אוֹ דִּלְמָא אַכָּל חֲדָא וַחֲדָא מִיחַיַּיב?

Or perhaps he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim made by each claimant.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הֲרֵי כָּאן עֶשְׂרִים חַטָּאוֹת; הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דְּפָרֵישׁ, רַבִּי חִיָּיא מִנְיָנָא אֲתָא לְאַשְׁמוּעִינַן? אֶלָּא לָאו דְּלָא פָּרֵישׁ, וּשְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: פְּרָטָא הָוֵי.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Ḥiyya taught in a baraita : There are twenty sin-offerings here that the defendant must bring. The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances of the baraita ? If the defendant specified each claim of each of the claimants in his oath, does Rabbi Ḥiyya come to teach us a number? Obviously, the defendant is liable to bring twenty offerings. Rather, is it not that the baraita is referring to a case where he did not specify an oath to each claimant, but he specified it to the first claimant and said: And neither are yours, to each of the remaining claimants? And therefore, conclude from the baraita that such a denial is considered specific.

״אָנַסְתָּ וּפִתִּיתָ אֶת בִּתִּי״ כו׳. אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? הוֹאִיל וְעִיקַּר קְנָס הוּא תּוֹבֵעַ.

§ The mishna teaches that if one accuses another: You raped or you seduced my daughter, and the other says: I did not rape and I did not seduce your daughter, to which the father replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, the defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if it is false oath, and Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt from liability for a false oath on a deposit. The reason is that the payment for rape or seduction is a fine, and one does not pay a fine based on his own admission; therefore, he is also exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for having taken a false oath. The Rabbis hold that he is liable since he would have been liable to pay compensation for humiliation and degradation resulting from her being raped or seduced, which are monetary claims. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon holds that since the father is primarily claiming the fine and his claim to the other payments is secondary, the defendant is exempt from liability.

אָמַר רָבָא: מָשָׁל דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה? לְאָדָם שֶׁאָמַר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי חִטִּין״, וְאִשְׁתְּכַּח דְּחִטִּין הוּא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ, הָא שְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין אִית לֵיהּ – דְּפָטוּר, דְּכִי אִשְׁתַּבַּע אַחִטִּין – אַקּוּשְׁטָא מִשְׁתַּבַּע.

Rava says: To what case is this explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon compared? It is compared to a case where a person said to another: Give me back my wheat and barley and spelt that are in your possession, and the other said to him: On my oath your wheat is not in my possession; and it was then discovered that it was only wheat that he did not have, but he did have the claimant’s barley and spelt. In that case, the halakha is that he is exempt from liability for an oath on a deposit, as when he took an oath with regard to the wheat, he took a truthful oath.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבַּיֵי: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם בְּחִטִּין קָא כָּפַר לֵיהּ, בִּשְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין לָא קָא כָּפַר לֵיהּ; הָכָא בְּכוּלָּהּ מִילְּתָא הוּא דְּקָא כָּפַר לֵיהּ! הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי כְּלָל״, וְאִשְׁתְּכַּח חִטִּין הוּא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ, הָא שְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין אִית לֵיהּ – דְּמִיחַיַּיב!

Abaye said to Rava: Are the two cases comparable? There, in the case of the grain, the defendant denies only the other’s claim of wheat, but he does not deny his claim of barley and spelt. Here, the defendant denies the entire matter, as he claims that he never raped or seduced the man’s daughter. Rather, this explanation is comparable only to a case where one said to another: Give me back my wheat and barley and spelt that are in your possession, and the defendant said to him: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession at all, and it was then discovered that it was only wheat that he did not have, but he did have the claimant’s barley and spelt. In that case, the halakha is that he is liable for an oath on a deposit. This, then, cannot be the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, as he exempts the defendant from liability.

אֶלָּא כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אֲמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְדִבְרֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן – קְנָס הוּא תּוֹבֵעַ וְלֹא בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם, לְדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים – אַף בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם הוּא תּוֹבֵעַ. בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? אֲמַר רַב פַּפָּא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: לָא שָׁבֵיק אִינִישׁ מִידֵי דְּקִיץ וְתָבַע מִידֵי דְּלָא קִיץ; וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לָא שָׁבֵיק מִידֵי דְּכִי מוֹדֶה בֵּיהּ לָא מִיפְטַר, וְתָבַע מִידֵי דְּכִי מוֹדֶה בֵּיהּ מִיפְטַר. הדרן עלך שבועת הפקדון

Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: According to the statement of Rabban Shimon, the father is claiming only the fine and not the compensation for humiliation and degradation resulting from his daughter’s having been raped or seduced. According to the statement of the Rabbis, he is also claiming payment for humiliation and degradation resulting from her having been raped or seduced. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Shimon holds: A person does not forgo a claim to something with a fixed value, such as a fine, and claim something whose value is not fixed and requires an appraisal, such as humiliation and degradation resulting from being raped or seduced. And the Rabbis hold that one does not forgo a claim to something that the defendant is not exempt from paying if he admits his guilt, and claim something that the defendant is exempt from paying if he admits his guilt, such as a fine.

