וַאֲנַן בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ תְּנַן! אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא דָּמֵי, אֲרוּכָּה דְּהָכָא קְצָרָה דְּהָתָם, וַאֲרוּכָּה דְּהָתָם קְצָרָה דְּהָכָא.

And we learned this difference in the mishna specifically with regard to ritual impurity in the Temple. If such a distinction were also in effect with regard to a menstruating woman, the mishna would mention it. Rather, one can explain: No parallel distinction is made, because the two cases are not similar in their details. The long way here, with regard to a menstruating woman, namely, that the man must wait, is like the shortest way there, with regard to impurity in the Temple, namely, that the impure person must leave the Temple by way of the most direct route. And the long way there, with regard to the Temple, is like the shortest way here, with regard to a menstruating woman.

מַתְקִיף לָהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נָתָן: מִי אֲמַר אַבַּיֵי אָנוּס הוּא? אַלְמָא בְּשֶׁלֹּא סָמוּךְ לְוִסְתָּהּ קָאָמְרִינַן; וְהָא אַבַּיֵי דְּאָמַר חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם, אַלְמָא בְּסָמוּךְ לְוִסְתָּהּ עָסְקִינַן!

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, objects to what Abaye said: Did Abaye really say with regard to the mishna that if the man withdraws with a flaccid penis he is exempt because he is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control? Apparently, then, we are speaking of a man who engaged in intercourse with a woman not near the expected date of her menstruation, and therefore the situation is considered beyond his control. But is it not Abaye who says that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings for this transgression, one for his initial entry and one for his withdrawal? Apparently, we are dealing with a man who engaged in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation, so he is considered an unwitting transgressor, who is liable to bring a sin-offering, and is not the victim of circumstances beyond his control. Consequently, Abaye’s two statements contradict each other.

כִּי אִיתְּמַר דְּאַבַּיֵי – בְּעָלְמָא אִיתְּמַר.

The Gemara answers: When this statement of Abaye was stated, that the man is liable to bring two sin-offerings, it was stated in general. It was not relating to the case in the mishna, but was an independent ruling concerning one who engages in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן יוֹסֵי בֶּן לָקוֹנְיָא מֵרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹסֵי בֶּן לָקוֹנְיָא: אַזְהָרָה לְבוֹעֵל נִדָּה מִנַּיִן מִן הַתּוֹרָה? שְׁקַל קָלָא פְּתַק בֵּיהּ: אַזְהָרָה לְבוֹעֵל נִדָּה? ״וְאֶל אִשָּׁה בְּנִדַּת טֻמְאָתָהּ לֹא תִקְרַב״!

§ Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosei ben Lakonya asked Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya: From where in the Torah is the prohibition concerning one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman [nidda] derived? Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya took a clod [kala] of earth and threw it at him in reproach and said to him: Is there a need to search the Torah for a derivation for the prohibition concerning one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman? The verse states: “And a woman who is impure by her uncleanness [nidda] you shall not approach, to uncover her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:19)?

אֶלָּא, אַזְהָרָה לִמְשַׁמֵּשׁ עִם הַטְּהוֹרָה וְאָמְרָה לוֹ ״נִטְמֵאתִי״ דְּלָא נִיפְרִישׁ מִיָּד, מְנָלַן? אֲמַר חִזְקִיָּה, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּתְהִי נִדָּתָהּ עָלָיו״, אֲפִילּוּ בִּשְׁעַת נִדָּתָהּ תְּהֵא עָלָיו.

The Gemara explains the intent of the question of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosei ben Lakonya: Rather, from where do we derive the prohibition with regard to the case in the mishna concerning one who was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, that he must not withdraw immediately? In response to this question Ḥizkiyya said: The verse states: “And if any man lies with her, and her menstrual flow shall be upon him” (Leviticus 15:24), teaching that even at any time when she is menstruating, the prohibition shall be upon him; therefore, he must not withdraw from her immediately.

אַשְׁכְּחַן עֲשֵׂה, לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה מְנָלַן? אֲמַר רַב פַּפָּא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״לֹא תִקְרַב״; ״לֹא תִקְרַב״ נַמִי לֹא תִּפְרוֹשׁ הוּא, דִּכְתִיב: ״הָאֹמְרִים קְרַב אֵלֶיךָ אַל תִּגַּשׁ בִּי כִּי קְדַשְׁתִּיךָ״.

The Gemara asks: We found a source for a positive mitzva with regard to the manner in which one must withdraw from a menstruating woman; from where do we derive that immediate withdrawal is also subject to a prohibition? Rav Pappa said: The verse states: “And a woman who is impure by her uncleanness you shall not approach, to uncover her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:19). The Gemara explains: “You shall not approach [tikrav]” means also the opposite: You shall not withdraw, as it is written: “Those who say: Withdraw [kerav] to yourself, come not near to me, for I am holier than you” (Isaiah 65:5), where “ kerav ” means remove or withdraw.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְהִזַּרְתֶּם אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִטֻּמְאָתָם״, אָמַר רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה: מִיכָּן אַזְהָרָה לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁיִּפְרְשׁוּ מִנְּשׁוֹתֵיהֶן סָמוּךְ לְוִסְתָּן. וְכַמָּה? אָמַר רַבָּה: עוֹנָה.

