הֲרֵי גּוּפִין מוּחְלָקִים, הֲרֵי שֵׁמוֹת מוּחְלָקִים!

Aren’t they separate bodies, i.e., three different people? Aren’t they labels [shemot] of separate [muḥlakim] prohibitions, since each one is forbidden in her own right? It is therefore clear that he should receive lashes for each act.

אֶלָּא שֶׁבָּא עַל אַלְמָנָה אַחַת שָׁלֹשׁ בִּיאוֹת. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דְּלָא אַתְרוּ בֵּיהּ – פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת,

Rather, perhaps it means that he engaged in three acts of intercourse with one widow. The Gemara analyzes this possibility: What are the circumstances? If they did not forewarn him between each act, it is obvious that he is liable to receive only one set of lashes, for one must be forewarned in order to be liable to receive lashes, and here he was forewarned only once for the three acts. There would be no need to state this halakha.

אֶלָּא דְּאַתְרוּ בֵּיהּ אַכָּל חֲדָא וַחֲדָא – אַמַּאי אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת? וְהָתְנַן: נָזִיר שֶׁהָיָה שׁוֹתֶה יַיִן כָּל הַיּוֹם כּוּלּוֹ – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. אָמְרוּ לוֹ ״אַל תִּשְׁתֶּה״ ״אַל תִּשְׁתֶּה״ וְהוּא שׁוֹתֶה – חַיָּיב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת!

Rather, perhaps the case is that they forewarned him for each and every one of his acts of intercourse. But if that were the case, why is he liable to receive only one set of lashes? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nazir 42a): A nazirite who was drinking wine in violation of his naziriteship the entire day is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If they said to him: Do not drink, do not drink, i.e., he was forewarned several times, and he nevertheless drinks, he is liable to receive lashes for each and every time he was forewarned and proceeded to drink.

לָא צְרִיכָא, שֶׁבָּא עַל אַלְמָנַת רְאוּבֵן שֶׁהָיְתָה אַלְמָנַת שִׁמְעוֹן, שֶׁהָיְתָה אַלְמָנַת לֵוִי. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הֲרֵי שֵׁמוֹת מוּחְלָקִים. קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן: גּוּפִים מוּחְלָקִים בָּעֵינַן, וְלֵיכָּא.

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for a case where he engaged in sexual intercourse one time with Reuven’s widow, who was previously Shimon’s widow, who was previously Levi’s widow. Lest you say they are separate labels of prohibitions and he should be liable to receive three sets of lashes, since she was widowed from three different people, the baraita therefore teaches us that we require separate bodies for him to receive separate punishments, and as that is not the case here, he is liable to receive only one set of lashes.

״אַלְמָנָה וּגְרוּשָׁה וַחֲלָלָה זֹנָה״, הַאי תַּנָּא מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר – אִיפְּכָא נַמִי? וְאִי קָסָבַר אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר – אֲפִילּוּ כַּסֵּדֶר הַזֶּה נַמִי לָא!

The baraita teaches that if a High Priest engages in sexual intercourse with a woman who was a widow, and then was a divorcée, and then was a ḥalala, and then was a zona, if the changes to her status occurred in that order he is liable to receive lashes for each of them. The Gemara asks: What does this tanna hold? If he holds that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, i.e., if an item or a person is rendered forbidden by a prohibition then another prohibition can take effect in addition to the first one, the reverse should also be the case, i.e., if she was initially a zona and subsequently became a ḥalala, the same two prohibitions should apply to her. And if he holds that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, likewise not be liable to receive more than one set of lashes even if they occurred in this order.

אֲמַר רָבָא: הַאי תַּנָּא אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר – לֵית לֵיהּ, אִיסּוּר מוֹסִיף – אִית לֵיהּ.

Rava said: In general, this tanna does not accept the principle that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, but he holds that it does take effect in the case of an expanded prohibition. If the second prohibition adds people to the category of those to whom the item is forbidden, then it takes effect in addition to the previous prohibition, which had a more limited range.