מתני׳ שְׁבוּעַת הַדַּיָּינִין, הַטַּעֲנָה שְׁתֵּי כֶסֶף, וְהַהוֹדָאָה בְּשָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה, וְאִם אֵין הַהוֹדָאָה מִמִּין הַטַּעֲנָה – פָּטוּר.

By Torah law, the oath imposed by the judges upon one who admits to part of a claim is administered only when the claim is for the value of at least two silver ma’a , and the defendant’s admission is for the value of at least one peruta . And furthermore, if the admission is not of the same type as the claim, i.e., the defendant admitted to a debt that the claimant did not claim, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath.

כֵּיצַד? ״שְׁתֵּי כֶסֶף לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא פְּרוּטָה״ – פָּטוּר; ״שְׁתֵּי כֶסֶף וּפְרוּטָה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״ – ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא פְּרוּטָה״ – חַיָּיב.

How so? If the claimant said to the defendant: I have two silver ma’a in your possession, and the latter responded: You have only one peruta , a coin made from copper, in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath (see 39b). But if the claimant said: I have two silver ma’a and one peruta in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only one peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath.

״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי״ – פָּטוּר; ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא חֲמִשִּׁים דִּינָר״ – חַיָּיב.

If the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt, as he denies the entire claim. But if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim.

״מָנֶה לְאַבָּא בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא חֲמִישִּׁים דִּינָר״ – פָּטוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּמֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה.

If the claimant said: My late father had one hundred dinars in your possession, and I am now claiming them, and the defendant responded: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as he is like one returning a lost item, since he could have easily denied the entire claim.

״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ: ״הֵן״, לְמָחָר אָמַר לוֹ: ״תְּנֵהוּ לִי״! ״נְתַתִּיו לְךָ״ – פָּטוּר, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי״ – חַיָּיב.

§ The mishna discusses other cases where the defendant denies an entire claim. In a case where one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, I acknowledge that claim; and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is exempt. But if he responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, i.e., he denies that a debt ever existed, he is liable to pay, as he already admitted that he owed him the amount.

״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ: ״הֵן״, ״אַל תִּתְּנֵהוּ לִי אֶלָּא בְּעֵדִים״. לְמָחָר אָמַר לוֹ: ״תְּנֵהוּ לִי״, ״נְתַתִּיו לְךָ״ – חַיָּיב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לִיתְּנוֹ בְּעֵדִים.

In a case where the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant said to him: Yes, to which the claimant responded: Give the money to me only in the presence of witnesses, then if the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is liable to pay, as he is required to give it to him in the presence of witnesses, and he cannot prove that he did so.

״לִיטְרָא זָהָב יֵשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא לִיטְרָא כֶּסֶף״ – פָּטוּר; ״דִּינָר זָהָב יֵשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא דִּינָר כֶּסֶף, וּטְרֵיסִית, וּפוּנְדְּיּוֹת, וּפְרוּטָה״ – חַיָּיב, שֶׁהַכֹּל מִין מַטְבֵּעַ אַחַת.

§ The mishna resumes discussion of the oath imposed by the court in a case where the defendant admits to a part of a claim. If the claimant said: I have a litra , i.e., a specific weight, of gold in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a litra of silver in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as his admission relates to a different item than that which the claim relates to. But if the claimant said: I have a gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar, or a tereisit , or a pundeyon , or a peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type; they are all coins. Since the claim concerns money, the difference between the different types of coins is disregarded, as the claim is essentially referring to the monetary value, not to a specific type of coin.

״כּוֹר תְּבוּאָה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא לֶתֶךְ קִטְנִית״ – פָּטוּר; ״כּוֹר פֵּירוֹת לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא לֶתֶךְ קִטְנִית״ – חַיָּיב, שֶׁהַקִּטְנִית בִּכְלַל פֵּירוֹת.

If the claimant said: I have a kor of grain in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a half- kor of legumes in my possession, he is exempt. But if the claimant said: I have a kor of produce in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a half- kor of legumes in my possession, he is liable, as legumes are included in produce.

טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין – פָּטוּר, וְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מְחַיֵּיב.

If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. According to Rabban Gamliel, one who admits to a part of the claim is liable to take an oath even if the admission is not of the same type as the claim.

הַטּוֹעֵן לַחֲבֵירוֹ בְּכַדֵּי שֶׁמֶן וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּקַנְקַנִּים – אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: הוֹאִיל וְהוֹדָה לוֹ מִקְצָת מִמִּין הַטַּעֲנָה יִשָּׁבַע. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין הַהוֹדָאָה מִמִּין הַטַּעֲנָה. אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן.

With regard to one who claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the latter then admitted that he owes him pitchers, i.e., the jugs themselves, but not the oil, Admon says: Since he admitted to him with regard to a part of the claim, and his admission was of the same type as the claim, i.e., the claim included both containers and oil and he admitted to owing him containers, he must take an oath. And the Rabbis say: The partial admission in this case is not of the same type as the claim, as he completely denied owing him oil. Rabban Gamliel said: I see the statement of Admon as correct.

