הַמְשַׁחְרֵר חֲצִי עַבְדּוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, גִּיטּוֹ וְיָדוֹ בָּאִין כְּאַחַת.

With regard to a master who emancipates half of his slave, half of the slave is emancipated, and he is a half-slave half-freeman. Although a slave does not have the ability to acquire items, in this case he does acquire his freedom because his bill of manumission and his ability to acquire himself come at the same time.

וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ: שִׁיְּירוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, עוּבָּר לָאו יֶרֶךְ אִמּוֹ הוּא, אַמַּאי זָכְתָה לוֹ? וְהָא תַּנְיָא: נִרְאִין שֶׁהָעֶבֶד זוֹכֶה לְקַבֵּל גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ מִיַּד רַבּוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, וְלֹא מִיַּד רַבּוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ. אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינָּהּ: אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ אֵינוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, וּתְיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, תְּיוּבְתָּא.

But if you say that if one reserved a consecration it is considered reserved, and a fetus is not considered the thigh of its mother, but the mother and the fetus are separate entities, why does the mother acquire freedom for the fetus in a case where the master freed the fetus but not the mother? The Gemara continues: And isn’t it taught in a baraita: It appears to be the case that a slave can acquire a bill of manumission for another slave from the hand of his fellow’s master who is not also his own master, but not from the hand of his own master, i.e., not if both of them are enslaved to the same person. Here too, how can the mother receive the bill of manumission for the fetus from the hand of their shared master? Rather, conclude from it that if he reserved a consecration it is not considered reserved, and the refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is indeed a conclusive refutation.

לֵימָא אִם שִׁיְּירוּ מְשׁוּיָּיר תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא, הָאוֹמֵר לְשִׁפְחָתוֹ ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ בַּת חוֹרִין, וּוְלָדֵךְ עֶבֶד״ – וְלָדָהּ כָּמוֹהָ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״הָאִשָּׁה וִילָדֶיהָ תִּהְיֶה לַאֲדֹנֶיהָ״.

The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the claim that if one reserved a consecration it is reserved is subject to a dispute between tanna’im? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to his pregnant Canaanite maidservant: You are hereby a free woman but your offspring shall remain a slave, the offspring is emancipated like her. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. And the Rabbis say: His statement is upheld. This is because it is stated: “The woman and her children shall be her master’s” (Exodus 21:4).

קְרָא מַאי תַּלְמוּדָא לְרַבָּנַן? אֲמַר רָבָא: אֲמַר קְרָא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, דְּקָתָנֵי: וְלָדָהּ כָּמוֹהָ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הָאִשָּׁה וִילָדֶיהָ תִּהְיֶה לַאֲדֹנֶיהָ״, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה לַאֲדוֹנֶיהָ – וְלָדָהּ לַאֲדוֹנֶיהָ.

The Gemara expresses surprise at this ruling: What is the derivation of the verse here that indicates support for the opinion of the Rabbis, who rule in this case that the child of a freed maidservant remains a slave? Rava said: The verse does not support the opinion of the Rabbis; rather, the verse that the baraita states is cited as support for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, as it teaches, i.e., the baraita should be understood as follows: The offspring is emancipated like her, as it is stated: “The woman and her children shall be her master’s,” which indicates that when the woman belongs to the master her offspring likewise belongs to the master, but if the woman is freed the offspring is also freed.

מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: שִׁיְּירוֹ אֵינוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מְשׁוּיָּיר?

What, is it not correct to say that the Sages disagree over this point, that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that if he reserved it, it is not considered reserved, and therefore the mother and the fetus are treated as one entity, and the Rabbis maintain that it is considered reserved. If so, this would mean that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im.

אֲמַר לָךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא – שִׁיְּירוּ מְשׁוּיָּיר. וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעֲמָא, דַּאֲמַר קְרָא ״הָאִשָּׁה וִילָדֶיהָ תִּהְיֶה לַאֲדֹנֶיהָ״.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you that everyone holds that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved, and here this is the reason that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili rules that the offspring is freed with the mother, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili himself explains: It is that the verse states: “The woman and her children shall be her master’s.” This verse teaches that the status of the offspring follows the status of the mother with regard to slavery, but not because the fetus is considered a part of its mother.

