וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין הוּא וּבֵין חֲבֵירוֹ לֹא מָעַל, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מְעִילָה בְּקוֹנָמוֹת!

And the Rabbis say: Both he and the other are not liable for misusing consecrated property, because there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property with regard to konamot.

אֵיפּוּךְ: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה לֹא מָעַל, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מְעִילָה בְּקוֹנָמוֹת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר; וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הוּא מָעַל, וַחֲבֵירוֹ לֹא מָעַל.

The Gemara responds: Reverse the opinions and say as follows: Both this one and that one are not liable for misusing consecrated property, because there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property with regard to konamot. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He is liable for misuse of consecrated property and the other is not liable for misuse of consecrated property.

אִי הָכִי, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: קוֹנָמוֹת כִּשְׁבוּעוֹת; אֶלָּא קוֹנָמוֹת אִצְטָרוּפֵי הוּא דְּלָא מִצְטָרְפִי, הָא מְעִילָה אִית בְּהוּ? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אֵין מְעִילָה בְּקוֹנָמוֹת כְּלָל!

The Gemara asks: If so, how is it that Rabbi Meir says in the previous baraita: Items forbidden by konamot are like those forbidden by oaths? Items forbidden by konamot do not combine to produce a full measure that renders one liable for misuse of consecrated property, but this indicates that misuse of consecrated property nevertheless applies to them. But doesn’t Rabbi Meir say, according to the reversal of the opinions, that with regard to konamot, there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property at all?

לְדִבְרֵיהֶן דְּרַבָּנַן קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי – אֵין מְעִילָה בְּקוֹנָמוֹת כְּלָל, לְדִידְכוּ – אוֹדוּ לִי מִיהַת דְּקוֹנָמוֹת כִּשְׁבוּעוֹת.

The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Meir says that items forbidden by konamot do not combine to produce a full measure, he is saying this to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, as follows: According to my opinion with regard to konamot, there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property at all. According to your opinion, at least admit to me that items forbidden by konamot are like items forbidden by oaths and do not combine to produce a full measure.

וְרַבָּנַן? שְׁבוּעוֹת אִיכָּא דְּרַב פִּנְחָס, קוֹנָמוֹת לֵיכָּא דְּרַב פִּנְחָס.

And the Rabbis? They explain that with regard to items forbidden by oaths one should apply the reasoning of Rav Pineḥas that since two items that are forbidden by a single oath are distinct with regard to sin-offerings, they do not combine in order to produce a full measure. With regard to konamot the reasoning of Rav Pineḥas does not apply.

אָמַר רָבָא: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל עָפָר – פָּטוּר. בָּעֵי רָבָא: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל עָפָר״, בְּכַמָּה? כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ – דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַכַּזַּיִת, אוֹ דִּלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּלָאו מִידֵי דְּאָכְלִי אֱינָשֵׁי הוּא – בְּכָל שֶׁהוּא? תֵּיקוּ.

§ Rava says that if one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate dirt, he is exempt, because eating dirt is not considered to be eating. Rava raises a dilemma: If one says: On my oath I will not eat dirt, how much dirt must he eat in order to be liable? Is the halakha that since he said: I will not eat dirt, his intention is that the prohibition applies to an olive-bulk? That is the standard measure for prohibitions with regard to eating. Or perhaps, since dirt is not something that people eat, he is liable for eating any amount. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל חַרְצָן״, בְּכַמָּה? כֵּיוָן דְּמִתְאַכֵיל עַל יְדֵי תַּעֲרוֹבֶת – דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַכַּזַּיִת, אוֹ דִּלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּלָא בְּעֵינֵיהּ אָכְלִי לֵיהּ אֱינָשֵׁי – דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַמַּשֶּׁהוּ? תֵּיקוּ.

