שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים נִדְחִים.

Conclude from it that living things can be permanently deferred. Not only an offering that has already been slaughtered, but also a living animal that has been separated as an offering for which it is disqualified, is permanently deferred from being sacrificed on the altar. Likewise here, when he consecrated only half of it, the animal cannot be offered and is rejected. This ruling is in opposition to the claim that only slaughtered animals are permanently rejected.

וּשְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: דִּחוּי מֵעִיקָּרָא הָוֵי דִּחוּי. וּשְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: יֵשׁ דִּחוּי בְּדָמִים.

And furthermore, learn from it that deferral at the outset, i.e., a condition disqualifying the animal from being sacrificed that was present when the animal was first consecrated, is considered a permanent deferral. One does not say that the halakha of deferral applies only to an animal that was eligible to be sacrificed at the time it was consecrated and later was deferred. And learn from it that there is deferral not only with regard to an offering itself, but also with regard to monetary value, i.e., deferral applies even to an animal whose value was consecrated. In this case, half of an animal is not consecrated to be sacrificed as an offering, and yet it can still be permanently deferred from the altar.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: ״חֶצְיֵיךְ בַּחֲצִי פְּרוּטָה וְחֶצְיֵיךְ בַּחֲצִי פְּרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר לָהּ חֲצִי פְּרוּטָה – פְּסַקָהּ, אוֹ דִּילְמָא – מוֹנֶה וְהוֹלֵךְ הוּא?

§ Rava raises a dilemma: If a man says to a woman: Half of you is betrothed with half of one peruta, and half of you with half of one peruta, what is the halakha? Does one say that since he said to her: Half of one peruta, he has divided his statement? In other words, by specifying half of one peruta he intended the betrothal to be performed in two stages, with one half- peruta for each stage, and half of one peruta does not effect betrothal. Or perhaps he was counting toward the full sum of the betrothal money, and intends for the betrothal to take effect at one time.

אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר מוֹנֶה וְהוֹלֵךְ הוּא, ״חֶצְיֵיךְ בִּפְרוּטָה וְחֶצְיֵיךְ בִּפְרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר לָהּ בִּפְרוּטָה וּפְרוּטָה – פְּסַקָהּ לְמִילְּתֵיהּ, אוֹ דִּילְמָא – כָּל בְּיוֹמֵיהּ, מוֹנֶה וְהוֹלֵךְ הוּא?

And if you say that in that case it is considered as though he were counting, then if he said to her: Half of you is betrothed with one peruta and half of you with one peruta, what is the halakha? Does one say that since he said to her: With one peruta and one peruta, he divided his statement and intended to betroth her two halves separately, and one cannot betroth half a woman? Or perhaps anything that he does on that day is considered as if he were counting, i.e., since he intended to complete the action that day it is as though she were betrothed with two perutot.

אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר כָּל בְּיוֹמֵיהּ מוֹנֶה וְהוֹלֵךְ הוּא, ״חֶצְיֵיךְ בִּפְרוּטָה הַיּוֹם וְחֶצְיֵיךְ בִּפְרוּטָה לְמָחָר״ מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר לָהּ ״לְמָחָר״ – פְּסַקָהּ, אוֹ דִּילְמָא הָכִי קָאָמַר לָהּ: קִדּוּשִׁין מַתְחְלוּ מֵהָאִידָנָא, וּמִגְמַר לָא נִיגְמְרוּ עַד לְמָחָר?

And if you say that everything he does on that day is considered as if he were counting, then if he said to her: Half of you is betrothed with one peruta today, and half of you is betrothed with one peruta tomorrow, what is the halakha? Does one say that since he said to her: Tomorrow, he has divided his statement, which prevents the days from being combined, or perhaps this is what he is saying to her: The betrothal begins from now, and it will not be completed until tomorrow.

״שְׁנֵי חֲצָיָיִךְ בִּפְרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? הָכָא וַדַּאי בְּחַד זִימְנָא קָאָמַר לָהּ, אוֹ דִּילְמָא – אֵין אִשָּׁה מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת לַחֲצָאִין כְּלָל? תֵּיקוּ.

Rava further inquires: If he said to her: Your two halves are be-trothed with one peruta, what is the halakha? Here, he certainly spoke to her at one time, i.e., he did not divide his statement into two, and therefore it should be a valid betrothal, or perhaps a woman may not be betrothed in halves at all. No resolution was found for any of these questions, and therefore the Gemara says that the dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: ״שְׁתֵּי בְנוֹתֶיךָ לִשְׁנֵי בָנַי בִּפְרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? בָּתַר נוֹתֵן וּמְקַבֵּל אָזְלִינַן – וְהָאִיכָּא מָמוֹנָא, אוֹ דִּילְמָא בָּתַר דִּידְהוּ אָזְלִינַן – וְהָא לֵיכָּא? תֵּיקוּ.