אֶלָּא וַדַּאי לֵימָא כִּי הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַחַטָּאת וּמָצָא בָּהּ בֶּן אַרְבָּעָה חַי. תָּנֵי חֲדָא: אֵין נֶאֱכֶלֶת אֶלָּא לְזִכְרֵי כְהוּנָּה, וְאֵינָהּ נֶאֱכֶלֶת אֶלָּא לְיוֹם אֶחָד, וְאֵינָהּ נֶאֱכֶלֶת אֶלָּא לִפְנִים מִן הַקְּלָעִים.

Rather, certainly we shall say that the opinion that if he reserved it, it is reserved, is subject to a dispute between these tanna’im, as it is taught that there are two baraitot that discuss the case of one who slaughters a sin offering, which is assumed to have been consecrated when it was pregnant, and he found a four-month-old fetus alive inside. It is taught in one baraita: The slaughter of the mother is also considered a slaughter with regard to the fetus, and therefore the fetus is considered a sin offering. This means that its meat is eaten only by males of the priesthood, and it is eaten only for one day, and it is eaten only inside the curtains. In the Tabernacle in the wilderness this area was surrounded by curtains. The corresponding area in the Temple is the courtyard.

וְתַנְיָא אִידָךְ: נֶאֱכֶלֶת לְכָל אָדָם, וְנֶאֱכֶלֶת בְּכָל מָקוֹם, וְנֶאֱכֶלֶת לְעוֹלָם.

And it is taught in another baraita: The slaughter of the mother is also considered a slaughter for the fetus to the extent that it permits it to be eaten, but the fetus is non-sacred, and therefore it may be eaten by any person, and may be eaten in any place, and may be eaten forever, with no time limit.

מַאי לָאו תַּנָּאֵי, דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: שִׁיְּירוֹ אֵינוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, וּמָר סָבַר: שִׁיְּירוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר.

What, is it not correct to say that these tanna’im disagree over this point, that the first tanna holds: If he reserved it, it is not considered reserved, and therefore the mother and the fetus are considered one entity and the status of the mother applies to the fetus; and the Sage in the second baraita holds: If he reserved it, it is considered reserved, which means that the fetus is considered an independent entity and is non-sacred. If so, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im.

אֲמַר לָךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, וְהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: וְלָדֵי קֳדָשִׁים – בַּהֲוָיָיתָן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁים, וּמָר סָבַר, וְלָדֵי קֳדָשִׁים – בִּמְעֵי אִמָּן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁים.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rabbi Yoḥanan could say to you that everyone holds that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved, and therefore a person can consecrate an animal while reserving the fetus as non-sacred. And these tanna’im disagree over this following point: In the case of an animal that was consecrated as a sin offering and only then became pregnant, one Sage holds: The offspring of sacrificial animals become consecrated when they are born and come into being, and as that fetus which was found alive inside the mother was never born, it never became consecrated. And one Sage holds: The offspring of sacrificial animals become consecrated in the womb of their mother, which means that the fetus that was found alive inside the mother was already consecrated.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן – בְּשֶׁהִקְדִּישָׁהּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִתְעַבְּרָה,

If you wish, say instead an alternative explanation of the dispute between these two baraitot: It is not difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan. Everyone holds that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved, and everyone also maintains that offspring of sacrificial animals become consecrated when they are born. Rather, these two baraitot are discussing two different cases. Here, the second baraita is referring to a case where the owner consecrated the animal before it became pregnant and only afterward it became pregnant. Consequently, the offspring is non-sacred, as it was not in the womb when the mother was consecrated, and as it was never born, it was not consecrated at the moment of birth either.

כָּאן – בְּשֶׁנִּתְעַבְּרָה וּלְבַסּוֹף הִקְדִּישָׁהּ.

