממון:

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כְּמִי שֶׁהוּרְמוּ דָּמְיָין, וְטוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן. וְהָכָא בְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: חִיטָּה אַחַת פּוֹטֶרֶת אֶת הַכְּרִי.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the gifts are considered as though they have been separated, and that the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value. The case is not concerning an Israelite who came into possession of untithed produce as an inheritance from the household of his mother’s father; rather, it is concerning regular untithed produce, and here they disagree with regard to a statement of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: By Torah law, even one grain given as teruma exempts the entire heap, since the Torah does not specify a minimum amount for teruma.

RASHI

ואיבעית אימא דכ״ע כמי שהורמו דמיין וטובת הנאה אינה ממון והכא לאו דנפלו לו מבית אבי אמו כהן עסקינן אלא שגדלו בארצו וטעמא דרבי משום דאית ליה דשמואל דאמר חטה אחת פוטרת את הכרי הילכך אמר ליה בעל הטבל אל הגנב כולה דידי הוא דפטרנא נפשי בחטה אחת לתרומה וכי פליג רבי עליה דר׳ יוסי בר׳ יהודה בתרומה לחודה פליג אבל במעשר מודה דלאו בעל דברים דידיה הוא:

דְּמָר אִית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, וּמָר לֵית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל.

As one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, so the thief must pay the value of the untithed produce as well, since the owner can say that he would separate a single grain as teruma for the entire heap and the rest would remain non-sacred produce. And one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, which means that when the owner makes his claim he must subtract at least one-sixtieth of the total amount as teruma.

RASHI

ורבי יוסי לית ליה דשמואל הילכך בתרומה נמי לא מצי תבע ליה וה״ה דמצי לאוקמיה נמי בטבלים שנפלו לו ודכ״ע כמי שלא הורמו דמיין וטובת הנאה אינה ממון וקמיפלגי בדשמואל אלא אי אוקמת הכי אוקמת ליה מתניתין דקתני מקודשת דלא כתרוייהו דכיון דטובת הנאה אינה ממון ומתנות שלא הורמו כלא הורמו דמיין היכי מיקדשא הא אין לו בתרומה אלא טובת הנאה ואפילו נפלו לו טבלים מבית אבי אמו כהן אבל השתא דאמרינן כמי שהורמו דמיין ופלוגתייהו בטיבלא דאתי מארעיה מתרצא מתני׳ כדשנינן לעיל ודברי הכל:

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לֵית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעֲמָא דְּרַבִּי – דִּקְנָסוּהוּ רַבָּנַן לַגַּנָּב.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel; and here, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Although the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value, and by right should not lead to reimbursement, the Sages penalized the thief. If he did not need to pay for the teruma contained in the produce, he would have been able to keep it, as no priest has the legal ability to demand that the teruma be given specifically to him.

RASHI

קנסוהו לגנב שלא תהא תרומה אצלו ממון שאין לו תובעים ונמצא חוטא נשכר:

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעֲמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – דִּקְנָסוּהוּ רַבָּנַן לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת, דְּלָא אִיבָּעֵי לֵיהּ לְשַׁהוּיֵהּ לְטִיבְלֵיהּ.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, and here, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: The Sages penalized the owner, since he should not have left his untithed produce in that state, and should have separated teruma without delay.

תְּנַן: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בִּתְרוּמוֹת, וּבְמַעַשְׂרוֹת, וּבְמַתָּנוֹת, בְּמֵי חַטָּאת, וּבְאֵפֶר פָּרָה – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאַף עַל פִּי יִשְׂרָאֵל. וּרְמִינְהוּ: הַנּוֹטֵל שָׂכָר לָדוּן – דִּינָיו בְּטֵלִים; לְהָעִיד – עֵדוּתוֹ בְּטֵלָה; לְהַזּוֹת וּלְקַדֵּשׁ – מֵימָיו מֵי מְעָרָה וְאֶפְרוֹ אֵפֶר מִקְלֶה!