Rava raises a dilemma: If one says: On my oath I will not eat a grape seed, how much must he eat in order to be liable? Is the halakha that since it is ordinarily eaten in a mixture, i.e., as part of a grape, his intention is that the prohibition applies to a complete olive-bulk measure of grape seeds? Or perhaps, since people do not eat it by itself but always in a mixture, his intention is to be liable for eating any amount. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי רַב אַשִׁי: נָזִיר שֶׁאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל חַרְצָן״, בְּכַמָּה? דְּכֵיוָן דְּכַזַּיִת אִיסּוּרָא דְּאוֹרַיְיתָא הוּא, כִּי קָא מִשְׁתַּבַּע – אַהֶתֵּירָא קָא מִשְׁתַּבַּע וְדַעְתֵּיהּ אַמַּשֶּׁהוּ, אוֹ דִּלְמָא כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ – דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַכַּזַּיִת?

§ Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: In the case of a nazirite who says: On my oath I will not eat a grape seed, how much must he eat in order to be liable? A nazirite is prohibited from eating grape seeds (see Numbers 6:4). Is the halakha that since eating an olive-bulk is a prohibition by Torah law, when he takes an oath of this sort, he is taking the oath to prohibit that which is permitted to him and his intention in taking the oath is to prohibit eating any amount? Or perhaps, since he said: I will not eat a grape seed, his intention is that the prohibition applies to an olive-bulk, which is the standard measure for what is considered eating.

תָּא שְׁמַע: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל נְבֵילוֹת וּטְרֵיפוֹת, שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים – חַיָּיב, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר; וְהָוֵינַן בָּהּ: אַמַּאי חַיָּיב? מוּשְׁבָּע וְעוֹמֵד מֵהַר סִינַי הוּא! רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמְרִי: בְּכוֹלֵל דְּבָרִים הַמּוּתָּרִין עִם דְּבָרִים הָאֲסוּרִין,

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a mishna (22b): With regard to one who said: On my oath I will not eat, and then ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt. And we discussed it: Why is he liable for violating his oath when he eats non-kosher food? He is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat forbidden food, and an oath cannot take effect to prohibit that which is already forbidden. Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan all say that this is a case where he incorporates into the oath that he will not eat some permitted items, along with the statement concerning the forbidden items. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the permitted items, it extends also to the forbidden ones.

וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אִי אַתָּה מוֹצֵא אֶלָּא אִי בִּמְפָרֵשׁ חֲצִי שִׁיעוּר וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן, אִי בִּסְתָם וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: אָדָם אוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ בְּכָל שֶׁהוּא;

And Reish Lakish says: You find that one is liable for eating non-kosher food after taking an oath not to eat only if it is both a case where he specifies in the oath that his oath includes a half-measure and in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that one is not liable for eating a half-measure unless it is specified in the oath. Since eating a half-measure is not prohibited by the Torah, the oath takes effect. Alternatively, you find that one is liable if he took the oath without specifying that the oath prohibits less than the usual measure and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that a person renders himself prohibited from eating any amount by taking an oath not to eat.

וְהָא נְבֵילָה דְּמוּשְׁבָּע וְעוֹמֵד מֵהַר סִינַי הוּא, דְּכִי חַרְצָן לְגַבֵּי נָזִיר דָּמְיָא, וְטַעְמָא – דְּפָרֵישׁ, הָא לָא פָּרֵישׁ – דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַכַּזַּיִת, שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ.

The Gemara comments: But isn’t a carcass an item for which one is already under oath from Mount Sinai? In that respect it resembles a grape seed for a nazirite, and yet the reason that Reish Lakish says he is liable according to the Rabbis is that he specified that the oath prohibits him from eating even a half-measure, indicating that if he did not specify, his intention is that the oath refer to an olive-bulk. Conclude from it that a nazirite who takes an oath not to eat a grape seed is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk.

אֶלָּא תִּפְשׁוֹט דְּבָעֵי רָבָא: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל עָפָר״, בְּכַמָּה? תִּפְשׁוֹט דְּעַד דְּאִיכָּא כַּזַּיִת, דְּהָא נְבֵילָה כְּעָפָר דַּמְיָא, וְטַעְמָא דְּפָרֵישׁ, הָא לָא פָּרֵישׁ – דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַכַּזַּיִת!

