וּמַחֲלוֹקֶת בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה בְּעֵדֵי סְתִירָה, מָר סָבַר: דָּבָר הַגּוֹרֵם לְמָמוֹן כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי וְחַיָּיב, וּמָר סָבַר: לָאו כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי וּפָטוּר.

And there is a dispute with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota; this is referring to witnesses of seclusion who testify that the woman who was warned by her husband in fact entered into seclusion with the man in question. One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that a matter that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, and each witness is liable for taking a false oath of testimony, as had they testified the woman would lose her marriage contract. And one Sage, the Rabbis, hold that a matter that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value, and he is exempt.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּשֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה, הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד אֶחָד דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא.

§ It is stated above further: All concede with regard to a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant when his counterpart is suspect about the oath. All concede in the case of one witness, as in the incident with Rabbi Abba.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּשֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה. דַּחֲשִׁיד מַאן? אִילֵימָא דַּחֲשִׁיד לֹוֶה, דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ מַלְוֶה: אִי אֲתֵית אַסְהַדְתְּ לִי הֲוָה מִשְׁתַּבַּעֲנָא וְשָׁקֵילְנָא – וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ: מִי יֵימַר דְּמִשְׁתַּבַּעְתְּ!

The Gemara elaborates: All concede with regard to a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant when his counterpart is suspect about the oath. The testimony of one witness renders the borrower liable to take an oath that he does not owe money. The Gemara asks: In a case where who is suspect? If we say that the borrower who is denying the debt is suspect, and it is a case where the lender says to the witness: If you came and testified on my behalf I would have taken an oath and taken the sum owed me from the borrower, since he is suspect with regard to oaths, why would the witness be liable for taking a false oath of testimony? Let the witness say to the lender: Who could say that you would have taken an oath? Since there is no certainty that he would have taken the oath, the witness is merely the cause of a cause of financial loss.

אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶן חֲשׁוּדִין, דְּאָמַר מָר: חָזְרָה שְׁבוּעָה לַמְחוּיָּב לָהּ, וּמִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִישָּׁבַע – מְשַׁלֵּם.

Rather, it is a case where both the borrower and the lender are suspect, as the Master says: Since both are suspect, the oath reverts to the one who is initially obligated to take it, i.e., the borrower, and since he is unable to take the oath because he is suspect, he pays the entire claim to the lender. One witness rendered the borrower liable to pay the debt.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד אֶחָד דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא. דְּהַהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּחֲטַף נַסְכָא מֵחַבְרֵיהּ, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַמִי, הֲוָה יָתֵיב רַבִּי אַבָּא קַמֵּיהּ. אֲזַל אַיְיתֵי חַד סָהֲדָא דְּמִיחֲטַף חָטְפָהּ מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, חֲטַפִי וְדִידִי חֲטַפִי;

Abaye said: All concede in the case of one witness, as in the incident with Rabbi Abba. What are the circumstances? As there was a certain man who snatched a silver ingot from another. The one from whom it was taken came before Rabbi Ami while Rabbi Abba was sitting before him, and he went and brought one witness who testified that the defendant indeed snatched it from him. The one who snatched it said to him: Yes, it is true that I snatched it, but I merely snatched that which was mine.

אֲמַר רַבִּי אַמִי: הֵיכִי לְדַיְינֵי דַּיָּינֵי לְהַאי דִּינָא? לִישַׁלֵּם – לֵיכָּא תְּרֵי סָהֲדֵי! לִיפְטְרֵיהּ – הָא אִיכָּא חַד סָהֲדָא דְּמִחְטַף חֲטַף! לִישְׁתַּבַּע – כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר: אִין, חֲטַפִי וְדִידִי חֲטַפִי, הֲוָה לֵיהּ כְּגַזְלָן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא: הֲוָה לֵיהּ מְחוּיָּב שְׁבוּעָה וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִישָּׁבַע, וְכָל הַמְחוּיָּב שְׁבוּעָה וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִישָּׁבַע – מְשַׁלֵּם.

Rabbi Ami said: How shall judges rule in this case? Let the judges require him to pay. But there are not two witnesses who witnessed the robbery. Let the judges rule to exempt him from payment. But there is one witness that he snatched the ingot. Based on the testimony of that witness, let the alleged robber take an oath that he did not snatch the ingot. But once he said: Yes, I snatched it, but I merely snatched that which was mine, his halakhic status is like that of a robber, who is disqualified from taking an oath. Rabbi Abba said to him: He is one who is obligated to take an oath but is unable to take an oath, and anyone who is obligated to take an oath but is unable to take an oath is liable to pay. In that case, were that witness to take a false oath and deny knowledge of the matter, he would be liable.

אָמַר רַב פַּפָּא: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר.