We learned in the mishna: With regard to one who betroths a woman with terumot, or with tithes, or with the gifts given to priests, or with the water of purification, or with the ashes of the red heifer, in all of these cases she is betrothed, and this is so even if the man betrothing her is an Israelite. And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this from the following baraita (Tosefta, Bekhorot 3:5): With regard to one who accepts payment to judge, his judgments are nullified. Similarly, with regard to one who accepts payment to testify, his testimony is nullified. With regard to one who accepts payment to sprinkle the purification water on one who was impure from impurity imparted by a corpse, or to sanctify the purification water by placing the ashes of the red heifer in them, his water is considered cave water, which is generally foul, and his ashes are burnt ashes. Using these items to betroth a woman is analogous to being paid for them, so they should be considered as having no monetary value, and the betrothal should not take effect.

RASHI

להזות ולקדש משנה היא בבכורות הנוטל שכרו לדון דיניו בטלים להזות ולקדש מימיו מי מערה ואפרו אפר מקלה:

להזות על הטמא ולקדש מי חטאת כשנותן האפר במים קרי קדושה:

מי מערה סרוחים הם:

אפר מקלה כלומר סתם אפר שבא מן הקלוי באש:

TOSAFOT

מימיו מי מערה פי׳ בקונטרס מים סרוחים ובחנם דחק לפרש כן דמצי לפרש מי מערה ממש כלומר מכונסים ואינן מים חיים ואנן מים חיים בעינן ואפרו אפר מקלה פירוש שעבר על דברי תורה דכתיב (דברים ד׳:ה׳) ראה למדתי אתכם חוקים ומשפטים מה אני בחנם אף אתם בחנם וזה שעשה בשכר עבר על דברי תורה ומקרא ממש לא נפק ליה דהא לא שמעינן מיניה היכא דעבד בשכר דלא מהני אלא אסמכתא בעלמא הוא דלא מהני אפילו דיעבד:

אֲמַר אַבַּיֵי: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן – בִּשְׂכַר הֲבָאָה וּמִילּוּי; כָּאן – בִּשְׂכַר הַזָּאָה וְקִידּוּשׁ.

Abaye said: This is not difficult, since here, the mishna is referring to one who betroths a woman with the value of the payment for bringing and filling the vessel with the purification waters, There, the baraita dealing with one who accepts payment for sprinkling or sanctifying the water is referring to payment for the actual sprinkling and sanctifying.

RASHI

בשכר הבאה האפר ממקום למקום ושכר מילוי המים דמילתא דטירחא היא ורחמנא לא רמיא עליה ושרי למשקל אגרא ומקודשת ומתניתין דבכורות בשכר הזאה וקידוש דליכא טירחא ושכר לימוד מצוה הוא נוטל והתורה אמרה (דברים ד׳:ה׳) ראה למדתי אתכם וגו׳ כאשר צוני וגו׳ מה אני בחנם אף אתם בחנם (נדרים דף לז.):

דַּיְקָא נַמִי, דְּקָתָנֵי הָכָא ״בְּמֵי חַטָּאת וּבְאֵפֶר פָּרָה״, וְקָתָנֵי הָתָם ״לְהַזּוֹת וּלְקַדֵּשׁ״. שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ. הדרן עלך האיש מקדש

The Gemara comments: According to this answer, the language of the mishna and the baraita is also precise, as it teaches here, in the mishna, that she is betrothed with the water of purification or with the ashes of purification, which indicates that the water and ashes have not yet been mixed together; and it teaches there, in the baraita: To sprinkle or to sanctify, indicating that he receives payment for the actual sprinkling and sanctification. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the correct explanation of the mishna and the baraita.

