וְיָלֵיף סוֹף הֶקְדֵּשׁ מִתְּחִילַּת הֶקְדֵּשׁ, מַה תְּחִילַּת הֶקְדֵּשׁ – יוֹרֵשׁ מֵימַר, אַף סוֹף הֶקְדֵּשׁ – יוֹרֵשׁ סוֹמֵךְ.

And he derives the halakhot of the end of a consecrated animal from the initial consecration of the animal, as follows: Just as with regard to the initial state of consecration of the animal, an inheritor can effect substitution, so too, with regard to the end of the consecrated animal, an inheritor places his hands on its head.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הַאי ״וְאִם הָמֵר יָמִיר״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הָאִשָּׁה. וְכִדְתַנְיָא: לְפִי שֶׁכָּל הָעִנְיָן כּוּלּוֹ אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא לְשׁוֹן זָכָר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא יַחֲלִיפֶנּוּ וְלֹא יָמִיר אֹתוֹ״, אִשָּׁה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְאִם הָמֵר יָמִיר״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הָאִשָּׁה.

The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that an inheritor is not able to effect substitution, what does he do with this repetitive language in the verse: “And if he shall at all substitute”? How does he interpret it? The Gemara answers: It serves to include a woman as able to effect substitution and to incur the penalty of forty lashes for doing so. And this is as it is taught in a baraita: Since the verses concerning the entire matter of substitution speak only in the masculine, as it is stated: “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute it” (Leviticus 27:10), from where is it derived that a woman is included? The verse states: “And if he shall at all substitute,” to include a woman.

וּלְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, אִשָּׁה מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״וְאִם״. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – ״וְאִם״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Meir, who derives a different halakha from that verse, from where does he derive that a woman is included? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the addition of the conjunction “and” in the verse: “And if he shall at all substitute.” And Rabbi Yehuda does not interpret the term “and if” as having any special significance.

וּבֵין רַבִּי מֵאִיר וּבֵין רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, טַעְמָא – דְּרַבִּי קְרָא לְאִשָּׁה, הָא לָא רַבְּיָיהּ קְרָא, הֲוָה אָמִינָא: כִּי עָבְדָא תְּמוּרָה – לָא לָקְיָא? וְהָאֲמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וְכֵן תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״אִישׁ אוֹ אִשָּׁה כִּי יַעֲשׂוּ מִכָּל חַטֹּאת הָאָדָם״ – הִשְׁוָה הַכָּתוּב אִשָּׁה לְאִישׁ לְכָל עוֹנָשִׁין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה!

The Gemara analyzes this dispute. And according to both the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the reason why a woman is included is that the verse explicitly includes a woman, either by adding a conjunction or by repetition of the verb. The Gemara asks: Should one infer that if the verse did not include a woman, I would say that when a woman performs an act of substitution she is not flogged? But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says, and so too the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, that when the verse states: “When a man or woman shall commit any sin that people commit” (Numbers 5:6), the verse equates a woman with a man with regard to all punishments of the Torah? Why, then, is there a need for the verse to include women in the prohibition against substitution?

אִיצְטְרִיךְ, מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי – עוֹנֶשׁ דְּשָׁוֶה בֵּין בְּיָחִיד בֵּין בְּצִבּוּר, אֲבָל הָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּעוֹנֶשׁ שֶׁאֵינָהּ שָׁוָה בַּכֹּל הוּא, דִּתְנַן: אֵין הַצִּבּוּר וְהַשּׁוּתָּפִין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה, אִשָּׁה נַמִי, כִּי עָבְדָא – לָא לָקְיָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the verse to include women specifically, lest you say that this statement that equates women with men in general refers only to a punishment that applies equally to an individual and to the public. But here, since it is a punishment that does not apply equally to all, as we learned in a mishna (13a): The public and partners do not render an animal a substitute, one could claim that a woman as well, when she performs an act of substitution, is not flogged. The verse therefore teaches us that she is in fact liable.

בָּעֵי רָמִי בַּר חָמָא: קָטָן מַהוּ שֶׁיָּמִיר? הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵימָא בְּקָטָן שֶׁלֹּא הִגִּיעַ לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים – לָא תִּיבָּעֵי לָךְ, דְּכֵיוָן אַקְדּוּשֵׁי לָא אַקְדֵּישׁ, אֲמוּרֵי מֵמִיר? אֶלָּא כִּי קָמִבָּעֲיָא לֵיהּ, בְּקָטָן שֶׁהִגִּיעַ לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים.

§ Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: With regard to a minor, what is the halakha? Is he able to effect substitution or not? The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances where this question arises? If we say that it is referring to a minor who has yet to reach the age of responsibility for his vows, i.e., twelve years and one day, you should not raise the dilemma, as since he cannot consecrate an animal by means of a vow, can he effect substitution? Rather, when he raises this dilemma, it is with regard to a minor who has reached the age of responsibility for his vows.

מִי אָמְרִינַן כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר מָר: ״אִישׁ״, מַה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כִּי יַפְלִיא נֶדֶר״ – לְרַבּוֹת מוּפְלָא הַסָּמוּךְ לְאִישׁ, דְּקָדְשׁוֹ קָדוֹשׁ. מִדְּאַקְדּוּשֵׁי מַקְדִּישׁ – אֲמוּרֵי נַמִי מֵמִיר. אוֹ דִּלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלָאו בַּר עוֹנָשִׁין הוּא – בִּתְמוּרָה לָא מִיתְפִּיס?