Rava raises another dilemma. If one man said to another: Let your two daughters be betrothed to my two sons with one peruta, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains the two sides of the dilemma: Do we follow the giver and recipient, and as the giver bestows one peruta and the recipient receives one peruta there is money here, since one peruta is considered money and therefore the betrothal is valid. Or perhaps we follow them, i.e., those affected by the issue, in this case the sons and the daughters, and there is not one peruta for each of these individuals, and therefore the betrothal is not valid? This problem is also left unanswered, and therefore the Gemara says that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי רַב פַּפָּא: ״בִּתְּךָ וּפָרָתְךָ בִּפְרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: בִּתְּךָ בַּחֲצִי פְּרוּטָה וּפָרָתְךָ בַּחֲצִי פְּרוּטָה, אוֹ דִּילְמָא: בִּתְּךָ בִּפְרוּטָה, וּפָרָתְךָ בִּמְשִׁיכָה? תֵּיקוּ.

Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one man said to another: I hereby acquire your daughter and your cow with one peruta, what is the halakha? Do we say that he meant: Your daughter should be betrothed with half of one peruta and your cow purchased with half of one peruta? In that case neither the betrothal nor the acquisition take effect. Or perhaps he meant: Your daughter should be betrothed with one peruta and your cow should be acquired by pulling? No satisfactory answer was found in this case either, and the Gemara says that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי רַב אַשִׁי: ״בִּתְּךָ וְקַרְקַעֲךָ בִּפְרוּטָה״ מַהוּ? בִּתְּךָ בַּחֲצִי פְּרוּטָה וְקַרְקַעֲךָ בַּחֲצִי פְּרוּטָה, אוֹ דִּילְמָא: בִּתְּךָ בִּפְרוּטָה, וְקַרְקַעֲךָ בַּחֲזָקָה? תֵּיקוּ.

Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If he said: I hereby acquire your daughter and your land with one peruta, what is the halakha? Does this mean: Your daughter should be betrothed with half of one peruta and your land should be acquired with half of one peruta? Or perhaps it means: Your daughter should be betrothed with one peruta and your land should be acquired through the act of taking possession? This question is also left unanswered, and the Gemara again says that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

הַהוּא גַּבְרָא דְאַקְדֵּישׁ בְּשִׁירָאֵי. רַבָּה אֲמַר: לָא צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא. רַב יוֹסֵף אֲמַר: צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא. אִי דַּאֲמַר לָהּ בְּכָל דְּהוּ – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא.

§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who betrothed a woman with silk [beshira’ei] garments. Rabba said: An appraisal of the value of the garments is not necessary, as they are certainly worth more than one peruta. Rav Yosef said: An appraisal of the value of the garments is necessary, and as the man did not determine the value of the silk garments before the betrothal, the betrothal is invalid. The Gemara comments: If he said to her that she should become betrothed to him by any amount, regardless of the value of the silk garments, everyone agrees that the garments do not require appraisal, as they are undoubtedly worth more than one peruta.

אִי דַּאֲמַר לָהּ ״חַמְשִׁין״ וְלָא שָׁווּ חַמְשִׁין – הָא לָא שָׁווּ. כִּי פְּלִיגִי – דַּאֲמַר ״חַמְשִׁין״ וְשָׁווּ חַמְשִׁין. רַבָּה אֲמַר: לָא צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא, דְּהָא שָׁווּ חַמְשִׁין. רַב יוֹסֵף אֲמַר: צְרִיכִי שׁוּמָא. כֵּיוָן דְּאִיתְּתָא לָא בְּקִיאָה בְּשׁוּמָא – לָא סָמְכָה דַּעְתָּהּ.

Conversely, if he said to her that they are worth fifty dinars, and they are not worth fifty dinars, then everyone agrees that the betrothal is not valid, as they are not worth the amount he specified. They disagree when he said that they are worth fifty dinars, and in actuality they are worth fifty dinars. Rabba said: An appraisal of the value of the garments is not necessary before the betrothal, as they are worth fifty dinars. Rav Yosef said: An appraisal of the value of the garments is necessary, because the woman herself is not an expert in appraisal and she does not rely on his assessment. Since she is unsure if the garments are actually worth fifty dinars as he claimed, she does not agree to be betrothed.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: בְּכָל דְּהוּ נַמִי פְּלִיגִי, רַב יוֹסֵף אֲמַר: שָׁוֶה כֶסֶף הֲרֵי הוּא כְּכֶסֶף. מַה כֶּסֶף – דְּקִיץ,

There are those who say that even in a case where he says to her: Be betrothed to me with these silk garments, whatever they are worth, the amora’im disagree with regard to the halakha. The reason for the dispute in this case is as follows. Rav Yosef said: An item worth money is like money in every way. Just as money is set, i.e., it has a clearly defined value,