RASHI

דיקא נמי דמתניתין לאו אהזאה וקידוש קאי דקתני מי חטאת ואפר חטאת שעדיין אינן מעורבין:

SUMMARY

This chapter discusses various halakhot related to betrothal, including betrothal via an agent, stipulations stated at the time of betrothal, and the items via which a betrothal can be performed. The Gemara explains that the act of betrothal can be performed by means of an agent, although it is preferable, as with all mitzvot, to perform this act on one’s own. The Gemara concludes that agency can be carried out only by a halakhically competent, adult Jew, and with the consent of the one for whom one is acting. The one designating the agent must also be a halakhically competent, adult Jew. One cannot act as an agent with regard to an area of halakha in which he or she is not obligated. Despite the fact that an agent is considered to be acting on behalf of the one who designated him, this is not so with regard to transgressions, where the full responsibility, with several exceptions, rests upon the agent alone. If one betroths a woman and explicitly stipulates that a certain condition be met, if the stipulation is not fulfilled, the betrothal does not take effect. This is true whether the stipulation is with regard to the actual act of betrothal, the lineage of the man or woman, their place of residence, their financial status, or another similar condition. It is irrelevant if the existing situation is regarded by the general public to be superior or inferior to the stipulated situation. Additionally, only explicit conditions are taken into account. If one of the parties claims later that he intended for the betrothal to take effect only subject to certain conditions being met, the principle that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters applies. The Gemara outlines certain limitations with regard to the item given to effect the betrothal. There are certain items that, although they are in the possession of a man, he may not use them for betrothal, as he is not in fact their owner. Included in this category is the portion that a priest receives from an offering, or second tithe. Items from which one is prohibited to derive benefit also cannot be used for betrothal. With regard to most items from which one is prohibited to derive benefit, if the man sold them it is permitted for him to betroth a woman with the proceeds from the sale. An exception to this would be an item which is forbidden because it was used for idol worship. A man can betroth a woman with an item that possesses sanctity, e.g., teruma, tithe, or produce of the Sabbatical Year. Even if the woman will not be able to consume these items herself, as long as she can sell them for at least one peruta, she will be betrothed. The Gemara also concluded that if a man sends gifts to a woman on the incorrect assumption that he had previously betrothed her, the gifts are not regarded as betrothal money. Betrothal that is not halakhically given to consummation takes effect nevertheless, and the woman can be released only by receiving a bill of divorce.

INTRO

And Moses said to them: If the children of Gad and the children of Reuben pass over the Jordan with you, every man armed for battle, before the Lord, and the land shall be subdued before you, then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession. But if they will not pass over with you armed, they shall have possessions among you in the land of Canaan. (Numbers 32:29–30)

This chapter deals with three topics: The conditions stipulated between a man and woman at the time of their betrothal; betrothals concerning which there is uncertainty with regard to the identity of one of the partners; and principles with regard to permitted and forbidden betrothals, those that are valid and those that are not. This chapter provides a fundamental analysis of the halakhot of conditions in general: How must a condition be formulated for it to be binding? It also discusses the meaning of various conditions stipulated at the time of a betrothal. One case concerns a condition that the betrothal take effect after a certain period of time or after a change in the personal status of the man or woman. These discussions focus on both the precise formula of the condition as well as the woman’s status between the moment of the betrothal and the date when it goes into effect. Another matter addressed in this chapter is situations where the identity of one member of the couple is uncertain. An uncertainty of this kind can result either due to the failure of one partner to clarify fully whom he is betrothing, which is especially likely to occur when the betrothal is performed by means of an agent, or when the claim of a man to have betrothed a woman is denied by her. There are two aspects to these problems: First, the precise meaning of various statements expressed at the time, and second, the credibility of the claimants. To what extent can the statement of one person be relied upon, and to what extent does his claim obligate him? The third main subject of this chapter, which is discussed in detail, concerns the question of who is eligible for betrothal. Certain betrothals are entirely permitted. Others are valid despite the fact that they involve a prohibition. In other words, the halakhot of marriage are binding upon the couple, but due to the prohibition entailed in their relationship it is not permitted for them to remain together. Instead, the husband is obligated to give his wife a bill of divorce. Incidental to this issue, the chapter analyzes another important matter, which is closely connected with the topic of the tractate: What is the halakhic status of the offspring of various unions, both permitted and forbidden ones?

