וְכֵן שְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁאָבְדוּ וְהִפְרִישׁ אֲחֵרִים תַּחְתֵּיהֶן – כּוּלָּן יָמוּתוּ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמְרִים: יִרְעוּ עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֲבוּ, וְיִמָּכְרוּ וְיִפְּלוּ דְּמֵיהֶן לִנְדָבָה, שֶׁאֵין חַטַּאת צִבּוּר מֵתָה;

and likewise, goats that were designated to atone for an act of unwitting public idol worship that were lost, and one separated and sacrificed others in their stead, in such cases, all of the lost animals, should they subsequently be found, shall be left to die. This is in accordance with the halakha that a sin-offering whose owner has already achieved atonement is left to die. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: They should graze until they become unfit by developing a blemish, and then they are sold and their proceeds are allocated for communal gift offerings. because the halakha is that a communal sin-offering is not left to die.

וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא: לֵב בֵּית דִּין מַתְנֶה עֲלֵיהֶן!

Abaye explains his challenge: But why should it even be necessary to wait until the offerings develop a blemish? Let us say here also that the court tacitly stipulates concerning them, so that if it ultimately emerges that they were not needed, then they should have only sanctity that inheres in their value, and therefore it should be possible to redeem them even if they do not develop a blemish.

אֲבוּדִין קָאָמְרַתְּ? שָׁאנֵי אֲבוּדִין, דְּלָא שְׁכִיחִי.

Rabba deflects the challenge: Did you say that there is a proof from the case of lost animals? Cases of lost animals are different, because they are not common. Therefore, the court does not stipulate concerning such an eventuality.

הֲרֵי פָּרָה דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא, וְתַנְיָא: פָּרָה נִפְדֵּית עַל כָּל פְּסוּל שֶׁבָּהּ, מֵתָה – תִּפָּדֶה, נִשְׁחֲטָה – תִּפָּדֶה, מָצָא אַחֶרֶת נָאָה הֵימֶנָּה – תִּפָּדֶה. שְׁחָטָהּ עַל גַּבֵּי מַעֲרַכְתָּהּ – אֵין לָהּ פְּדִיָּיה עוֹלָמִית! שָׁאנֵי פָּרָה, דְּקָדְשֵׁי בֶדֶק הַבַּיִת הִיא.

Abaye persists: But consider the case of a red heifer, which is not common, and yet it is taught in a baraita: A red heifer may be redeemed for any disqualification that occurs to it. If it died, it shall be redeemed; if it was slaughtered in an improper place, it shall be redeemed; if another was found that is choicer than it, it shall be redeemed. But once the priest has slaughtered it properly on its arrangement of wood on the Mount of Olives, it can no longer be redeemed. Presumably, the reason it may be redeemed if a choicer one is found is that the court tacitly stipulates that in such a case it should be consecrated with sanctity that inheres in its value. It is apparent that even in uncommon cases, the court makes such stipulations. Rabba rejects the proof: The red heifer is different, as in all cases it has only the sanctity of items consecrated for Temple maintenance, which inheres only in the item’s value, and so it can always be redeemed, even if still unblemished.

אִי הָכִי, מֵתָה אוֹ נִשְׁחֲטָה תִּפָּדֶה? הָא בָּעֵינַן הַעֲמָדָה וְהַעֲרָכָה! הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: קָדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ הָיוּ בִּכְלַל הַעֲמָדָה וְהַעֲרָכָה, קָדְשֵׁי בֶדֶק הַבַּיִת לֹא הָיוּ בִּכְלַל הַעֲמָדָה וְהַעֲרָכָה.

Abaye asks: If so, if it died or was slaughtered, how can it be redeemed? In order for an item to be redeemed, don’t we require that it first undergo the process of standing and valuation? The animal must be stood before a priest who then evaluates how much it should be redeemed for (see Leviticus 27:11–12), and a dead animal cannot stand. Rabba answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Items consecrated to be offered on the altar were included in the requirement of standing and appraising, but items with the sanctity of items consecrated for Temple maintenance, such as the red heifer, were not included in the requirement of standing and appraising.

אִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: שְׁחָטָהּ עַל גַּבֵּי מַעֲרַכְתָּהּ, אֵין לָהּ פְּדִיָּיה עוֹלָמִית.

Abaye asks: If, as you claim, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, then say and try to justify the latter clause, which states: Once the priest has slaughtered it properly on its arrangement of wood on the Mount of Olives, it can no longer be redeemed.

וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: פָּרָה מְטַמְּאָה טוּמְאַת אוֹכָלִין הוֹאִיל וְהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר; וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, אוֹמֵר הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: פָּרָה נִפְדֵּית עַל גַּב מַעֲרַכְתָּהּ!

