וְדָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּא בְּשׁוּתָּפוּת.

and it must be an item that is not brought in partnership.

רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: לָמָּה יָצָאת מַעֲשֵׂר מֵעַתָּה – לִידּוֹן בִּ״תְמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ״ וּבִ״תְמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ״.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Why was the animal tithe singled out of all offerings as subject to substitution now, after the halakha of substitution was stated in general? It serves to discuss a special halakha with regard to the animal tithe, that of substitution of its name. If, when the animals emerge from the pen to be tithed, the one counting them errs and calls the tenth animal the ninth and the eleventh the tenth, they are both sanctified. The animal that actually emerges tenth is the animal tithe, while the eleventh animal is consecrated as a peace offering. And since this halakha of a substitution of its name applies only to the animal tithe, it is necessary to teach that the general halakha of the substitution of its body, i.e., regular substitution, applies to it as well.

לוֹמַר לְךָ: תְּמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ – קְרֵיבָה, תְּמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ – אֵינָהּ קְרֵיבָה. תְּמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ – נִגְאֶלֶת, תְּמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ – אֵינָהּ נִגְאֶלֶת.

Furthermore, the verse tells you other halakhot unique to the animal tithe: An animal that is the substitute of the name of an animal tithe is sacrificed upon the altar as a peace offering, whereas the substitute of its body is not sacrificed at all. But for all other offerings, substitutes hold the same status as the animal for which they were substituted. Another difference is that the substitute of the name of an animal tithe is redeemed when it develops a blemish, like a peace offering, and the proceeds of the sale belong to the Temple treasury, whereas the substitute of its body is not redeemed, as it is stated with regard to the animal tithe: “Then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred; it shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33).

תְּמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ – חָלָה עַל דָּבָר הָרָאוּי וְעַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי, וּתְמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ – אֵינָהּ חָלָה אֶלָּא עַל דָּבָר הָרָאוּי בִּלְבַד.

Finally, the sanctity of the substitution of the body of an animal tithe takes effect upon both an item that is fit for sacrifice upon the altar and upon an item that is unfit for sacrifice, but the substitution of its name takes effect only upon an item that is fit for sacrifice. If the animal that was mistakenly called the tenth is blemished, it is not consecrated.

אָמְרִי: מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ תְּמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ, אִיגְרוּעֵי אִיגְרַע? אִין, דְּאָמְרִינַן: מַאי דְּרַבִּי – רַבִּי, וּמַאי דְּלָא רַבִּי – לָא רַבִּי.

The Sages say in response to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Simply because the Merciful One includes a unique halakha with regard to the animal tithe, that it has the substitution of its name, would one assume that it is diminished, and the halakha of regular substitution does not apply to it? The Gemara answers: Yes, one can make such a claim, as we say: That which the verse included with regard to a particular halakha, it included, and that which it did not include, it did not include. Since the passage initially addresses substitution of name solely with regard to the animal tithe, one could assume that this is the only substitution that applies to it.

וְהָא מֵהֵיכָא תֵּיתֵי? אֲמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מִשּׁוּם דַּהֲוָה דָּבָר הַבָּא לִידּוֹן בַּדָּבָר הֶחָדָשׁ – וְאֵין בּוֹ אֶלָּא חִידּוּשׁוֹ בִּלְבַד.

The Gemara asks: And from where would this be derived, that in this case we should assume only that which is specifically mentioned? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is derived since this is a case of a matter, i.e., the animal tithe, where the Torah comes to discuss a novel matter, i.e., substitution of name, and as a rule, in such cases the object of discussion has only its novelty, and one cannot infer the applicability of additional principles. It was therefore necessary for a verse to teach that substitution of body, which applies to all other offerings, applies to the animal tithe as well.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק לְרָבָא: לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דַּאֲמַר דָּבָר הַבָּא בְּחוֹבָה, עוֹלַת חוֹבָה – הִיא דְּעָבְדָה תְּמוּרָה, הָא עוֹלַת נְדָבָה – לָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עוֹלַת נְדָבָה נַמִי, כֵּיוָן דְּקִבְּלָהּ עֲלֵיהּ – עָבְדָה תְּמוּרָה,

§ Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said earlier that the halakha of substitution applies only to offerings that come as an obligation, should one conclude that it is only an obligatory burnt offering that renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute, but a voluntary burnt offering does not? Rava said to him: A voluntary burnt offering also falls under the category of obligatory offerings. Since he accepted upon himself to bring a voluntary burnt offering, it is considered an obligation for him, and therefore it renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute.

וְלָא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת.

Rava adds: And this qualification mentioned by Rabbi Shimon is necessary only to exclude a burnt offering that came from surplus funds. halakha of substitution does not apply to such an animal.

מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר לָהּ כְּמַאן דַּאֲמַר מוֹתָרוֹת לְנִדְבַת צִבּוּר אָזְלִי – פְּשִׁיטָא דְּלָא עָבְדָה תְּמוּרָה, הָא אֵין תְּמוּרָה בְּצִבּוּר!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: The Sages disputed the use of surplus money. Some say that it must go toward the purchase of communal burnt offerings, whereas Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the owner himself must purchase a voluntary burnt offering. What does Rabbi Shimon hold in this regard? If he holds in accordance with the one who said that these surplus funds go toward communal gift offerings, then it is obvious that this offering does not render a substitute, as it is explicitly taught that there is no substitution with regard to a communal offering. Rabbi Shimon’s statement would then be redundant.

אֶלָּא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ כְּמַאן דַּאֲמַר מוֹתָרוֹת לְנִדְבַת יָחִיד אָזְלִי. מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ הַאי סְבָרָא – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הָא שָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ בְּהֶדְיָא דְּעָבְדָה תְּמוּרָה! דְּתַנְיָא: עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת – עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר!

Rather, say that Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the one who said that these surplus funds go toward the voluntary burnt offering of an individual. But this too is problematic, as whom did you hear who holds this reasoning? It is Rabbi Eliezer, but we heard that Rabbi Eliezer explicitly stated that such an animal renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute. As it is taught in a baraita: A burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal that is exchanged for it consecrated as a substitute. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבַר לָהּ כְּוָתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא, וּפָלֵיג עֲלֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא. דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סְבַר: עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת – עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה, וְאִיהוּ סְבַר: אֵין עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one matter, that surplus funds go toward an individual voluntary burnt offering, and disagrees with him with regard to another matter, as Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, and he, Rabbi Shimon, maintains that it does not render it a substitute.

אִי הָכִי, דְּבָעֲיָא רַבִּי אָבִין: הִפְרִישׁ אָשָׁם לְהִתְכַּפֵּר בּוֹ, וְהֵמִיר בּוֹ, וְנִתְכַּפֵּר בְּאָשָׁם אַחֵר, וְנִיתַּק זֶה לְעוֹלָה, מַהוּ שֶׁיַּחֲזוֹר וְיָמִיר בּוֹ?

The Gemara objects: If so, consider that dilemma raised by Rabbi Avin: If one separated an animal as a guilt offering by which to achieve atonement, and he effected substitution for it, and then that original guilt offering developed a blemish and he redeemed it with another animal, which he subsequently lost, and the owner achieved atonement by bringing yet another animal as a guilt offering; and then this lost animal was found and consigned to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, what is the halakha as to whether he can again effect substitution for it? In this case, the animal in question is a burnt offering that came from surplus funds.

אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן? אִילֵימָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – הָא אָמְרַתְּ: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת אֵין עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה!

In accordance with whose opinion was this dilemma raised? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, you said that Rabbi Shimon maintains that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. There would therefore be no dilemma at all. This is problematic, because the dilemma assumes that one cannot effect substitution twice for the same animal, which is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

רַבִּי אָבִין הָכִי קָמִיבָּעֲיָא לֵיהּ: אִי מַשְׁכַּחַת תַּנָּא דְּקָאֵי כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דַּאֲמַר אֵין מְמִירִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְמִירִין, וּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דַּאֲמַר עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה, מַהוּ שֶׁיַּחֲזוֹר וְיָמִיר בּוֹ?

The Gemara explains that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Avin was raising: If a tanna is found who holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that one cannot effect substitution once and again effect substitution for the same consecrated animal, and he also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, what is his opinion as to whether one can again effect substitution with the animal in question?

בִּשְׁנֵי גוּפִין וּקְדוּשָּׁה אַחַת מַאי?

As explained earlier (9b), Rabbi Avin’s dilemma was first posed with regard to two bodies, i.e., two different animals, and one type of sanctity, e.g., in a case where one separated an animal as a guilt offering, and he effected substitution for it, and the animal he separated as a guilt offering developed a blemish and he redeemed it with another animal, which assumed the same status of a guilt offering. What is the halakha as to whether one can substitute for this replacement? Do we say that since it is a different animal from the one for which he initially effected substitution, the second substitution is effective? Or perhaps, since it possesses the same sanctity as the original animal, one cannot effect substitution for it.

וְאִם תִּימְצָא לוֹמַר קְדוּשָּׁה אַחַת (אוֹ לֹא), אֶלָּא שְׁתֵּי קְדוּשּׁוֹת וְגוּף אֶחָד מַאי? תִּיבָּעֵי. הדרן עלך הכל ממירין

And then Rabbi Avin further asked: If you say that in the above case one cannot effect substitution for the animal, perhaps this is only because the two animals possess one sanctity. But in a case of two sanctities and one body, what is the halakha? For example, if one consecrated a guilt offering and effected substitution for it, and he subsequently lost it and atoned using another animal, and he then found it again, such that the original animal must now be consigned to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, does one say that since the animal now possesses a different sanctity he can effect further substitution for it? The Gemara concludes: According to that tanna, the dilemma remains unresolved [tiba’ei].