The Gemara asks: But according to this, resolve the dilemma that Rava raises with regard to one who says: On my oath I will not eat dirt, asking how much he must eat in order to be liable? Resolve the dilemma by saying that he is not liable unless he eats an olive-bulk, since a carcass resembles dirt, and the reason he is liable is that he specified that the oath prohibits him from eating even a half-measure, indicating that if he did not specify, his intention is that the oath refers to an olive-bulk.

לָא, עָפָר לָאו בַּר אֲכִילָה הוּא כְּלָל, נְבֵילָה בַּת אֲכִילָה, וְאַרְיָא הוּא דִּרְבִיעַ עִילָּוָוהּ.

The Gemara answers: No, the dilemma cannot be resolved based on this comparison. Dirt is entirely inedible. A carcass, by contrast, is edible, but a lion crouches on it, i.e., eating it is prohibited by the Torah. Therefore, one cannot derive the halakha concerning dirt from the halakha concerning a carcass.

מתני׳ ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל וְשָׁתָה – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת; ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה״, וְאָכַל וְשָׁתָה – חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל פַּת חִטִּין וּפַת שְׂעוֹרִין וּפַת כּוּסְמִין – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת; ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל פַּת חִטִּין וּפַת שְׂעוֹרִין וּפַת כּוּסְמִין״, וְאָכַל – חַיָּיב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה״, וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין הַרְבֵּה – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת; ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה יַיִן וְשֶׁמֶן וּדְבַשׁ״, וְשָׁתָה – חַיָּיב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת.

If one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring only one offering, because an oath to refrain from eating includes refraining from drinking. If he said: On my oath I will not eat and I will not drink, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring two offerings. If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate wheat bread and barley bread and spelt bread, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread or barley bread or spelt bread, and then he ate all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one. If he said: On my oath I will not drink, and then he drank several kinds of liquids, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he said: On my oath I will not drink wine or oil or honey, and then he drank all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one.

״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל אוֹכָלִין שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִן לַאֲכִילָה, וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִן לִשְׁתִיָּה – פָּטוּר. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל נְבֵילוֹת וּטְרֵיפוֹת שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים – חַיָּיב, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר. אָמַר: ״קוֹנָם אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנֵית לִי אִם אָכַלְתִּי הַיּוֹם״, וְהוּא אָכַל נְבֵילוֹת וּטְרֵיפוֹת שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים – הֲרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲסוּרָה.

If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate foods that are inedible or drank liquids that are not potable, he is exempt. If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt, since he is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat them and an oath cannot take effect where another oath is in force. But if he said: It is konam for my wife to derive benefit from me if I ate today, and he had eaten carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, his wife is prohibited from deriving benefit from him.

גמ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְשָׁתָה – חַיָּיב; אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin says that Shmuel says: If one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he drank, he is liable. If you wish, you may propose a logical argument for this ruling, and if you wish, you may cite a verse to explain it.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא: דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ אֱינָשׁ לְחַבְרֵיהּ: ״נִטְעוֹם מִידֵי״, וְעָיְילִי וְאָכְלִי וְשָׁתוּ. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא: שְׁתִיָּה בִּכְלַל אֲכִילָה, דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מִנַּיִן לִשְׁתִיָּה שֶׁהִיא בִּכְלַל אֲכִילָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאָכַלְתָּ לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ בַּמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר לְשַׁכֵּן שְׁמוֹ שָׁם מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנְךָ וְתִירֹשְׁךָ״,

The Gemara explains: If you wish, you may propose a logical argument for this ruling: It is clear that drinking is included in eating from the fact that a person will say to another: Let’s have a taste of something, and they go in and eat and drink. And if you wish, cite a verse as the source for this ruling, as Reish Lakish says: From where is it derived that drinking is included in eating? It is derived from that which is stated: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there, the tithe of your grain, of your tirosh, and of your oil” (Deuteronomy 14:23).