By contrast, there, the first baraita is referring to a case where the animal first became pregnant and afterward the owner consecrated it. Since the owner did not reserve the fetus from the consecration of the mother, the fetus was consecrated as a sin offering together with the mother.

מַתְקִיף לָהּ רָבָא: מִמַּאי דְּטַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, דִּלְמָא הַיְינוּ טַעֲמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דְּאָדָם מִתְכַּפֵּר בִּשְׁבַח הֶקְדֵּשׁ?

Rava objects to this claim: From where is it known that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved? Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that if he reserved it, it is not considered reserved, and this is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is that one can achieve atonement with the offspring of a pregnant animal he set aside as a sin offering, as he maintains that a person can achieve atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property, and the fetus is considered an enhancement of consecrated property.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הַמְנוּנָא: רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר תַּלְמִידֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְיָתֵיב לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְלָא אַהֲדַר לֵיהּ הַאי שִׁינּוּיָא, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ טַעֲמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם דְּאָדָם מִתְכַּפֵּר בִּשְׁבַח הֶקְדֵּשׁ?!

Rav Hamnuna said to Rava: Rabbi Elazar was the pupil of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and he sat before Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rabbi Elazar assumed that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan was that he held that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved, and he questioned Rabbi Yoḥanan himself about his statement based on that assumption. And Rabbi Yoḥanan did not answer him with this answer, i.e., that the real reason for his opinion is that a person can achieve atonement with an enhancement of consecrated property. And if so, how can you say that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that a person can achieve atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property? Therefore, it must be that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that he held that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved.

״אִם מִשֶּׁאָמַר הֲרֵי זוֹ שְׁלָמִים נִמְלַךְ״ כו׳. פְּשִׁיטָא וְלָדָן שְׁלָמִים, אֶלָּא כָּל אֵימַת דְּבָעֵי מִימְלַךְ?

§ The mishna teaches: And if it was only after he said: This animal is hereby a peace offering, that he reconsidered and said: Its offspring is a burnt offering, that offspring is a peace offering, as before he reconsidered the offspring had already assumed the status of the offspring of a peace offering. The Gemara asks: If he reconsidered after saying: This animal is a peace offering, it is obvious that he cannot remove the status he already applied to the animal, and that the offspring remains a peace offering. Can one change his mind anytime that he wants?

אֲמַר רַב פַּפָּא: לָא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא שֶׁאָמַר בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר, וְהַאי עַיּיוּנֵי הוּא דְּקָמְעַיֵּין – קָא מַשְׁמַע לָן.

Rav Pappa said: This halakha is necessary only in a case where he reconsidered and said: Its offspring is a burnt offering, within the time required for speaking a short phrase. Lest you say: The halakhic status of a pause that lasts less than the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, and therefore the offspring is a burnt offering, and that time he was merely prolonging his thought but not changing his mind; consequently, the mishna teaches us that he changed his mind and it is not considered continuous speech.

מתני׳ ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

If one had two animals standing before him, one a burnt offering and the other a peace offering, and he said with regard to a third, non-sacred animal: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, the substitute of the peace offering, that animal is the substitute of the burnt offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Once he designated it as the substitute of the burnt offering, his initial statement takes effect and the animal assumes the sanctity of the burnt offering.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אִם לָכֵן נִתְכַּוֵּין תְּחִלָּה, הוֹאִיל וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִקְרוֹת שְׁנֵי שֵׁמוֹת כְּאַחַת – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִים. וְאִם מִשֶּׁאָמַר ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה״, נִמְלַךְ וְאָמַר ״תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה.

Rabbi Yosei said: If that was his intent from the outset, when he said that the animal is the substitute of the burnt offering, to state that the animal is also the substitute of the peace offering, then since it is impossible to call two designations simultaneously, i.e., one must first say one designation and then the other, his statement stands, and the animal is half a burnt offering and half a peace offering. And if it was only after he said: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, that he reconsidered and said: The substitute of the peace offering, that entire animal is the substitute of the burnt offering.