§ Rav Pappa says: All concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is liable for taking an oath of testimony if he took a false oath and denied knowledge of the incident, and all concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is exempt in that case.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר – דַּאֲמַר לָהּ לְדִידָהּ וְלָא אֲמַר לְהוּ לְבֵית דִּין, דִּתְנַן: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה: מֵת בַּעְלִי – תִּנָּשֵׂא, מֵת בַּעְלִי – תִּתְיַבֵּם.

The Gemara elaborates: All concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is exempt where he said to the wife herself that her husband is dead, but he did not tell it to the court, and now he denies his earlier statement, as we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 1:12): The woman who said: My husband died, shall remarry on the basis of her own testimony. Likewise, if she says: My husband died, she shall enter into levirate marriage with her brother-in-law on the basis of her own testimony. The fact that the witness subsequently denied knowledge of the matter does not cause her to lose her marriage contract, since she can come to the court and testify based on the statement of the witness and collect her marriage contract.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב דְּלָא אֲמַר לְדִידָהּ וְלָא אֲמַר לְהוּ לְבֵית דִּין.

All concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is liable in a case where he did not say that the husband is dead to the wife herself nor did he say it to the court. In that case, his denial of knowledge of the matter causes the wife to lose payment of her marriage contract.

שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קַרְקַע חַיָּיב? דִּלְמָא דִּתְפִישָׂא מִטַּלְטְלֵי.

The Gemara asks: Shall we conclude from here that according to Rav Pappa, in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to land, the witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony, given that the marriage contract here is collected from land belonging to the husband? This matter is subject to a dispute between the Sages (37b). The Gemara answers: No proof may be cited from here, as perhaps Rav Pappa is referring to a case where she seizes her husband’s movable property as payment for her marriage contract. Therefore, this is not considered testimony with regard to land.

״כָּפַר אֶחָד וְהוֹדָה אֶחָד״ כו׳. הָשְׁתָּא בָּזֶה אַחַר זֶה דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ קָא כַּפְרִי, אָמְרַתְּ: הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב וְהַשֵּׁנִי פָּטוּר, כָּפַר אֶחָד וְהוֹדָה אֶחָד מִיבָּעֲיָא?

§ The mishna teaches: If one of the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident, and the other one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, the one who denies knowledge of the incident is liable. The Gemara asks: Why was it necessary to teach this halakha in the mishna? Now that in the previous case, where the potential witnesses both denied knowledge of the matter one after the other, you said: The first is liable and the second is exempt, in a case where one denied knowledge and one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, is it necessary to mention that the one who denied knowledge is liable?

לָא צְרִיכָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁכָּפְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן, וְחָזַר אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְהוֹדָה בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר; וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן, דְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי.

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where both of them denied knowledge of the matter, and one of them retracted his denial and admitted to knowledge of the matter within the time required for speaking a short phrase. And this teaches us that the halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב חִסְדָּא דְּמוֹקֵי לָהּ לְהַהוּא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, רֵישָׁא אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם, וְסֵיפָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ לְאַשְׁמוּעִינַן דְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי; אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, רֵישָׁא תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר, סֵיפָא תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר, תַּרְתֵּי לָמָּה לִי?

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who interprets the previous case in the mishna in which the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident as one, and they are liable in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, a different halakha may be learned from each clause in the mishna. It is learned from the first clause that it is possible for two events to coincide precisely, and the latter clause was necessary to teach us that the halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the halakha of: Within the time required for speaking a short phrase, is learned from the first clause, and the halakha of: Within the time required for speaking a short phrase, is learned from the latter clause. Why do I need two clauses to teach the same halakha?

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי כְּפִירָה וּכְפִירָה, אֲבָל כְּפִירָה וְהוֹדָאָה אֵימָא לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.

The Gemara answers: Even according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, both clauses are necessary. Lest you say that this statement: The halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, applies only in a case where the first statement is a denial and the second statement is a denial; but in a case where the first statement is a denial and the second statement is an admission, say that no, its halakhic status is not like that of continuous speech and one cannot admit knowledge after having denied it. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that even in a case where he retracts the denial and admits his knowledge, its halakhic status is not like that of continuous speech.

״הָיוּ שְׁתֵּי כִיתֵּי עֵדִים, כָּפְרָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ כָּפְרָה הַשְּׁנִיָּה״. בִּשְׁלָמָא שְׁנִיָּה תִּתְחַיֵּיב, דְּכָפְרָה לָהּ רִאשׁוֹנָה, אֶלָּא רִאשׁוֹנָה אַמַּאי?

§ The mishna teaches: If there were two sets of witnesses that took the oath of testimony, and the first set denied knowledge of the matter and thereafter, the second set denied knowledge of the matter, both sets of witnesses are liable. The Gemara asks: Granted, the second set will be held liable, as since the first set denied knowledge of the matter, the ability of the plaintiff to collect his monetary claim is dependent exclusively on the second set, and their denial caused his loss. But why is the first set liable?