״נִטְמָא בָּעֲזָרָה וְנֶעֶלְמָה מִמֶּנּוּ טוּמְאָה״ וכו׳. טוּמְאָה בָּעֲזָרָה מְנָלַן? אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כָּתוּב אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״אֶת מִשְׁכַּן ה׳ טִמֵּא״, וְכָתוּב אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי אֶת מִקְדַּשׁ ה׳ טִמֵּא״; אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְטוּמְאָה שֶׁבַּחוּץ, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְטוּמְאָה שֶׁבִּפְנִים.

§ The mishna teaches about one who was ritually pure when he entered the Temple but who became impure while in the Temple courtyard, and afterward his impurity was hidden from him. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one is liable even if he contracted impurity in the Temple courtyard and failed to leave immediately by way of the shortest route, and not only if he entered the Temple courtyard when he was already impure? Rabbi Elazar says: One verse states: “He has defiled the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Numbers 19:13), and one verse states: “For he has defiled the Temple of the Lord” (Numbers 19:20). If this second verse is not needed for the matter of one who contracted impurity outside before he entered the Temple courtyard, as this situation is already referred to in the previous verse, apply it to the matter of one who contracted impurity inside the Temple courtyard.

וּקְרָאֵי מְיַתְּרִי? הָא מִיצְרַךְ צְרִיכִי! דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אִם נֶאֱמַר ״מִשְׁכַּן״ לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״מִקְדַּשׁ״, וְאִם נֶאֱמַר ״מִקְדַּשׁ״ לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״מִשְׁכַּן״? אִילּוּ נֶאֱמַר ״מִשְׁכַּן״ וְלֹא נֶאֱמַר ״מִקְדַּשׁ״, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: עַל מִשְׁכָּן יְהֵא חַיָּיב, שֶׁהֲרֵי מָשׁוּחַ בְּשֶׁמֶן הַמִּשְׁחָה, וְעַל מִקְדָּשׁ לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב; וְאִם נֶאֱמַר ״מִקְדַּשׁ״ וְלֹא נֶאֱמַר ״מִשְׁכַּן״, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: עַל מִקְדָּשׁ יְהֵא חַיָּיב, שֶׁהֲרֵי קְדוּשָּׁתוֹ קְדוּשַּׁת עוֹלָם, וְעַל מִשְׁכָּן לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב; לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר ״מִשְׁכַּן״, לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר ״מִקְדַּשׁ״!

The Gemara asks: But is it really superfluous to have both of these verses, one having been sufficient? Aren’t they each necessary to teach a novel ruling? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar says: If it is stated: “Tabernacle,” why does it state: “Temple”? And if it is stated: “Temple,” why does it state: “Tabernacle”? He explains: Had the verse stated only: “Tabernacle,” and not stated: “Temple,” I would have said that one is liable for entering the Tabernacle in a state of impurity, since it was anointed with the anointing oil, and therefore it carries greater sanctity, but he is not liable for entering the Temple, which was not anointed with the anointing oil. And had the verse stated only: “Temple,” and not stated: “Tabernacle,” I would have said that one is liable for entering the Temple in a state of impurity, since its sanctity is an eternal sanctity, but he is not liable for entering the Tabernacle, whose sanctity was only for its time. For this reason, it is stated: “Tabernacle,” and for this reason, it is stated: “Temple.”

רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הָכִי קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ: מִכְּדֵי מִשְׁכָּן אִיקְרֵי ״מִקְדָּשׁ״ וּמִקְדָּשׁ אִיקְרֵי ״מִשְׁכָּן״, נִכְתּוֹב אוֹ אִידִי וְאִידִי מִקְדָּשׁ אוֹ אִידִי וְאִידִי מִשְׁכָּן, ״מִשְׁכַּן״ וּ״מִקְדַּשׁ״ לָמָּה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Elazar did not base his derivation on a superfluous verse, but on the change in wording between the two verses. This is what is difficult for him: Since the Tabernacle is also called Temple and the Temple is also called Tabernacle, then let the verse write either in both verses: Temple, or in both verses: Tabernacle; why do I need both “Tabernacle” and “Temple”? Conclude two conclusions from it, i.e., that one is liable even for impurity contracted inside the grounds, and that the halakha applies both in the Tabernacle and in the Temple.