§ Having mentioned that it is prohibited for a man to engage in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation, the Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught: The verse with regard to a menstruating woman states: “And shall you separate the children of Israel from their uncleanness” (Leviticus 15:31), Rabbi Yoshiya says: From here we derive a prohibition to the children of Israel that they must separate from their wives near the expected date of their menstruation. And how long before must they separate? Rabba says: A set interval of time for the ritual impurity of a menstruating woman, which is half of a twenty-four hour day, either the daytime or the nighttime.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַאי: כָּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ פּוֹרֵשׁ מֵאִשְׁתּוֹ סָמוּךְ לְוִסְתָּהּ, אֲפִילּוּ הָוְיָין לוֹ בָּנִים כִּבְנֵי אַהֲרֹן – מֵתִים, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהִזַּרְתֶּם אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִטֻּמְאָתָם…וְהַדָּוָה בְּנִדָּתָהּ״, וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ: ״אַחֲרֵי מוֹת״.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: With regard to anyone who does not separate from his wife near the expected date of her menstruation, even if he has sons who are fit to be great and holy like the sons of Aaron, these sons will die due to his sin, as it is written: “And shall you separate the children of Israel from their uncleanness… this is the law… of her that is sick with her menstrual flow” (Leviticus 15:31–33), and it is stated near it: “After the death of the two sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 16:1).

אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כָּל הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מֵאִשְׁתּוֹ סָמוּךְ לְוִסְתָּהּ – הָוְיָין לוֹ בָּנִים זְכָרִים, דִּכְתִיב: ״לְהַבְדִּיל בֵּין הַטָּמֵא וּבֵין הַטָּהֹר״, וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ: ״אִשָּׁה כִּי תַזְרִיעַ וְיָלְדָה זָכָר״. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי אָמַר: הָוְיָין לוֹ בָּנִים רְאוּיִין לְהוֹרָאָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״לְהַבְדִּיל וּלְהוֹרוֹת״.

Concerning this matter, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who separates himself from his wife near the expected date of her menstruation will have male children, as it is written: “To distinguish between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 11:47), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: He will have sons who are worthy of teaching halakha, as it is written: “To distinguish… between the impure and the pure, and to teach the children of Israel all the statutes” (Leviticus 10:10–11).

אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כָּל הַמַּבְדִּיל עַל הַיַּיִן בְּמוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּתוֹת – הָוְיָין לוֹ בָּנִים זְכָרִים, דִּכְתִיב: ״לְהַבְדִּיל בֵּין הַקֹּדֶשׁ וּבֵין הַחוֹל״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״לְהַבְדִּיל בֵּין הַטָּמֵא וּבֵין הַטָּהוֹר״, וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ: ״אִשָּׁה כִּי תַזְרִיעַ״. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי אָמַר: בָּנִים רְאוּיִן לְהוֹרָאָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״לְהַבְדִּיל וּלְהוֹרוֹת״.

The Gemara continues to expound these verses: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who recites havdala over wine at the conclusion of Shabbatot, and not over some other beverage, will have male children, as it is written: “To distinguish between the holy and the unholy, and between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 10:10), and it is written there once again: “To distinguish between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 11:47), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Anyone who recites havdala over wine at the conclusion of Shabbatot will have sons who are worthy of teaching halakha, as it is written: “To distinguish between the holy and the unholy… and to teach” (Leviticus 10:10–11).

אָמַר רַבִּי בִּנְיָמִין בַּר יֶפֶת אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כָּל הַמְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת עַצְמוֹ בִּשְׁעַת תַּשְׁמִישׁ – הָוְיָין לוֹ בָּנִים זְכָרִים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְהִתְקַדִּשְׁתֶּם וִהְיִיתֶם קְדֹשִׁים״, וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ: ״אִשָּׁה כִּי תַזְרִיעַ״.

Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet says that Rabbi Elazar says: Anyone who sanctifies himself with modest conduct while engaging in sexual intercourse will have male children, as it is stated: “You shall sanctify yourselves, and you shall be holy” (Leviticus 11:44), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2).

״רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ‘הַשֶּׁרֶץ וְנֶעְלָם מִמֶּנּוּ׳״ כו׳. מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ?

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to the sliding-scale offering the verse states: “Or if a person touches any impure thing, whether it is the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher creeping animal, and it is hidden from him, so that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2). The juxtaposition of the words “and it is hidden” to the words “a creeping animal” teaches that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering when it was hidden from him that he had contracted ritual impurity from a creeping animal, but not when it was hidden from him that he was entering the Temple or partaking of sacrificial food. Rabbi Akiva says that it is from the words “and it is hidden from him, so that he is impure” that it is derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for a lapse of awareness about his impurity, but not for a lapse of awareness about the Temple or the sacrificial food. The Gemara asks: Since Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva agree about the halakha, what is the practical difference between them?

אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: שֶׁרֶץ וּנְבֵלָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: בָּעֵינַן עַד דְּיָדַע אִי בְּשֶׁרֶץ אִיטְמֵי אִי בִּנְבֵלָה אִיטְמֵי; וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: לָא בָּעֵינַן עַד דְּיָדַע, דְּכֵיוָן דְּיָדַע דְּאִיטְמַא בָּעוֹלָם, לָא צָרִיךְ אִי בְּשֶׁרֶץ אִיטְמֵי אִי בִּנְבֵלָה אִיטְמֵי.

Ḥizkiyya says: There is a practical difference between them in a case where one initially knew that he had contracted ritual impurity, but he did not know whether the impurity was contracted from a creeping animal or from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal. Rabbi Eliezer holds that for him to be liable to bring an offering, we require that he initially know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass, and if he never knew this, he does not bring an offering. And Rabbi Akiva holds that for him to be liable to bring an offering, we do not require that he know this detail; since he knows in general terms that he contracted impurity, it is not necessary that one know whether he contracted the impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted the impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass.

וְכֵן אָמַר עוּלָּא: שֶׁרֶץ וּנְבֵלָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. דְּעוּלָּא רָמֵי דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אַדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וּמְשַׁנֵּי; מִי אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: בָּעֵינַן עַד דְּיָדַע אִי בְּשֶׁרֶץ אִיטְמֵי אִי בִּנְבֵלָה אִיטְמֵי?

And Ulla also says: There is a practical difference between them in a case where the person did not know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal. Ulla did not say this explicitly, but rather he raises a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Eliezer and another statement of Rabbi Eliezer, and then resolves it. He asked: Does Rabbi Eliezer actually say that in order to be liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, we require that one initially know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass?

וּרְמִינְהִי, אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: מַה נַּפְשָׁךְ? חֵלֶב אָכַל – חַיָּיב, נוֹתָר אָכַל – חַיָּיב! שַׁבָּת חִילֵּל – חַיָּיב, יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים חִילֵּל – חַיָּיב! אִשְׁתּוֹ נִדָּה בָּעַל – חַיָּיב, אֲחוֹתוֹ בָּעַל – חַיָּיב!

And he raises a contradiction from a baraita with regard to one who ate a forbidden food but did not know whether it was forbidden fat or it was notar, part of a sacrifice left over after the time allotted for its consumption; or one who performed labor but did not know whether it was Shabbat or Yom Kippur; or one who engaged in intercourse but did not know whether it was with his menstruating wife or with his sister. In all these cases Rabbi Eliezer holds that he must bring a sin-offering, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rabbi Eliezer says: Whichever way you look at it, he is liable. If he ate forbidden fat he is liable; if he ate notar he is liable. If he desecrated Shabbat he is liable; if he desecrated Yom Kippur he is liable. If he engaged in intercourse with his menstruating wife, he is liable; if he engaged in intercourse with his sister, he is liable. In all these cases, he knows that he transgressed, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אוֹ הוֹדַע אֵלָיו חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא בָּהּ״, עַד שֶׁיִּוָּדַע לְךָ בַּמֶּה חָטָא!

Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: The verse states with regard to a sin-offering: “Or if his sin, in which he sinned, became known to him” (Leviticus 4:23), teaching that there is no liability for an offering until it becomes known to the sinner the manner in which he sinned. According to this baraita, Rabbi Eliezer himself holds that in order to become liable to bring a sin-offering, it is not necessary that one know precisely which prohibition he violated.

וּמְשַׁנֵּי: הָתָם ״אֲשֶׁר חָטָא וְהֵבִיא״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא – חֵטְא כָּל שֶׁהוּא. הָכָא, מִכְּדֵי כְּתִיב: ״בְּכָל דָּבָר טָמֵא״, ״אוֹ בְּנִבְלַת שֶׁרֶץ טָמֵא״ לָמָּה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: בָּעֵינַן עַד דְּיָדַע אִי בְּשֶׁרֶץ אִיטְמֵי אִי בִּנְבֵלָה אִיטְמֵי.

And Ulla resolves the contradiction: There, with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering, the Merciful One states: “Or if his sin, in which he sinned, became known to him, he shall bring his offering” (Leviticus 4:23), teaching that it suffices that he knows that he committed some type of sin. Here, with regard to ritual impurity in the Temple, since it is written at the beginning of the verse: “Or if a person touches any impure thing” (Leviticus 5:2), why do I need that which is stated immediately afterward: “Or the carcass of a non-kosher creeping animal”? Conclude from it that we require that he initially know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass, and if he never knew this, he does not bring an offering.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא? אַיְּידֵי

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva, who does not expound the verses in this way, what does he say to this? The Gemara answers: He maintains that since