תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יָכוֹל הָאוֹמֵר ״רַגְלָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ עוֹלָה״ תְּהֵא כּוּלָּהּ עוֹלָה – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כֹּל אֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מִמֶּנּוּ לַה׳ יִהְיֶה קֹּדֶשׁ״ – מִמֶּנּוּ לַה׳, וְלֹא כּוּלּוֹ לַה׳.

The Sages taught: One might have thought that if one says: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, the sanctity should extend to the whole animal and all of the animal will be a burnt offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And if it is an animal of those that they bring as an offering to the Lord, anything of it that one gives to the Lord, it shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:9). The verse indicates that the part of it that one gives will be sacred unto the Lord, and not all of the animal will be sacred unto the Lord.

יָכוֹל תֵּצֵא לְחוּלִּין – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״יִהְיֶה קֹּדֶשׁ״. הָא כֵּיצַד – תִּמָּכֵר לְצָרְכֵי עוֹלוֹת, וְדָמֶיהָ חוּלִּין, חוּץ מִדְּמֵי אֵבָר שֶׁבָּהּ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

If so, one might have thought that the consecrated limb may be redeemed and thereby transferred to non-sacred status. Therefore the verse states: “Shall be sacred,” teaching that the limb remains consecrated. How is this possible, i.e., what should one do with the animal? The animal should be sold for the needs of burnt offerings to an individual who will sacrifice the entire animal as a burnt offering, and the payment received for the animal will be non-sacred, except for the payment received in exchange for the limb of the animal that was consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לָאוֹמֵר ״רַגְלָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ עוֹלָה״ שֶׁכּוּלָּהּ עוֹלָה – שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כֹּל אֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מִמֶּנּוּ לַה׳״, כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״יִהְיֶה קֹּדֶשׁ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת כּוּלָּהּ.

But Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: From where is it derived in the case of one who says: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, that all of it becomes a burnt offering? Since it is stated: “All that any man give of such to the Lord shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:9), one might have thought that individual limbs can be consecrated. When it says: “Shall be sacred,” this phrase serves to include all of the animal, indicating that it all becomes sacred.

אָמַר מָר: ״תִּמָּכֵר לְצָרְכֵי עוֹלוֹת״, וְהָא קָמַיְיתֵי בְּהֵמָה מְחוּסֶּרֶת אֵבָר! אָמַר רָבָא: בְּאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי עוֹלָה בְּחַיֶּיהָ״.

The Gemara objects: The Master said: The animal should be sold for the needs of burnt offerings. But it is as though the purchaser is bringing an animal that lacks that limb that was consecrated by the previous owner, as his share in the offering consists only of the balance of the animal. Rava says: The baraita does not mean that the animal should be sold to anyone obligated to bring a burnt offering, but specifically to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering with all the limbs upon which its life depends. Since the consecrated limb is not one of these, it does not detract from the purchaser’s vow.

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּדָבָר שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתָהּ טְרֵפָה. רָבָא אָמַר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתָהּ נְבֵילָה. וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁהִיא מֵתָה.

The Gemara cites a dispute between amora’im: Rav Ḥisda says that Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir concede with regard to a limb whose removal renders the animal a tereifa. If one consecrated such a limb, the sanctity extends throughout the entire animal. Rava says: Even in such a case, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda maintain that the sanctity does not extend throughout the entire animal. Yet, they concede with regard to a limb whose removal renders it an animal carcass, i.e., without which the animal would die so soon that it assumes the status of a carcass. And Rav Sheshet says: They conceded only with regard to a limb whose removal would cause it to die immediately.

מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין רַב חִסְדָּא לְרָבָא? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ טְרֵפָה חָיָה. רַב חִסְדָּא סְבַר לָהּ כְּמַאן דַּאֲמַר טְרֵפָה אֵינָהּ חָיָה, וְרָבָא סְבַר לָהּ כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר טְרֵפָה חָיָה.

The Gemara explains: What difference is there between the opinion of Rav Ḥisda and that of Rava? The difference between them is with regard to the issue of whether a tereifa can survive. Rav Ḥisda holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that a tereifa cannot survive but will shortly die. Therefore, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda concede that if one consecrates a limb whose removal would render an animal a tereifa, the sanctity applies to the whole animal, since it is a vital organ. And Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that a tereifa can survive, and consequently the consecration of such a limb does not extend to the entire animal.

וּמַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין רָבָא לְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. דַּאֲמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: נִיטְּלָה יָרֵךְ וְחָלָל שֶׁלָּהּ – נְבֵילָה. רָבָא סְבַר לָהּ כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, רַב שֵׁשֶׁת לָא סְבַר לָהּ כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר.

The Gemara further explains: And what difference is there between the opinion of Rava and the opinion of Rav Sheshet? The difference between them is with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said: If the thigh, i.e., the hind leg of the animal, and its recess were removed, the animal is considered a carcass and imparts ritual impurity even while still alive. Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, and therefore he maintains that according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, if one consecrates its thigh and its recess the sanctity extends throughout the animal, as it is a vital limb. But Rav Sheshet does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, and therefore the sanctity in such a case does not extend to the entire animal.