בִּשְׁלָמָא מִקְדָּשׁ אִיקְרֵי ״מִשְׁכָּן״, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְנָתַתִּי מִשְׁכָּנִי בְּתוֹכְכֶם״. אֶלָּא מִשְׁכָּן דְּאִיקְרֵי ״מִקְדָּשׁ״ מְנָלַן? אִילֵימָא מִדִּכְתִיב: ״וְנָסְעוּ הַקְּהָתִים נֹשְׂאֵי הַמִּקְדָּשׁ״ – הַהוּא בָּאָרוֹן כְּתִיב! אֶלָּא מֵהָכָא: ״וְעָשׂוּ לִי מִקְדָּשׁ וְשָׁכַנְתִּי בְּתוֹכָם״, וּכְתִיב: ״כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מַרְאֶה אוֹתְךָ אֵת תַּבְנִית הַמִּשְׁכָּן״.

The Gemara questions its previous assumption: Granted, the Temple is also called Tabernacle, as it is written: “And I will set My Tabernacle among you” (Leviticus 26:11), But from where do we derive that the Tabernacle is also called Temple? If we say that it is derived from that which is written: “And the Kehatites, the bearers of the Temple, set forward” (Numbers 10:21), that instance of the term Temple is not written with regard to the Tabernacle; rather, it is written with regard to the Ark and the other sacred vessels. Rather, it is derived from here: “And let them make Me a Temple, that I may dwell among them” (Exodus 25:8), where the reference is to the Tabernacle, as immediately afterward it is written: “According to all that I show you, the pattern of the Tabernacle” (Exodus 25:9).

״וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁהָה כְּדֵי הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה״. אָמַר רָבָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה כְּלַפֵּי פְנִים; אֲבָל הִשְׁתַּחֲוָה כְּלַפֵּי חוּץ, שָׁהָה – אִין, לֹא שָׁהָה – לֹא.

§ The mishna teaches: If he bowed down, or he tarried in the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down, or he went out by way of a longer route when he could have taken a shorter route, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. Rava says: They taught this only when he bowed down in the Temple courtyard facing inward, toward the Holy of Holies, as that alone is proper bowing. But if he bowed down facing outward, that is not considered bowing. When he bows facing outward, if he tarried in the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down, yes, he is liable, but if he did not tarry long enough to bow down, he is not liable.

אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לָהּ אַסֵּיפָא: אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁהָה בִּכְדֵי הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה – מִכְּלָל דְּהִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה גּוּפָהּ בָּעֲיָא שְׁהִיָּיה. אָמַר רָבָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה כְּלַפֵּי חוּץ, אֲבָל כְּלַפֵּי פְנִים – אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא שָׁהָה; וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: הִשְׁתַּחֲוָה כְּלַפֵּי פְנִים, אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁהָה כְּדֵי הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה בְּהָךְ הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה דִּכְלַפֵּי חוּץ – חַיָּיב.

There are those who teach the statement of Rava with regard to the latter clause: Or if he tarried in the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. It may be said by inference that bowing down itself entails tarrying, and the mere act of bowing does not render one liable. With regard to this Rava says: They taught this only when he bowed down facing outward. In such a case, he is liable only if he tarried long enough to bow down. But if he bowed down facing inward toward the Holy of Holies, he is liable even if he did not tarry for that length of time. And this is what the mishna is saying: If he bowed down facing inward, or if he tarried long enough to bow down while he was bowing down facing outward, he is liable.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה דְּאִית בָּהּ שְׁהִיָּיה, וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה דְּלֵית בָּהּ שְׁהִיָּיה? דְּלֵית בָּהּ שְׁהִיָּיה – זוֹ כְּרִיעָה בְּעָלְמָא הִיא, דְּאִית בָּהּ שְׁהִיָּיה – פִּישּׁוּט יָדַיִם וְרַגְלַיִם.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of bowing in which there is tarrying, and what are the circumstances of bowing in which there is no tarrying? The Gemara answers: With regard to bowing in which there is no tarrying, that is merely kneeling. As for bowing in which there is tarrying, that is prostrating oneself while spreading one’s arms and legs in total submission.