And this statement is not consistent with Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, as isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says that the meat of a red heifer that was slaughtered properly is susceptible to becoming ritually impure with the ritual impurity of food, even though it is prohibited to partake of it in its current state, since it had a time when it was fit to be eaten. And in explanation of when it was fit to be eaten, Reish Lakish says: Rabbi Shimon would say that a red heifer may be redeemed even while it is upon its arrangement of wood. It is considered fit to be eaten due to the potential to redeem it, which would allow one to then partake of it. It is apparent from Reish Lakish’s comment that the latter clause, and by logical extension, the rest of the baraita, is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon’s opinion.

אֶלָּא שָׁאנֵי פָּרָה, הוֹאִיל וְדָמֶיהָ יְקָרִין.

Rabba concedes therefore that the red heifer can be redeemed due to the fact that the court makes a stipulation with regard to it, but, nevertheless, he defends his opinion that they do not normally make a stipulation for uncommon cases: Rather, the case of a red heifer is different, since it is of great monetary value. Therefore, to avoid a great loss, the court makes a stipulation despite its being an uncommon case.

אָמַר מָר: מֵתָה – תִּפָּדֶה. וְכִי פּוֹדִין אֶת הַקֳּדָשִׁים לְהַאֲכִילָן לִכְלָבִים? אֲמַר רַב מְשָׁרְשִׁיָּא: מִשּׁוּם עוֹרָהּ. וְקַיְימִי בֵּית דִּין וּמַתְנוּ אַדַּעְתָּא דְּעוֹרָהּ? אֲמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא, אָמְרִי אֱינָשֵׁי: מִגַּמְלָא אוּנָּהּ.

The Gemara interjects with a question concerning the baraita: The Master said in the baraita: If a red heifer died, it shall be redeemed. The Gemara asks: But may one redeem consecrated items in order to feed the meat from them to dogs? Certainly one may not. Nevertheless, the meat of a red heifer that died without being slaughtered is not suitable for any other purpose. Rav Mesharshiyya said: It is redeemed for the sake of its hide. The Gemara asks: But does the court stand and stipulate with its mind on the hide of the heifer, which is presumably of little value? Rav Kahana said: As people say in a popular adage: From a camel, even just its ear. Since a camel is so valuable, even the flesh of its ear is valuable and should be saved if possible. Similarly, the hide of a red heifer will also be valuable.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ, אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מַהוּ שֶׁיִּקְרְבוּ זֶה בָּזֶה? אָמַר לְהוּ: יִקְרְבוּ, אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הוֹאִיל וְאֵין כַּפָּרָתָן שָׁוָה, הֵיאָךְ הֵן קְרֵיבִין? אָמַר לָהֶן: כּוּלָּן בָּאִין לְכַפֵּר עַל טוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו;

§ Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s claim that the court tacitly stipulates concerning items consecrated for public offerings from the mishna (2b): The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: What is the halakha with regard to whether goats consecrated for different days may be sacrificed, this one in place of that one? For example, if a goat was initially consecrated to be sacrificed as part of the Yom Kippur additional offerings, may it be sacrificed instead as part of the Festival additional offerings? Rabbi Shimon said to them: Such a goat may be sacrificed. They said to Rabbi Shimon: Since, according to you, their atonement is not the same, how could they possibly be sacrificed? Rabbi Shimon said to them: They can be interchanged, since ultimately all of them come to atone for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא: לֵב בֵּית דִּין מַתְנֶה עֲלֵיהֶן! רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן קָאָמְרַתְּ? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לֵית לֵיהּ לֵב בֵּית דִּין מַתְנֶה עֲלֵיהֶן; דְּאָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: תְּמִידִין שֶׁלֹּא הוּצְרְכוּ לַצִּבּוּר, לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – אֵין נִפְדִּין תְּמִימִים, לְדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים – נִפְדִּין תְּמִימִים.

Abaye explains the objection brought from the mishna: But according to Rabba, why did Rabbi Shimon give the reason he gave? Let Rabbi Shimon say instead that the court tacitly stipulates concerning them that they should be consecrated for the day on which they are ultimately brought. Rabba answers: Did you say a proof from a statement of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle that the court tacitly stipulates concerning them, as is apparent from that which Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav Amram says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Concerning lambs consecrated for the daily offerings that were not needed by the public, according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon they are not redeemed if they are unblemished; according to the statement of the Rabbis they are redeemed, even if they are unblemished.

וְרַבָּנַן דִּפְלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַאן נִינְהוּ? אִי נֵימָא רַבָּנַן דִּקְטוֹרֶת

The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon and hold that the court does make such stipulations, who are they? Where is their opinion recorded? If we say that they are the Sages who ruled, in the mishna cited above (Shekalim 4:5), with regard to surplus incense that it may be redeemed,