טְעָנוֹ כֵּלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת, וְהוֹדָה בְּכֵלִים וְכָפַר בְּקַרְקָעוֹת, בְּקַרְקָעוֹת וְכָפַר בְּכֵלִים – פָּטוּר; הוֹדָה בְּמִקְצָת הַקַּרְקָעוֹת – פָּטוּר, בְּמִקְצָת הַכֵּלִים – חַיָּיב, שֶׁהַנְּכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן אַחֲרָיוּת זוֹקְקִין אֶת הַנְּכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן אַחֲרָיוּת לִישָּׁבַע עֲלֵיהֶן.

If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or conversely, he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath, as oaths are not taken concerning claims involving land. If he admitted to part of the claim about the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim about the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the entire claim, as property that does not serve as a guarantee, i.e., movable property, binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., the land, so that the oath about the movable property can be extended to require him to take an oath concerning the land as well.

אֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל טַעֲנַת חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, וְאֵין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אֶת הַקָּטָן, אֲבָל נִשְׁבָּעִין לְקָטָן וְלַהֶקְדֵּשׁ.

One does not take an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor. And the court does not administer an oath to a minor. But one does take an oath to a minor, or to a representative of the Temple treasury with regard to consecrated property.

גמ׳ הֵיכִי מַשְׁבְּעִינַן לֵיהּ? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ בַּשְּׁבוּעָה הָאֲמוּרָה בַּתּוֹרָה, דִּכְתִיב ״וְאַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ בַּה׳ אֱלֹהֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם״.

How does the court administer an oath to someone Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The court administers to him the oath stated in the Torah, as it is written in Abraham’s instruction to his servant: “And I will make you swear by the Lord, the God of heaven” (Genesis 24:3).

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אַשִׁי: כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בַּר אִידִי, דְּאָמַר: בָּעֵינַן שֵׁם הַמְּיוּחָד?

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In accordance with whose opinion is Rav’s statement? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Idi, who says that when one is liable to take an oath, we require him to take it using the ineffable name of God?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי: בְּכִינּוּי, וְנָפְקָא מִינָּהּ – צָרִיךְ לְאַתְפּוּשֵׂי חֶפְצָא בִּידֵיהּ,

Rav Ashi said to him: You may even say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that one is merely required to take an oath using an appellation of God. And the practical ramification of Rav’s statement is that just as in the aforementioned verse, Abraham said: “Please put your hand under my thigh, and I will make you swear” (Genesis 24:2–3), instructing his servant to grasp his circumcised penis, which is considered sacred to some degree, so too, in oaths administered by the court, one must grasp a sacred item in his hand while taking the oath.

וְכִדְרָבָא, דַּאֲמַר רָבָא: הַאי דַּיָּינָא דְּאַשְׁבַּע ״בַּה׳ אֱלֹהֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם״, נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁטָּעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה וְחוֹזֵר. וַאֲמַר רַב פַּפָּא: הַאי דַּיָּינָא דְּאַשְׁבַּע בִּתְפִלִּין, נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁטָּעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה וְחוֹזֵר.

And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rava; as Rava said: This judge who administers an oath “by the Lord, the God of heaven,” without instructing the litigant to grasp a sacred item, is considered like one who made a mistake with regard to a matter that appears in the Mishna; in which case his ruling is revoked, and the litigant must repeat the oath. And Rav Pappa said: This judge who administers an oath in which the litigant grasps phylacteries, not a Torah scroll, is considered like one who made a mistake with regard to a matter that appears in the Mishna; in which case his ruling is revoked, and the litigant must repeat the oath.

וְהִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, וְלֵית הִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב פַּפָּא; הִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרָבָא – דְּהָא לָא נָקֵיט חֶפְצָא בִּידֵיהּ, וְלֵית הִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב פַּפָּא – דְּהָא נָקֵיט חֶפְצָא בִּידֵיהּ.

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, but the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava that if the litigant merely took an oath using the ineffable name of God, he is required to take another oath, as he was not grasping any sacred item in his hand; but the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa, that if the litigant was grasping phylacteries he is required to take another oath, as he was grasping a sacred item in his hand, even though it was not a Torah scroll.

שְׁבוּעָה מְעוּמָד, תַּלְמִיד חָכָם – מְיוּשָׁב. שְׁבוּעָה בְּסֵפֶר תּוֹרָה, תַּלְמִיד חָכָם – לְכַתְּחִלָּה בִּתְפִלִּין.

One takes an oath while standing, but a Torah scholar takes an oath while sitting. One takes an oath grasping a Torah scroll ab initio , but a Torah scholar may take an oath grasping phylacteries ab initio .

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁבוּעַת הַדַּיָּינִין אַף הִיא בִּלְשׁוֹנָהּ נֶאֶמְרָה.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita : An oath imposed by the judges may also be recited in its language, i.e., in any language spoken by the one taking the oath. It is not required that the oath be in Hebrew.

אוֹמְרִים לוֹ: הֱוֵי יוֹדֵעַ,

Before he takes the oath, the judges say to him: Be aware