וְכַמָּה שִׁיעוּר שְׁהִיָּיה? פְּלִיגִי בָּהּ רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר נַחְמָנִי וְחַד דְּעִימֵּיהּ, וּמַנּוּ? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן פָּזִי; וְאָמְרִי לָהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן פָּזִי וְחַד דְּעִימֵּיהּ, וּמַנּוּ? רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר נַחְמָנִי, וְאָמְרִי לָהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בַּר נַחְמָנִי; חַד אָמַר: כְּמֵימְרֵיהּ דְּהַאי פְּסוּקָא, וְחַד אָמַר: כְּמִ״וַיִּכְרְעוּ״ לְסֵיפָא, ״וְכֹל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל רֹאִים בְּרֶדֶת הָאֵשׁ וּכְבוֹד ה׳ עַל הַבָּיִת וַיִּכְרְעוּ אַפַּיִם אַרְצָה עַל הָרִצְפָּה וַיִּשְׁתַּחֲווּ וְהוֹדוֹת לַה׳ כִּי טוֹב כִּי לְעוֹלָם חַסְדּוֹ״.

The Gemara asks: And what is the measure of that tarrying? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani and one other Sage who was with him disagree about this. And who is that other scholar? Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi. And some say that it was Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi and one other Sage who was with him. And who is that other scholar? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani. And some say it was Rabbi Shimon bar Naḥmani. One Sage says: It is as long as the time it takes to recite this following verse in its entirety, and one Sage says: It is as long as the time it takes to recite from the term “and they bowed” in the middle of that verse until the end. What is the verse? “And when all the children of Israel saw how the fire came down, and the glory of the Lord upon the House, and they bowed with their faces to the ground upon the pavement, and prostrated themselves, and praised the Lord, saying: For He is good, for His steadfast love endures forever” (II Chronicles 7:3).

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: קִידָּה – עַל אַפַּיִם, וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וַתִּקֹּד בַּת שֶׁבַע אַפַּיִם אֶרֶץ״; כְּרִיעָה – עַל בִּרְכַּיִם, וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״מִכְּרֹעַ עַל בִּרְכָּיו״; הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה – זוֹ פִּישּׁוּט יָדַיִם וְרַגְלַיִם, וְכֵן אוֹמֵר: ״הֲבוֹא נָבוֹא אֲנִי וְאִמְּךָ וְאַחֶיךָ לְהִשְׁתַּחֲוֹת לְךָ אָרְצָה״.

The Gemara discusses the different forms of bowing in greater detail. The Sages taught: The term kidda indicates falling upon one’s face, and so the verse states: “Then Bathsheba bowed [vatikkod] with her face to the ground” (I Kings 1:31). Keria means descending upon one’s knees, and so the verse states with regard to Solomon: “He rose from before the altar of the Lord, from kneeling [mikero’a] upon his knees” (I Kings 8:54). Hishtaḥava’a, this is prostrating oneself while spreading one’s arms and legs in total submission, and so the verse states that Jacob asked, in response to Joseph’s relating of his dream: “Shall I and your mother and your brothers indeed come to bow down [lehishtaḥavot] to you to the ground” (Genesis 37:10), i.e., spread out completely on the ground.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: צָרִיךְ שְׁהִיָּיה לְמַלְקוֹת, אוֹ אֵין צָרִיךְ שְׁהִיָּיה לְמַלְקוֹת? לְקָרְבָּן גְּמִירִי שְׁהִיָּיה, לְמַלְקוֹת לָא גְּמִירִי שְׁהִיָּיה;

§ Rava raises a dilemma: Is tarrying long enough to bow down necessary to incur lashes? If one was warned not to remain in the Temple courtyard in a state of impurity, is he liable to receive lashes only if he remains there long enough to bow down, completely spread out on the ground? Or is tarrying not necessary to incur lashes, and he is immediately liable to receive lashes? The Gemara clarifies the two possibilities: Is it learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary in order to incur liability to bring an offering, but not learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary to become liable to receive lashes?