מֵיתִיבֵי: אָמַר רַבִּי, נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה – בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין הַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי – בְּדָבָר שֶׁהַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ. לָאו מִכְּלָל דְּפָלֵיג עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה?

The Gemara raises an objection: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, that the sanctity does not extend to the whole animal, appears correct with regard to a limb upon which the animal’s life does not depend, and the statement of Rabbi Yosei appears correct with regard to a limb upon which the animal’s life depends. May one not conclude by inference from the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that Rabbi Yosei disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda even with regard to a limb upon which the animal’s life depends, contrary to the statements of the amora’im above?

בִּשְׁלָמָא ״נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין הַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ״ – מִכְּלָל דְּפָלֵיג עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, אֶלָּא ״נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּדָבָר שֶׁהַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ״ – לָאו מִכְּלָל דְּפָלֵיג עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? וּתְיוּבְתָּא דְּכוּלְּהוּ!

Granted, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s comment: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct with regard to a limb upon which the animal’s life does not depend, is not difficult, as one learns by inference only that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Yosei with regard to such a case. But when he says that the statement of Rabbi Yosei appears correct with regard to a limb upon which the animal’s life depends, must one not conclude by inference that Rabbi Yosei disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda with regard to this case as well? And this is apparently a conclusive refutation of all the opinions of the amora’im cited above, who maintain that Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to vital organs.

לָא, חַסּוּרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: ״נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּדָבָר שֶׁהַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ, שֶׁאַף רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לֹא נֶחֱלַק עָלָיו אֶלָּא בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין הַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ, אֲבָל בְּדָבָר שֶׁהַנְּשָׁמָה תְּלוּיָה בּוֹ – מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ״.

The Gemara answers: No, the baraita citing Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: The statement of Rabbi Yosei appears correct to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of a limb upon which the animal’s life depends, as even Rabbi Yehuda disagreed with Rabbi Yosei only with regard to a limb upon which the animal’s life does not depend. But with regard to a limb upon which the animal’s life depends, Rabbi Yehuda concedes to him that the sanctity extends to the entire animal.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: בְּעוֹף מַהוּ? ״בְּהֵמָה״ אֲמַר רַחֲמָנָא – וְהָא לָאו בְּהֵמָה הִיא. אוֹ דִּלְמָא: ״קָרְבָּן״ אֲמַר רַחֲמָנָא – וְהַאי נַמִי קָרְבָּן הוּא? תֵּיקוּ.

§ According to Rabbi Yosei, if one consecrates one limb of an animal the sanctity extends to the entire animal. Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to a bird that is fit for sacrifice, what is the halakha according to this opinion? Since this halakha is derived, as stated above, from the verse: “And if it is an animal of those that they bring as an offering to the Lord, anything of it that one gives to the Lord, it shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:9), one can contend that the Merciful One states “animal,” and this bird is not considered an animal. Or perhaps one should stress that the Merciful One states “offering,” and this bird is also considered an offering. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: הִקְדִּישׁ אֵבָר לְדָמָיו, מַהוּ דְּתֵיחוֹת לֵיהּ קְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף? מִי אֲמַר כֵּיוָן דְּנָחְתָא לֵיהּ קְדוּשַּׁת דָּמִים – נָחְתָא לֵיהּ נַמִי קְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף, וּמִדְּאַקְדְּשֵׁיהּ לְחַד אֵבָר – אַקְדְּשֵׁיהּ לְכוּלָּהּ. אוֹ דִּלְמָא: חַד מִגּוֹ – אֲמַר, תְּרֵי מִגּוֹ – לָא אֲמַר?

Rava raises another dilemma: According to Rabbi Yosei, if one consecrated a limb with the intention of selling it and purchasing an offering with its payment, what is the halakha as to whether the entire animal is imbued with inherent sanctity? Does one say that since it is imbued with sanctity that inheres in its value, it is likewise imbued with inherent sanctity, and then furthermore, from the fact that he consecrated one limb he has consecrated the entire animal? Or perhaps one says a claim using the logic that begins with: Since, only once, but one does not say two claims together using the logic that begins with: Since, i.e., one cannot make both of the suggested expansions simultaneously.

תִּפְשׁוֹט לֵיהּ מִדִּידֵיהּ, דְּהָאֲמַר רָבָא: הִקְדִּישׁ זָכָר לְדָמָיו – קָדוֹשׁ קְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף!

The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma by citing Rava’s own statement. As, didn’t Rava say: If one consecrated a male ram for its value, since the ram is fit for sacrifice, it is automatically consecrated with inherent sanctity? The same reasoning should apply here: Although the limb was consecrated for its value, since the animal is fit for sacrifice, once the entire animal is consecrated for its value it should automatically assume inherent sanctity.

