לֹא אָמַר וְלֹא כְלוּם. אָמַר לָהּ לְשִׁפְחָתוֹ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם״ – לֹא אָמַר וְלֹא כְלוּם.

he has said nothing, as this statement is not a valid expression of divorce. Similarly, if a master said to his female Canaanite slave upon emancipating her: You are hereby permitted to any man, he has not said anything.

אָמַר לָהּ לְאִשְׁתּוֹ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ לְעַצְמֵךְ״ מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן – לִמְלָאכָה קָאָמַר לָהּ, אוֹ דִּילְמָא – לְגַמְרֵי קָאָמַר לָהּ?

The Gemara addresses a less straightforward case: If a man said to his wife: You are hereby for yourself, what is the halakha? Do we say that he said this to her only with regard to work? In other words, he might have meant that she may keep her earnings. Or perhaps he said to her that she is on her own entirely, i.e., she is divorced.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אַשִׁי: תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתַנְיָא: גּוּפוֹ שֶׁל גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר: ״הֲרֵי אַתָּה בֶּן חוֹרִין״ ״הֲרֵי אַתָּה לְעַצְמְךָ״. הָשְׁתָּא, וּמָה עֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי דִּקְנִי לֵיהּ גּוּפֵיהּ, כִּי אָמַר לֵיהּ ״הֲרֵי אַתָּה לְעַצְמְךָ״ – לְגַמְרֵי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ, אִשָּׁה דְּלָא קְנִי לֵיהּ גּוּפָהּ – לֹא כָּל שֶׁכֵּן?!

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a proof, as it is taught in a baraita: The essence of a bill of manumission is the expression: You are hereby a freeman, or: You are hereby for yourself. Now consider, if in the case of a Canaanite slave, whose body belongs to the master, even so, when the master says to him: You are hereby for yourself, this is considered as though he said to him that he is entirely on his own and is freed, then all the more so is it not clear that a wife, whose body is not owned by her husband, is divorced by means of this expression?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אַשִׁי: אָמַר לְעַבְדּוֹ ״אֵין לִי עֵסֶק בְּךָ״ מַאי? מִי אָמְרִינַן: אֵין לִי עֵסֶק בְּךָ – לְגַמְרֵי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ, אוֹ דִּילְמָא – לִמְלָאכָה קָאָמַר לֵיהּ?

With regard to the same issue, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If one said to his Canaanite slave: I have no business with you, what is the halakha? Do we say that when he said to him: I have no business with you, he meant entirely, and therefore the slave is freed? Or did he perhaps say this to him with regard to labor? In other words, it is possible that the master is relieving the slave of his obligation to perform labor without actually emancipating him from slavery.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן לְרַב אַשִׁי, וְאָמְרִי לָהּ רַב חָנִין מְחוֹזָאָה לְרַב אַשִׁי, תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְנָכְרִי – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר מֵרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן.

Rav Naḥman said to Rav Ashi, and some say Rav Ḥanin from Meḥoza said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear: With regard to one who sells his Canaanite slave to a gentile, the slave is emancipated but nevertheless requires a bill [get] of manumission from his first master. In this manner the Sages penalized this owner for preventing the slave from fulfilling the mitzvot in which he is obligated.

אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – שֶׁלֹּא כָּתַב עָלָיו אוֹנוֹ, אֲבָל כָּתַב עָלָיו אוֹנוֹ – זֶהוּ שִׁחְרוּרוֹ. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי אוֹנוֹ? אֲמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: דְּכָתַב לֵיהּ ״כְּשֶׁתִּבְרַח מִמֶּנּוּ אֵין לִי עֵסֶק בְּךָ״.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in addition to this: In what case is this statement said? This is referring to a situation where he did not write a document [ono] for the slave when he sold him to the gentile. But if he wrote a document for him, this itself is his emancipation. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this document? Rav Sheshet said that he writes to him: When you escape from him I have no business with you. This indicates that the formula: I have no business with you, is a valid expression of emancipation.

אָמַר אַבַּיֵי: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוֶה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. בַּהֲנָאַת מִלְוֶה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְאָסוּר לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן מִפְּנֵי הַעֲרָמַת רִבִּית.

§ Abaye says: With regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, i.e., he previously lent this woman money and he now says that she is betrothed to him by means of that loan, she is not betrothed. The reason is that a woman can be betrothed only through her acceptance of money, or an item that has monetary value, at the time of the betrothal. Although this woman owes the man money, at the time the man states that she is betrothed to him, the loan is not in fact money but an obligation. Therefore, he does not actually give her anything at the time of the betrothal. By contrast, if he betroths her by means of the benefit of the loan, she is betrothed. But it is prohibited to do so, due to the fact that betrothing a woman via the benefit of a loan is an artifice used to circumvent the prohibition of receiving interest, as this enables the husband to gain an additional benefit from the loan.

הַאי הֲנָאַת מִלְוֶה הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵימָא דְּאַזְקָפָהּ, דַּאֲמַר לָהּ אַרְבַּע בַּחֲמִשָּׁה – הָא רִבִּית מַעַלְיְיתָא הוּא, וְעוֹד: הַיְינוּ מִלְוֶה!