אַלְמָנָה אֲסוּרָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל וְשַׁרְיָא לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט. הָוְיָא לָהּ גְּרוּשָׁה, מִיגּוֹ דְּאִיתּוֹסַף לָהּ אִיסּוּרָא לְגַבֵּי כֹּהֵן הֶדְיוֹט – אִיתּוֹסַף לָהּ אִיסּוּרָא לְגַבֵּי כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל. וַעֲדַיִין שַׁרְיָא לְמֵיכַל בִּתְרוּמָה. הָוְיָא לָהּ חֲלָלָה, מִיגּוֹ דְּאִיתּוֹסַף אִיסּוּרָא לְמֵיכַל בִּתְרוּמָה – אִיתּוֹסַף אִיסּוּרָא לְגַבֵּי כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל.

In this case, a widow is forbidden to a High Priest but is permitted to a common priest. Once she becomes a divorcée, since a prohibition has been added to her with regard to a common priest, as a common priest is prohibited from marrying a divorcée, the prohibition is also added to her with regard to a High Priest. And at this stage, she is still permitted to partake of teruma if she is the daughter of a priest. When she becomes a ḥalala by engaging in sexual intercourse with a priest, since a prohibition for her to eat teruma has been added, the prohibition with regard to a ḥalala is also added with regard to a High Priest who engages in intercourse with her, in addition to the prohibitions of a widow and a divorcée. It is only if they occurred in this order that each prohibition adds to the previous one, but not if they happened in the reverse order.

אֶלָּא זוֹנָה מַאי אִיסּוּר מוֹסִיף אִית בָּהּ? אֲמַר רַב חָנָא בַּר רַב קְטִינָא: הוֹאִיל וְשֵׁם זְנוּת פּוֹסֵל בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.

Yet, one could ask: But in the case of a zona, what expanded prohibition is there with regard to her? There is no additional prohibition with a zona beyond what is prohibited with regard to a ḥalala. Rav Ḥana bar Rav Ketina said: Since the label of zenut disqualifies her in Israel, it is viewed as an expanded prohibition. Although a zona as precisely defined in this context, i.e., a woman who engages in sexual intercourse with one who is unfit for her, is prohibited only to priests and does not add any prohibition beyond that of a ḥalala, the label of a zona in its broader sense, such as a married woman who commits adultery, does disqualify her to an Israelite, namely her husband. Therefore, there is a prohibition with regard to a zona that has a greater scope than the prohibition with regard to a ḥalala.

תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כָּל שֶׁהוּא בְּ״יִקָּח״ הֲרֵי הוּא בְּ״לֹא יִקָּח״, כָּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּ״יִקָּח״ – אֵינוֹ בְּ״לֹא יִקָּח״, פְּרָט לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל שֶׁבָּא עַל אֲחוֹתוֹ אַלְמָנָה.

A tanna taught a baraita before Rav Sheshet: The command addressed to the High Priest states: “A widow, or one divorced, or a ḥalala, or a zona, these shall he not take; but a virgin of his own people shall he take to wife” (Leviticus 21:14). Any woman who is included in the mitzva: “Shall he take” is included in the prohibition: “Shall he not take” if she becomes a widow or a divorcée. And any woman who is not included in the mitzva: “Shall he take” is not included in the prohibition: “Shall he not take.” This excludes the case of a High Priest who engaged in intercourse with his widowed sister. As his sister, she is forbidden to him even when she is a virgin, so the mitzva: “Shall he take” does not refer to her. Therefore, he does not transgress the prohibition: “Shall he not take” if he engages in intercourse with her after she had been widowed or divorced.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דְּאָמַר לָךְ מַנִּי? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: הָאוֹכֵל נְבֵילָה בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים – פָּטוּר. דְּאִי רַבָּנַן – הָא אָמְרִי: אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר.