מתני׳ הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ לִי אִשָּׁה פְּלוֹנִית״, וְהָלַךְ וְקִדְּשָׁהּ לְעַצְמוֹ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי. וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״ וּבָא אַחֵר וְקִידְּשָׁהּ בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לַשֵּׁנִי, בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן – תֹּאכַל בִּתְרוּמָה.

With regard to one man who says to another: Go and betroth so-and-so to me, and the latter went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second man. And similarly, with regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after thirty days, and another man came and betrothed her within those thirty days, she is betrothed to the second man. This is a full-fledged betrothal, so that if she is an Israelite woman betrothed to a priest, she may partake of teruma.

״מֵעַכְשָׁיו וּלְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״, וּבָא אַחֵר וְקִידְּשָׁהּ בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן אוֹ בַּת כֹּהֵן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל – לֹא תֹּאכַל בִּתְרוּמָה.

If the first man said to the woman: You are hereby betrothed to me from now, and only after thirty days shall the betrothal take effect, and another man came and betrothed her within those thirty days, there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed to each of them. Consequently, if she was the daughter of a non-priest betrothed to a priest, or the daughter of a priest betrothed to an Israelite, she may not partake of teruma. Since her betrothal is uncertain, the daughter of a non-priest cannot be considered the wife of a priest, and similarly a priest’s daughter who is doubtfully married to an Israelite loses her right to partake of teruma as the daughter of a priest.

RASHI

מתני׳ האומר מקודשת ואינה מקודשת לשניהם דאסורה לשניהם אלא אם כן נתן האחד גט ולאדם אחר אסורה עד שיתנו שניהם גט ובגמרא פליגי בה ומפרש טעמא:

בת ישראל לכהן לא תאכל בתרומה שמא אינן קדושין ובת כהן לישראל נמי לא תאכל בתרומת בית אביה שמא הוו קידושין וזר פוסל בקדושין את בת כהן מן התרומה:

פרק שלישי האומר

TOSAFOT

מתני׳: האומר והלך וקידשה לעצמו מקודשת. וא״ת מה חידוש יש כאן פשיטא ויש לומר דמיירי כגון דאמר השליח לאשה בשעת קדושין פלוני שלחני לקדשך לו ובתוך כך אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי והיא ידעה דקידשה לנפשיה דאל״כ לא היתה מקודשת לו ואשמועינן חידוש דמהו דתימא הא דקאמר לי לצורך משלחו קאמר קמ״ל דלא:

גמ׳ ״הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ״. תָּנָא: מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי, אֶלָּא שֶׁנָּהַג בּוֹ מִנְהַג רַמָּאוּת. וְתַנָּא דִּידָן, ״הָלַךְ״ נַמִי דְּקָתָנֵי – הָלַךְ בְּרַמָּאוּת.

The mishna teaches that in the case of one man who says to another: Go and betroth so-and-so to me, and the latter went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second man. A tanna taught concerning this issue: What he did is done; it is effective and the woman is betrothed to the second man, but he has treated him, i.e., the first man, in a deceitful manner, and it is prohibited to act in this fashion. The Gemara explains: And the tanna of our mishna, when he teaches the apparently superfluous term: Went, also indicates that he went and acted deceitfully.

RASHI

מתני׳ האומר מקודשת ואינה מקודשת לשניהם דאסורה לשניהם אלא אם כן נתן האחד גט ולאדם אחר אסורה עד שיתנו שניהם גט ובגמרא פליגי בה ומפרש טעמא:

בת ישראל לכהן לא תאכל בתרומה שמא אינן קדושין ובת כהן לישראל נמי לא תאכל בתרומת בית אביה שמא הוו קידושין וזר פוסל בקדושין את בת כהן מן התרומה:

מַאי שְׁנָא הָכָא דְּקָתָנֵי ״הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ״

§ The Gemara asks a question concerning the language of the mishna: What is different here that the mishna teaches: With regard to one man who says to another,