The Gemara clarifies: What is meant by this term: The benefit of the loan? If we say that it means that he established interest upon it when she took the loan, e.g., he said to her that he is lending her four coins in exchange for the repayment of five, and he betroths her by releasing her from the obligation to pay this additional coin, this is a case of full-fledged interest, not merely an artifice used to circumvent the prohibition of receiving interest. He is receiving full payment of the loan and an additional benefit. And furthermore, when he releases her from the obligation to pay this additional coin, he is simply forgoing another obligation she has toward him; he is not giving her anything. This is like a regular case of a betrothal with a loan, and therefore she should not be betrothed.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאַרְוַוח לָהּ זִימְנָא.

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he extended the time of the loan for her. When the time for her to repay the loan arrived he extended the deadline and betrothed her with the financial benefit she receives from the extra time he is giving her to use the money. In this case he does betroth her with the value he is giving her at that time, but it is similar to interest, as it is included in the prohibition of interest to pay the creditor for an extension of the time of a loan.

אָמַר רָבָא: הֵילָךְ מָנֶה עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּחֲזִירֵהוּ לִי, בְּמֶכֶר – לֹא קָנָה; בְּאִשָּׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת; בְּפִדְיוֹן הַבֵּן – אֵין בְּנוֹ פָּדוּי;

§ Rava says: With regard to one who says to another: Here are one hundred dinars for you that I am giving you on the condition that you return them to me, if he gave these one hundred dinars as part of a purchase, he does not acquire the item, as he has not given the seller any money. And similarly, with regard to a woman, if he gave her money for her betrothal on the condition that she return it, she is not betrothed. If one gave money in this manner for the redemption of his firstborn son, for which a priest must receive five sela, his son is not redeemed.

בִּתְרוּמָה – יָצָא יְדֵי נְתִינָה, וְאָסוּר לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנִּרְאֶה כְּכֹהֵן הַמְסַיֵּיעַ בְּבֵית הַגְּרָנוֹת.

If one does this with regard to teruma, i.e., he gives produce to a priest as teruma on the condition that it will be returned, he has technically fulfilled his obligation of giving. Once he gets the teruma back it belongs to him, as he is the original owner, and although it is prohibited for him to partake of it, as he is a non-priest, he may sell it to a different priest. But it is prohibited to do this, i.e., give teruma in this manner, ab initio, because this priest receiving the teruma appears like a priest who assists at the threshing floor, as he presumably agrees to this arrangement in return for some gain.

מַאי קָסָבַר רָבָא? אִי קָסָבַר מַתָּנָה עַל מְנָת לְהַחֲזִיר שְׁמָהּ מַתָּנָה – אֲפִילּוּ כּוּלְּהוּ נַמִי. וְאִי קָסָבַר לָא שְׁמָהּ מַתָּנָה – אֲפִילּוּ תְּרוּמָה נַמִי לָא!

The Gemara asks: What does Rava maintain? If he maintains that a gift given on the condition that it is returned is called a gift, this should apply not only to teruma but even to all the other cases, i.e., it should be considered a valid gift in all of the above cases. And if he maintains that a gift of this kind is not called a gift, then even with regard to teruma it should not be considered a legitimate form of giving.

וְעוֹד, הָא רָבָא הוּא דְּאָמַר: מַתָּנָה עַל מְנָת לְהַחֲזִיר – שְׁמָהּ מַתָּנָה! דַּאֲמַר רָבָא: ״הֵילָךְ אֶתְרוֹג זֶה עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּחֲזִירֵהוּ לִי״, נְטָלוֹ וְהֶחֱזִירוֹ – יָצָא; וְאִם לָאו – לֹא יָצָא!

And furthermore, Rava is the one who says: A gift given on the condition that it is later returned is called a gift. As Rava said that if one says to another on the first day of the festival of Sukkot: Take this etrog on the condition that you return it to me, and the recipient takes it, recites a blessing over it, and returns it, he has fulfilled his obligation, despite the fact that one must own the etrog he uses for the mitzva on the first day of Sukkot. And if he does not return it he has not fulfilled his obligation, as he gave him the gift only on the condition that it would be returned. This indicates that in the opinion of Rava, a gift that is given on the condition that it is returned is considered a gift.

אֶלָּא אֲמַר רַב אַשִׁי: בְּכוּלְּהוּ קָנֵי, לְבַר מֵאִשָּׁה, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין אִשָּׁה נִקְנֵית בַּחֲלִיפִין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נְחֶמְיָה לְרַב אַשִׁי: הָכִי אָמְרִינַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא כְּוָותֵיךְ.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: In all of these cases the gift is acquired, except for the betrothal of a woman, because a woman cannot be acquired by means of symbolic exchange. Rav Huna Mar, son of Rav Neḥemya, said to Rav Ashi: We say this in the name of Rava in accordance with your opinion, not in accordance with the previous ruling.

אָמַר רָבָא: ״תֵּן מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי

§ Rava says that if a woman said to a man: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so