Rav Sheshet said to him: He who said this to you, in accordance with whose opinion did he teach it? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says as a principle: A prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists. Therefore, his sister, who was already forbidden to him by virtue of being his sister, is not forbidden due to the additional prohibition: “Shall he not take.” As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: One who eats an unslaughtered animal carcass on Yom Kippur is exempt from karet for eating on the fast day, since the prohibition against eating an animal carcass applied to it beforehand. As, if you say this baraita follows the opinion of the Rabbis, don’t they say: A prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists?

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, כִּי אָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר – הָנֵי מִילֵּי אִיסּוּר חָמוּר עַל אִיסּוּר קַל, אֲבָל אִיסּוּר קַל עַל אִיסּוּר חָמוּר – לָא חָיֵיל.

The Gemara rejects this: You can even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as when the Rabbis say that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, that statement applies only when the second prohibition is a more severe prohibition, e.g., eating on Yom Kippur, which takes effect in addition to a light prohibition, in this case, eating an unslaughtered animal carcass. But a light prohibition does not take effect in addition to a severe prohibition. In this case, the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s sister, which is punishable by karet, is more severe than that of: “A widow or one divorced, or a ḥalala, or a zona, these shall he not take,” which is punishable by flogging.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: הָא מַנִּי – רַבָּנַן הִיא, דְּאָמְרִי: אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר. וְכִי אָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר – הָנֵי מִילֵּי אִיסּוּר חָמוּר עַל אִיסּוּר קַל, אֲבָל אִיסּוּר קַל עַל אִיסּוּר חָמוּר – לָא חָיֵיל. דְּאִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – הָשְׁתָּא אִיסּוּר חָמוּר עַל אִיסּוּר קַל לָא חָיֵיל, אִיסּוּר קַל עַל אִיסּוּר חָמוּר מִיבָּעֲיָא?

There are those who say that Rav Sheshet said to the tanna as follows: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: A prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists. And when the Rabbis say that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, that statement applies when the second prohibition is a more severe prohibition, which takes effect in addition to a light prohibition, but a light prohibition does not take effect in addition to a severe prohibition. As, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, now that he holds that even a severe prohibition does not take effect in addition to a light prohibition, is it necessary to say that a light prohibition does not take effect in addition to a severe prohibition? There would be no novelty in this ruling of the baraita.

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: אִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה שָׁאנֵי. קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.

The Gemara rejects this: It is necessary, lest you say that a prohibition involving the priesthood is different. You might say that since there are many stringencies that apply only to priests, then with regard to prohibitions of the priesthood, a second prohibition should take effect in addition to a first one. He therefore teaches us that Rabbi Shimon holds that the second prohibition does not take effect even when it is one addressed to members of the priesthood.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פַּפָּא לְאַבַּיֵי: יִשְׂרָאֵל הַבָּא עַל אֲחוֹתוֹ, זוֹנָה מְשַׁוֵּי לָהּ. חֲלָלָה מְשַׁוֵּי לָהּ אוֹ לָא מְשַׁוֵּי לָהּ?

§ Rav Pappa said to Abaye: In the case of an Israelite who engages in intercourse with his sister, this makes her a zona and she is forbidden to a priest. But does he also make her a ḥalala so that a priest who engages in intercourse with her is also liable for violating the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a ḥalala, or perhaps he does not make her a ḥalala?

מִי אָמְרִינַן, קַל וָחוֹמֶר: מֵחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין הָוְיָא חֲלָלָה – מֵחַיָּיבֵי כָּרֵיתוֹת לֹא כָּל שֶׁכֵּן? אוֹ דִּילְמָא: אֵין חֲלָלָה אֶלָּא מֵאִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין (אִיסּוּר) חֲלָלָה אֶלָּא מֵאִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה בִּלְבַד.

The two sides of the question are as follows: Do we say that this is an a fortiori inference: If she becomes a ḥalala by engaging in sexual intercourse for which she is liable for violating only an ordinary prohibition, should she not all the more so be considered a ḥalala by engaging in intercourse for which she is liable to be punished by karet? Or perhaps the status of ḥalala results only from a prohibition addressed specifically to the priesthood? Abaye said to him: A prohibition with regard to a ḥalala results only from a prohibition addressed specifically to the priesthood and from that alone.

אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא הָא מִילְּתָא דַּאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן אֵין חֲלָלָה אֶלָּא מֵאִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה? דְּתַנְיָא: לֹא יֹאמַר גְּרוּשָׁה בְּכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל וְתֵיתֵי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִכֹּהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, וַאֲנָא אָמִינָא: הָשְׁתָּא לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט אֲסוּרָה – לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל מִיבָּעֲיָא? לָמָּה נֶאֶמְרָה? כְּשֵׁם שֶׁחֲלוּקָה גְּרוּשָׁה מִזּוֹנָה וַחֲלָלָה בְּכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט – כָּךְ חֲלוּקָה בְּכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל.

Rava says: From where is this matter that the Sages state, that a ḥalala results only from a prohibition addressed specifically to the priesthood, derived? As it is taught in a baraita: The verse need not explicitly state that a divorcée is forbidden to a High Priest, and one could derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a common priest. As I can state the following argument: Now that a divorcée is forbidden to a common priest, is it necessary to state that she is forbidden to a High Priest? But if it is not necessary to mention it, why is the prohibition with regard to a divorcée to a High Priest stated? It is in order to teach the following: Just as the prohibition with regard to a divorcée is distinct from that of a zona and a ḥalala in the case of a common priest, as a divorcée is forbidden by a separate prohibition for which he is liable to be flogged, so too, the prohibition with regard to a divorcée is distinct in the case of a High Priest, and he will be liable to receive lashes for a separate prohibition if she was a ḥalala as well.

פְּשִׁיטָא! מִיגְרַע גָּרְעָה? אֶלָּא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁחֲלוּקָה גְּרוּשָׁה מִזּוֹנָה וַחֲלָלָה בְּכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט – כָּךְ אַלְמָנָה חֲלוּקָה מִגְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלָלָה זוֹנָה בְּכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל.

The Gemara questions this statement: This is obvious; is the status of a High Priest any lower than that of a common priest? Since this halakha applied to him when he was a common priest, it certainly applies to him when he becomes a High Priest. His restrictions as a priest are not lessened when he becomes a High Priest. Rather, teach as follows: Just as the prohibition with regard to a divorcée is distinct from that of a zona and a ḥalala in the case of a common priest, since he is liable to receive lashes for each of the prohibitions, so too, a widow is distinct from a divorcée, and a ḥalala, and a zona in the case of a High Priest, and he is liable to receive lashes for each prohibition, despite the fact that they are stated in the same verse (see Leviticus 21:14).

חֲלָלָה לָמָּה נֶאֶמְרָה? אֵין חֲלָלָה אֶלָּא מֵאִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה. זוֹנָה לָמָּה נֶאֶמְרָה? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״זוֹנָה״ וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״זוֹנָה״, מַה כָּאן זַרְעוֹ חוּלִּין – אַף לְהַלָּן זַרְעוֹ חוּלִּין.

The baraita further asks: Why is the prohibition with regard to a ḥalala stated with regard to a High Priest, as she is forbidden to him even when he is a common priest? This repetition serves to teach that a ḥalala results only from a prohibition addressed specifically to the priesthood. Why is the prohibition with regard to a zona stated with regard to a High Priest, as she is forbidden to him even when he is a common priest? It is stated here: “ Zona ” (Leviticus 21:14), with regard to a High Priest, and it is stated there: “ Zona ” (Leviticus 21:7), with regard to a common priest. Just as here, in the case of a High Priest who engages in sexual intercourse with a zona, his offspring are profaned, in accordance with the verse: “And he shall not profane his offspring” (Leviticus 21:15), so too there, in the case of a common priest who engages in intercourse with a zona, his offspring are profaned.

אָמַר רַב אַשִׁי: הִילְכָּךְ, כֹּהֵן הַבָּא עַל אֲחוֹתוֹ,

Rav Ashi says: Consequently, a priest who engages in intercourse with his sister