הָתָם – דְּאַקְדְּשֵׁיהּ לְכוּלֵּיהּ, הָכָא – דְּאַקְדְּשֵׁיהּ חַד אֵבָר. מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara responds that this is not a proof: There, where he initially consecrated all of it, the whole animal assumes inherent sanctity. Here, Rava is referring to a case where he consecrated only one limb at the outset, and one must invoke two separate expansions to apply inherent sanctity to the whole animal. The question stands: What is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ מֵרָבָא: הִקְדִּישׁ חַד אֵבָר, מַהוּ בְּגִיזָּה? תִּפְשׁוֹט לָךְ מֵהָא דְּתַנְיָא: ״לֹא תָגֹז בְּכוֹר צֹאנֶךָ״ – אֲבָל אַתָּה גּוֹזֵז בְּשֶׁלְּךָ וְשֶׁל אֲחֵרִים.

§ According to Rabbi Yehuda, if one consecrates a limb, the sanctity does not extend to the entire animal. A Sage posed a dilemma to Rava: If one consecrated one limb, what is the halakha with regard to shearing the wool of that limb? Rava replied: You can resolve the dilemma from that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Nor shear the firstborn of your flock” (Deuteronomy 15:19). This verse indicates that the prohibition against shearing applies only to an animal belonging entirely to you, but you may shear the wool of a firstborn that belongs both to you and to others, i.e., gentiles. Here too, since the animal is jointly owned by the Temple and by the one who consecrated it, the prohibition against shearing should not apply at all.

הָתָם – לָא נָחְתָא לֵיהּ קְדוּשָּׁה כְּלָל, הָכָא – נָחְתָא לֵיהּ קְדוּשָּׁה. לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא. הָתָם – אֵין בְּיָדוֹ לְהַקְדִּישׁוֹ, הָכָא – בְּיָדוֹ לְהַקְדִּישׁוֹ.

The Sage responded that this is not a proof: There, a firstborn animal owned partly by a gentile was not imbued with sanctity at all, whereas here it was at least partly imbued with sanctity, and therefore it is possible that the limb is prohibited with respect to shearing. The Gemara cites another version of this answer: There, in the case of a firstborn animal owned partly by a gentile, it is not in the Jew’s power to consecrate his share. Therefore, the prohibition against shearing does not apply. But here it is in his power to consecrate one limb, and sanctity applies to it. Therefore, one can claim that the limb should be prohibited with respect to shearing.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ אַבַּיֵי מֵרָבָא: הִקְדִּישׁ עוֹרָהּ מַהוּ בַּעֲבוֹדָה? תָּא שְׁמַע: הָאוֹמֵר ״מַה שֶּׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ שֶׁל זוֹ עוֹלָה״ – מוּתֶּרֶת בְּגִיזָּה וַאֲסוּרָה בַּעֲבוֹדָה, מִפְּנֵי כִּחוּשׁ עוּבָּר שֶׁבָּהּ.

Abaye posed a dilemma to Rava: If one consecrated only the skin of an animal, what is the halakha as to whether it may be used for labor? Rava responded: Come and hear a baraita: In the case of one who says: That which is in the womb of this animal is a burnt offering, it is permitted for the mother to be shorn but it is prohibited to use the animal for labor, due to the inevitable weakening of the fetus inside it. The same should apply to an animal whose skin alone was consecrated, as performing labor with the animal would reduce the value of its skin.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כִּי קָתָנֵי אֲסוּרָה בַּעֲבוֹדָה – מִדְּרַבָּנַן. אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ בְּגִיזָּה נַמִי תִּיתַּסַּר! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עֲבוֹדָה דְּמִיכַּחֲשָׁא – גָּזְרִי בָּהּ רַבָּנַן, גִּיזָּה – לָא גָּזְרִי בָּהּ רַבָּנַן.

Abaye said to Rava: When that baraita teaches that it is prohibited to use the mother for labor, this applies by rabbinic law. I was asking whether it is prohibited by Torah law. Rava responded: If so, that the baraita is referring to rabbinic law, then even shearing it should be prohibited. Abaye said to him: With regard to labor, which weakens the animal, the Sages issued a decree rendering it prohibited; with regard to shearing, which does not weaken the animal, the Sages did not issue a decree rendering it prohibited.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ אַבַּיֵי מֵרַב יוֹסֵף: הִיא שְׁלָמִים וּוְלָדָהּ חוּלִּין, וּשְׁחָטָהּ בִּפְנִים, מַהוּ? לְמַאן דַּאֲמַר וַלְדֵי קָדָשִׁים בַּהֲוָיָיתָן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁין, מִי הָוֵי חוּלִּין בָּעֲזָרָה אוֹ לֹא?

Abaye posed a dilemma to Rav Yosef: If one consecrates a pregnant animal as a peace offering but excludes its fetus, and as a result it is sanctified as a peace offering and its offspring is non-sacred, and he slaughtered the pregnant animal inside the Temple courtyard what is the halakha? Or, if one consecrates an animal and it subsequently becomes pregnant, then according to the one who said that the offspring of sacrificial animals are sanctified only when they come into being, i.e., at the time of their birth, are offspring such as this subject to the prohibition against slaughtering non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard, since they are not yet born? Or are they not subject to the prohibition, since they themselves were not slaughtered?