The Gemara explains the dilemma: Do we say that a minor can effect substitution, since the Master said with regard to consecration: The verse states: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 30:3). What is the meaning when the verse states the unusual formulation: Shall clearly utter [yafli] a vow, instead of the more conventional term: Shall take a vow [yiddor]? This serves to include a discriminating minor [mufla] on the brink of adulthood, teaching that his consecration takes effect. Perhaps, from the fact that he can consecrate an animal, he can also effect substitution. Or perhaps, since no minor is subject to punishments, he cannot apply sanctity to an animal by an act of substitution, which would incur a punishment.

אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר: קָטָן עָבֵיד תְּמוּרָה – דְּהָא אָתֵי לִכְלַל עוֹנָשִׁין, גּוֹי מַהוּ שֶׁיָּמִיר? מִי אָמְרַתְּ, מִדְּאַקְדּוּשֵׁי מַקְדִּישׁ, דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״, מַה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַגּוֹיִם, שֶׁנּוֹדְרִים נְדָרִים וּנְדָבוֹת כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲמוּרֵי נַמִי מֵמִיר. אוֹ דִּלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא אָתֵי לִכְלַל עוֹנָשִׁין, כִּי עָבֵיד תְּמוּרָה – לָא קָדְשָׁה?

And even if you say that a minor can perform substitution, as he will come to an age when he is subject to punishments, what is the halakha as to whether a gentile can effect substitution? Do you say that he can do so from the fact that his consecration takes effect, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Any man [ish ish]… that brings his offering.” What is the meaning when the verse states repetitively “ ish ish ”? This serves to include gentiles, teaching that they can take vows to bring vow offerings and gift offerings as a Jew can. he can effect substitution as well. Or perhaps, since he will not come to a time when he is subject to punishments, therefore when he performs an act of substitution, the animal is not consecrated.

אָמַר רָבָא: תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתַנְיָא, קָדְשֵׁי גוֹיִם – לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין, וְאֵין חַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶם מִשּׁוּם פִּיגּוּל נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא, אֵין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה, וְאֵין מְבִיאִין עֲלֵיהֶם נְסָכִים, אֲבָל קָרְבָּנוֹ טָעוּן נְסָכִים. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

Rava says: Come and hear, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Zevaḥim 5:6): With regard to animals consecrated by gentiles, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them, he is not liable for misuse of consecrated property after the fact. And if one consumes them one is not liable for committing a transgression with regard to the prohibitions of piggul if they were sacrificed with the intent to consume them beyond their designated time, of notar if he consumed them beyond their designated time, and of consuming ritually impure offerings cannot render a non-sacred animal a substitute for one they consecrate. And one does not bring libations for the offerings of a gentile but his offering requires libations. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: בְּכוּלָּן אֲנִי רוֹאֶה לְהַחְמִיר, בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בְּקָדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ, אֲבָל בְּקָדְשֵׁי בֶדֶק הַבַּיִת – מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן. קָתָנֵי מִיהָא ״אֵין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה״!

Rabbi Yosei said: With regard to all of them I see fit to be stringent. In what case is this statement, that Rabbi Shimon exempts animals consecrated by gentiles from liability for misuse, said? It is said with regard to animals consecrated for the altar, i.e., offerings; but with regard to animals consecrated for Temple maintenance, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property. Rava notes: In any event, the baraita teaches that gentiles cannot render an animal a substitute for his offering.

וְרָמִי בַּר חָמָא, בְּהִקְדִּישׁ גּוֹי לְהִתְכַּפֵּר גּוֹי – לָא קָמִיבָּעֲיָא לִי, כִּי קָמִיבָּעֲיָא לִי – בְּהִקְדִּישׁ גּוֹי וּמִתְכַּפֵּר בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל. בָּתַר מַקְדִּישׁ אָזְלִינַן, אוֹ בָּתַר מִתְכַּפֵּר אָזְלִינַן?

The Gemara responds: And Rami bar Ḥama can say: I do not raise a dilemma in a case where a gentile consecrated an animal as an offering for a gentile such as himself to achieve atonement. In this case the baraita rules explicitly that he cannot effect substitution. When I raise the dilemma, it is in a case where a gentile consecrated an animal as an offering and a Jew achieves atonement with it. In this situation, do we follow the one who consecrated it, in which case the gentile cannot effect substitution, or do we follow the one achieving atonement, in which case he can?

תִּיפְשׁוֹט לֵיהּ מִדְּרַבִּי אַבָּהוּ, דַּאֲמַר רַבִּי אַבָּהוּ, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ – מוֹסִיף חוֹמֶשׁ, וּמִתְכַּפֵּר – עוֹשֶׂה תְּמוּרָה, וְהַתּוֹרֵם מִשֶּׁלּוֹ

The Gemara suggests: Solve this dilemma by invoking a statement of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one consecrates an animal as an offering to be brought by another, and the animal develops a blemish disqualifying it for sacrifice, if the one who consecrated it desires to redeem it, he adds one-fifth to its value, just as he would were it his own offering. By contrast, if the one achieving atonement with the offering desires to redeem it, he does not need to add one-fifth. But the one achieving atonement with the offering can render another animal a substitute for it as if he had consecrated it. And if one separates teruma, the portion of produce designated for a priest, from his own produce